Over the last few years, the youth unemployment rate has continuously decreased in all WB economies. However, it varies from economy to economy and remains higher compared to EU member states. The highest youth unemployment rate is in North Macedonia, at 34.9%, while the lowest is in Kosovo* – 21.4%. According to Eurostat datafrom November 2023, youth unemployment in the EU stands at 14.5%. A decade ago, this rate was roughly 24%. How did youth unemployment decrease by approximately 10% over the past 10 years in the EU despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other crises affecting the European labour market?
Throughout 2013, the Youth Guarantee programme was initiated by the European Commission and was adopted by the European Council in the same year. The Youth Guarantee is the political commitment of all EU member states to provide all young people aged 15 to 29 with an offer of employment, an apprenticeship, internship, volunteering, or further education within four months of completing formal education or losing employment. The Youth Guarantee is a commitment of all relevant sectors in the country, including the executive authorities, employment agencies, civil society organisations, and the business sector, i.e. employers. The main goal of the programme is the inclusion of NEET youth, that is, those not in employment, education, or training.
With the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans published by the European Commission in October 2020, the Youth Guarantee programme became an obligation for Western Balkan economies aspiring to EU membership. They committed to implementing this programme, as stated in the Western Balkans Declaration on the Sustainable Integration of Youth into the Labour Market, adopted at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the European Union – Western Balkans held on 8 July 2021, in Slovenia. Western Balkan economies are at different stages of implementing the Youth Guarantee programme. North Macedonia, which initiated the programme in 2018, is the most successful regional example. Implementation plans for the Youth Guarantee have been adopted in Serbia, Kosovo*, and Albania, while Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still awaiting adoption.
As mentioned earlier, North Macedonia is the most successful country in the region in implementing the Youth Guarantee. From 2017 to 2019, youth unemployment decreased by nearly 9%. The new Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee for the period 2023-2026 was adopted by the Government of North Macedonia in March 2023. North Macedonia has set a target of 30%, meaning it considers the Youth Guarantee successful if a minimum of 30% of young people who go through the programme find employment, apprenticeships, volunteering, or further education and training within a four-month period. Out of 19,322 young people who participated in the Youth Guarantee programme in 2021, 41% were granted opportunities for employment, volunteering, or further education. In 2022, over 20,000 youths participated in the programme, and 43% were successful in securing employment or opportunities for training once they had completed the programme. Therefore, North Macedonia is considered exceptionally successful in implementing this programme, having achieved and exceeded the set goal of 30%.
Despite the successful integration of a large number of programme participants into the labour market, the implementation of the Youth Guarantee also contributes to strengthening institutions. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is the main driver of the implementation process, and a Coordination Council for the Youth Guarantee has been established to oversee the programme’s implementation. However, the youth unemployment rate in North Macedonia in 2022 stood at 34.9%, which is still nearly double the EU average, standing at 14.5%, and remains the highest youth unemployment rate in the entire region. The European Commission Progress Report on North Macedonia for 2023, states that active labour market measures and the Youth Guarantee programme are currently inadequately monitored, evaluated, and assessed. A key challenge of programme implementation is the limited financial resources the Government of North Macedonia is unable to secure.
The Youth Guarantee in Serbia has been recognised in the new National Employment Strategy for the period 2021-2026 and the Youth Strategy adopted in January 2023. The youth unemployment rate in Serbia for the year 2022 stood at 24.9%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET youth – those not employed, not in the educational system, nor in training – stood at roughly 15%. In late December 2023, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee. The pilot programme will be conducted in three branches of the National Employment Service – in Kruševac, Sremska Mitrovica, and Niš – from January 2024 to the end of 2026. The aim is to expand the programme across the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. During the EU Opportunities Week in 2023, the Republic of Serbia and the European Union signed a financial assistance agreement amounting to EUR 5.5 million, directed towards the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. This funding is specifically for piloting the programme in the mentioned three branches. Institutions in Serbia emphasise that there are currently insufficient capacities for the implementation of this programme throughout the entire country, but full implementation of the programme at the national level is one of the main priorities of the Operational Programme within IPA III 2023-2027. The programme is led by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans, and Social Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, which has established a Coordination Body to develop and monitor the implementation plan for the Youth Guarantee. They have also formed an Expert Group to carry out preparatory activities.
Kosovo* is still in the early preparatory phase regarding negotiating Chapter 19, which pertains to social policy and employment. However, the European Commission Progress Report on Kosovo* for 2023 notes that some progress has been made in preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, following the Implementation Plan adopted in November 2022. The report emphasises the need to continue with the Implementation Plan and creating conditions for piloting the programme in two municipalities – Mitrovica and Uroševac. The youth unemployment rate in Kosovo* saw a remarkable decrease of 16.6% in 2022. In 2021, the rate was 38%, dropping to 21.4% in 2022. The Employment Agency of Kosovo* is undergoing restructuring to enable the implementation of the programme. However, the European Commission’s report highlights the significant challenge of a lack of human resources in public employment services and an outdated information system.
According to the European Commission Progress Report on Albania for 2023, preparations for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme have progressed. It is deemed necessary to commence piloting the programme to enable its implementation across the entire country. Albania has adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee as an annex to the new National Youth Strategy for the period 2023-2030. The overall process is led by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Albania. The youth unemployment rate for 2022 stood at 27.8%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) youth stood at 23.4%.
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only countries in the region that have not yet adopted the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. The youth unemployment rate in Montenegro stood at 28.3% in May 2023. According to the Progress Report for Montenegro in 2023, the European Commission recommends strengthening the Employment Agency and preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. A Working Group for the Youth Guarantee programme has been formed to enhance the draft Implementation Plan, collaborating with experts from the International Labour Organisation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked last in the region relative to implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme. The Progress Report of the European Commission on Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2023, highlights that limited progress has been made regarding the finalisation and adoption of the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. In October 2023, the Employment Strategy in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2023-2030 was finally adopted, recognising the Youth Guarantee as a completely new youth employment model. The lengthy process of its adoption represented a major obstacle to the Youth Guarantee programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The programme’s pilot phase has already begun, with two smaller municipalities, Visoko and Čitluk, chosen for the pilot. After the pilot phase, expansion across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected. At the national level, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the implementation process, while the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is in charge of implementing the programme in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Information about the Youth Guarantee in the Republika Srpska entity is not available on the internet, nor is it mentioned in the annual reports of the European Commission. The youth unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the highest in the entire region, reaching 33.47% for the year 2022.
The key to the successful implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme lies in the intensive collaboration of all sectors in the country—from the governments responsible for providing financial resources for implementation to employers and civil society organisations. Once the Employment Strategy is adopted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina will adopt the Implementation Plan in the coming period. We hope that this will be followed by Montenegro, allowing all economies in the region to implement this ambitious programme for young people across their territories in the coming years. However, strong political will from all governments in the region will be essential for this, as only they can secure financial support for successful implementation.
Author: Nemanja Ivanović, Youth Activist and Member of the Governing Board of the Social Democratic Party
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Poslednjih nekoliko godina smanjuje se stopa nezaposlenoosti mladih u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, ali varira od zemlje do zemlje i još uvek je veća u odnosu na zemlje članice Evropske unije. Najveća stopa nezaposlenosti mladih je u Severnoj Makedoniji i iznosi 34,9%, dok je najniža na Kosovu* – 21,4%. Prema podacima Eurostata iz novembra 2023. godine, nezaposlenost mladih na nivou EU iznosi 14,5%. Pre 10 godina, ta stopa bila je oko 24%. Kako je došlo do smanjenja nezaposlenost mladih za oko 10% u proteklih 10 godina na nivou EU i pored izbijanja pandemije COVID-19, rata u Ukrajini i drugih kriza koje su ostavile posledice na evropsko tržište rada?
Tokom 2013. godine iniciran je program Garancija za mlade od strane Evropske komisije, a iste godine usvojio ga je i Evropski savet. Garancija za mlade je politička obaveza svih zemalja članica EU da svim mladim osobama od 15 do 29 godina obezbede ponudu za posao, pripravnički staž, volontiranje ili mogućnosti daljeg školovanja i to u roku od četiri meseca nakon završetka formalnog obrazovanja ili gubitka zaposlenja. Garancija za mlade je obaveza svih relevantnih sektora u zemlji – izvršne vlasti i zavoda za zapošljavanje, organizacija civilnog društva i biznis sektora, odnosno poslodavaca. Glavni cilj Programa je inkluzija NEET mladih, odnosno onih koji nisu zaposleni, nisu u sistemu obrazovanja, niti su na obuci.
Ekonomsko-investicionim planom za Zapadni Balkan objavljenim od strane Evropske komisije u oktobru 2020. godine, program Garancija za mlade postao je obaveza i za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana koje su kandidati za članstvo u EU. Obavezale su se na sprovođenje ovog Programa i na Drugom ministarskom sastanku Evropska unija – Zapadni Balkan, održanom 8. jula 2021. godine u Sloveniji, usvajanjem Deklaracije Zapadnog Balkana o održivoj integraciji mladih na tržište rada. Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana nalaze se u različitim fazama implementacije programa Garancija za mlade. Severna Makedonija, koja je još 2018. godine započela uvođenje ovog programa, predstavlja najuspešniji primer u regionu. Planovi implementacije Garancije za mlade usvojeni su u Srbiji, Kosovu* i Albaniji, dok Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina još uvek čekaju na usvajanje.
Kao što je već pomenuto, Severna Makedonija je najuspešnija zemlja u regionu kada je reč o implementaciji Garancije za mlade. U periodu od 2017. do 2019. godine nezaposlenost mladih smanjena je za oko 9%. Novi Plan za sprovođenje Garancije za mlade za period 2023-2026 Vlada Severne Makedonije usvojila je u martu 2023. godine. Severna Makedonija je postavila cilj od 30%, odnosno da se Garancija za mlade smatra uspešnom ako minimum 30% mladih koji prođu kroz Program dobiju zaposlenje, pripravnički staž, volontiranje ili mogućnost daljeg školovanja i usavršavanja u roku od 4 meseca. Od 19.322 mladih koji su tokom 2021. učestvovali u programu Garancija za mlade, 41% njih dobilo je priliku za zaposlednje, volontiranje ili usavršavanje. Tokom 2022. više od 20.000 mladih ljudi učestvovalo je u Programu, pri čemu je 43% njih nakon završetka programa uspešno pronašlo zaposlenje ili mogućnost za obuku. Stoga se smatra da je Severna Makedonija izuzetno uspešna u implementaciji ovog Programa, jer je uspela da dostigne i premaši postavljeni cilj od 30%.
Pored uspešnog uključivanja velikog broja učesnika Programa na tržište rada, implementacija Garancije za mlade doprinosi i jačanju institucija. Nosilac procesa implementacije je Ministarstvo rada i socijalne politike, a osnovan je i Koordinacioni savet za Garanciju za mlade čija je nadležnost nadgledanje sprovođenja ovog Programa. Ipak, procenat nezaposlenosti mladih u Severnoj Makedoniji u 2022. godini iznosio je 34,9%, što je i dalje skoro duplo više u odnosu na prosek u zemljama Evropske unije koji iznosi 14,5%, a ujedno je i najveća stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u celom regionu. U izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Severne Makedonije za 2023, navodi se da aktivne mere tržišta rada i program Garancija za mlade trenutno nisu dovoljno praćeni, evaluirani i procenjeni. Ključan izazov u implementaciji Programa je ograničenost finansijskih sredstava, koje Vlada Severne Makedonije nije u mogućnosti da obezbedi.
Garancija za mlade u Srbiji prepoznata je u novoj Nacionalnoj strategiji zapošljavanja za period 2021-2026 i Strategiji za mlade usvojenoj u januaru 2023. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u Srbiji za 2022. godinu iznosila je 24,9%, dok je stopa nezaposlenosti tzv. NEET mladih – onih koji nisu zaposleni, nisu u obrazovnom sistemu niti na obuci oko 15%. Krajem decembra 2023. godine Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila je Implementacioni plan Garancija za mlade. Pilotiranje programa u tri filijale Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje – Kruševcu, Sremskoj Mitrovici i Nišu trajaće od januara 2024. do kraja 2026. godine, sa ciljem proširenja programa na celu teritoriju Republike Srbije. Za vreme trajanja EU nedelje mogućnosti 2023. godine, Republika Srbija i Evropska unija potpisale su sporazum o finansijskoj pomoći u iznosu od 5,5 miliona evra koja je usmerena na implementaciju Garancije za mlade, odnosno za pilotiranje programa u pomenute tri filijale. Institucije u Srbiji ističu da trenutno ne postoje kapaciteti za realizaciju ovog programa na teritoriji cele Srbije, ali puna primena Programa na nacionalnom nivou je jedan od glavnih prioriteta Operativnog programa u okviru IPA III 2023-2027. Nosilac programa je Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalna pitanja Vlade Republike Srbije, koje je formiralo Koordinaciono telo za izradu i praćenje sprovođenja Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade, kao i Stručnu grupu za realizaciju pripremnih aktivnosti.
Kosovo* se još uvek nalazi u ranoj pripremnoj fazi kada je reč o pregovaračkom poglavlju 19 koje se odnosi na socijalnu politiku i zapošljavanje. Ipak, u Izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Kosova* za 2023. godinu napominje se da je postignut određeni napredak kada je reč o pripremama za implementaciju Garancije za mlade u skladu sa Implementacionim planom koji je usvojen u novembru 2022. godine. U Izveštaju se navodi da je neophodno nastaviti sa sprovođenjem Plana implementacije i obezbeđivanju uslova za pilotiranje programa u dve opštine – Mitrovica i Uroševac. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih na Kosovu* je tokom 2022. smanjena za neverovatnih 16,6% – 2021. godine taj procenat iznosio je 38%, dok se 2022. smanjio na 21,4%. Zavod za zapošljavanje Kosova* je u fazi restrukturiranja kako bi se ta institucija osposobila za implementaciju Programa. Ipak, u Izveštaju Evropske komisije ističe se da je najveći problem nedostatak ljudskih resursa u javnim službama za zapošljavanje, kao i zastareli informacioni sistem.
U izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Albanije za 2023. godinu navodi se da su pripreme za implementaciju Programa napredovale, te da je neophodno započeti pilotiranje programa kako bi se omogućila implementacija Programa na teritoriji cele zemlje. Albanija je usvojila Plan implementacije programa Garancija za mlade kao Aneks nove Nacionalne strategije za mlade za period 2023-2030. Nosilac celokupnog procesa je Ministarstvo finansija i ekonomije Republike Albanije. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih tokom 2022. bila je 27,8%, dok stopa nezaposlenosti tzv. NEET mladih iznosi 23,4%.
Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina su jedine zemlje u regionu koje još uvek nisu usvojile Plan implementacije Garancije za mlade. Udeo nezaposlenosti mladih u Crnoj Gori u maju 2023. iznosio je 28,3%. Prema Izveštaju o napretku Crne Gore za 2023, preporuke Evropske komisije su da se ojača Zavod za zapošljavanje i pripremi za sprovođenje Garancije za mlade. Formirana je Radna grupa za program Garancija za mlade sa ciljem unapređenja nacrta Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade, koja radi i sa stručnjacima iz Međunarodne organizacije rada.
Bosna i Hercegovina je poslednja zemlja u regionu kada je u pitanju sprovođenje programa Garancija za mlade. U Izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine za 2023. godinu ističe se da je postignut ograničen napredak kada je reč o finalizaciji i usvajanju Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade. U oktobru 2023. konačno je usvojena Strategija zapošljavanja u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine za period 2023-2030, koja prepoznaje Garanciju za mlade kao potpuno novi model zapošljavanja mladih, a dugačak proces njenog usvajanja predstavljao je glavnu prepreku za program Garancija za mlade u Bosni i Hercegovini. Pilotiranje programa je već počelo, a za pilot opštine izabrane su dve manje sredine Visoko i Čitluk. Nakon pilotiranja programa očekuje se proširenje na celu teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine. Na nacionalnom nivou Ministarstvo civilnih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine je nosilac procesa implementacije Programa, dok je za implementaciju programa u Federaciji BiH nadležno Federalno ministarstvo rada i socijalne politike. Informacije o Garanciji za mlade u entitetu Republika Srpska nije moguće pronaći na internetu, niti se pominju u godišnjim izveštajima Evropske komisije. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u Bosni i Hercegovini najveća je u celom regionu i iznosi 33,47% za 2022. godinu.
Ključ uspešne primene programa Garancija za mlade leži u intenzivnoj saradnji svih sektora u zemlji – od izvršne vlasti koja je dužna da obezbedi finansijska sredstva za implementaciju, preko poslodavaca, pa sve do OCD. Nakon usvajanja Strategije zapošljavanja u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine očekuje se da će i Bosna i Hercegovina u narednom periodu usvojiti Plan implementacije, koju će, nadamo se, slediti i Crna Gora, kako bi sve zemlje regiona u narednim godinama mogle da primenjuju ovaj ambiciozni program za mlade na celoj teritoriji. Ipak, za to će biti neophodna snažna politička volja svih vlada u regonu, jer samo one mogu da obezbede finansijsku podršku za uspešnu implementaciju.
Nemanja Ivanović, omladinski aktivista i član Glavnog odbora Socijaldemokratske stranke
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Tackling climate requires ambition and inclusivity. Climate crisis in no exception. Some progress is made on ambition. Constant failure is noted on inclusivity.
WB Green Agenda is no exception.
Introduction
The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, is a growth strategy developed for the region, which aims to address challenges related to climate change and green transition. It is developed based on the European Green Deal which aims to achieve “no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050, economic growth decoupled from resource use, and no person and no place left behind”. Implementation of the WB Green Agenda is supported by the Economic Investment Plan and further detailed by the Guidelines issued by the European Commission.
By signing the Sofia Declaration, countries of the region committed to implement the Green Agenda, whereas the Regional Cooperation Council will keep the torchlit of implementation, by also developing an action plan. The Green Agenda, includes five main pillars: climate, energy and mobility; circular economy; pollution prevention; sustainable agriculture and food production; and biodiversity.
Why is the Green Agenda important for the Western Balkans?
The Western Balkans comprises six countries and as a region it has a pristine landscape and a wealth of natural resources. It is, however, one of the most vulnerable regions to the negative consequences of climate change. From raising temperatures, to floods and fires, communities and governments are attesting the challenges, which are no longer distant.
It is now well-known that climate change does not have borders and ambitions under the European Green Deal cannot be achieved only within EU – calling for cross-border cooperation. This is when the WB Green Agenda comes into play. Its implementation, however, requires complex changes in the field of legislation, strategic planning, implementation, and monitoring.
It is also known that tackling the climate crisis requires both ambition and inclusivity.
While sometimes progress is made is announcing impressing ambitions, when it comes to inclusivity, failure has become a pattern.
Lack of meaningful youth engagement
Youth is one of the most vulnerable target groups of climate change and thus the sustainability agenda in general. Because of the actions of previous generations, young people are facing direct and indirect effects on their physical and mental health, but also on their socio-economic conditions.
In some countries, young people represent the largest share of the population. They are also the future. Which should make their meaningful engagement a priority.
In many countries, youth has taken a leading role in the climate action with Greta Thunberg becoming the face of powerful demonstration and the voice of many communities. Elsewhere, groups of young people are taking government to the courts, through strategic litigation efforts.
Many international bodies are taking concrete steps to engage with youth within the sustainability agenda. Although in many cases these steps appearing to be tokenistic, rather than providing for meaningful engagement, they still provide the basis of inclusivity.
The WB Green Agenda provides little opportunities for youth engagement, despite the vast potential.
The Guidelines provide that: “With proper information and education, the youth of the region can contribute decisively to the implementation of the Green Agenda. The European Green Deal will also have to be translated into the different components of Erasmus+, the EU flagship programme for education available in the region.”
Whereas the Action Plan, indicates that: “Another significant actor in the GAWB implementation is youth, as important change agent. It is the youth who will be most affected by the actions of today, particularly concerning the climate emergency, nature crisis, waste management and so forth.”
The Action Plan also vests the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) and the Youth Lab of RCC, as the main partners for ‘cooperation in this area’. However, both of these key documents fail to elaborate on concrete measures for the meaningful engagement of youth.
Such lack of meaningful youth engagement is recognized by young people themselves, as indicated in the Berlin Declaration of the Western Balkans Youth Forum 2022: “We request to be involved and acknowledged as key-partners in all phases of policy making that will arise from the implementation of the Green Agenda.”
During the WB Youth Forum in 2023, held in parallel to the Berlin Summit, young people across the region embarked on a train ride (the Balkan Youth Express) to discuss and agree on action points for the implementation of the Berlin Declaration, including the Green Agenda. Amongst others, one of the most interesting proposals is to establish ‘green seats’ within the Local Youth Councils, which would support implementation of green agenda in local level and also foster regional cooperation between councils in the region.
All in all, their proposals confirm two things: (i) good awareness of the challenges under the sustainability agenda and (ii) failure of decision makers to meaningfully engage with youth.
Such proposals are also a call for reflection.
Listen, listen again… and take action!
Youth engagement requires consistent efforts to incorporate youth perspectives across all stages of decision-making. Invitation to participate in ‘soft’ issues such as awareness-raising campaigns does not amount to meaningful engagement, rather risks of being tokenizing. With the increasing access to information, young people can be involved in topics such as energy transition or climate finance and come up with creative solutions, based on system thinking methodologies.
Youth can drive progress, by being fearless and push for radical change, from the streets to the courts and everywhere in between. This calls for the need to address intersectionality and address systemic settings that hinder youth engagement – including often-times patronizing behaviour.
In the context of WB Green Agenda, stakeholders can address some of these challenges, but it appears that little is done so far. Regional institutions such as RCC and RYCO can set the agenda and channel adequate resources towards the empowerment of youth within the WB Green Agenda, but only few projects are doing so, reconfirming the pattern of putting sustainability on the bottom of the priorities’ pyramid.
About the Author
Armando Bode is a senior lawyer and manager. He practiced law for 7 years, worked as Private Sector Partnerships & Programme Manager for the UK Government and held various research and teaching positions. Armando studied law at the University of Tirana and holds a LLM from the University of Westminster. His research areas are sustainable development, responsible business conduct and multi-stakeholder partnerships.
*This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Academy of European Integrations and Negotiations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
During the last decade the European integration process of the Western Balkans has proceeded rather slowly, leading to disappointment and disillusion among the local population. The governments’ delivering on reform agendas has been characterized of hiccup progress and over time thousands of people –many highly qualified- have decided to move out of their countries and settle for study or work purposes in EU member states.
According to Eurostat, out of 236.000 first residence permits issued by the EU member states in 2021 to Western Balkan and Turkish citizens, 23% are Albanians, followed by 19% Serbians and 14% from Bosnia and Herzegovina. When compared to the residence permits issued back in 2013, the figures are almost doubled, with a constant haemorrhage of work force moving out of the region. Focusing particularly on Albania, the preferred destinations of the last five years remain Germany and France, with respectively almost 77.000 and 33.000 new residence permits issued only in 2021.
In front of the Russian aggression still ongoing in Ukraine, the reinvigoration of the enlargement process in 2023 has provided for an opportunity to defy the status quo in the region. In particular, the Berlin Process is moving forward the promotion of enlargement objectives in the Balkans, thanks also to the Union’s recently adopted growth plan for the region. The Berlin Process seeks to provide a concrete mechanism that can push forward the operationalization of regional cooperation in concrete policy areas among the six countries.
By focusing on concrete initiatives that transversally cross the interests of the countries of the region, the Berlin Process today is paving the way towards the regional economic integration, as well as to its prospective integration into the EU Single Market – considered a clear carrot for the reforms. This is a significative development that can contribute to delineating a revived perspective for the younger generations to remain in their countries. Aware that the EU membership will take time, via the sectoral integration in the EU Single Market, the region’s inhabitants will have the chance to ripe off the first benefits from the implementation of the four freedoms, namely the freedom of movement of citizens, goods, capitals and services.
Regional mobility agreements
The coupling of the current demographic decline and youth migration trends from the region has raised serious concerns not only for the work and life perspective of the younger generations, but also for the future of the WB6 countries and the region in a mid- to long-term perspective. The WB6 leaders to a certain extent have understood that there is no time left to lose and the moment has come to turn their verbal promises into tangible results.
“Our young people want a brighter, more optimistic future. A future that is fair, prosperous and full of opportunities”, declared Charles Michel, President of the European Council, during the Summit of the leaders in Tirana on 15 October.
The Chair’s Conclusions adopted at the 2023 summit recognize that the advancement of a gradual integration at the regional level of the WB6 education, science and youth policies, as well as within the wider EU space, reflects a grounded demand raised by the youngsters in different occasions. In this regard, the Western Balkans Youth Forum declaration 2023 -an annual event that sees the participation of youth representatives from the region-, highlights two essential cross-cutting themes, namely the issue of quality education and youth mobility.
Reinforcing connectivity in education matters remains key to derail from the current worrying trends in the Western Balkans, as well as to fuelling hope that everyone can be a “European citizen” in his/her home country. The improvement of existing practices and boosting of new regional initiatives are expected to positively affect young people’s skills development and civic participation, with positive spill-over effects on greater public awareness and democracy enhancement at the domestic level.
At the Summit of Sofia back in November 2020, the WB6 governments, facilitated by the European Commission, embarked on the establishment of a Common Regional Market, which mirrors the Union’s single market and related four freedoms. In this framework, after two years of negotiations, in 2022 it was made possible the signature of three mobility agreements, namely: (i) on recognition of higher education qualifications; (ii) on recognition of professional qualifications for doctors of medicine, dentists and architects; and, (iii) on freedom of movement with identity cards. A fourth agreement on the recognition of professional qualifications for nurses, veterinary surgeons, midwives and pharmacists was signed during this year’s summit of the Berlin Process in Tirana.
The recognition of higher education qualifications in multiple countries in the wider European space remains a vital development for many professionals, since it facilitates brain circulation, capacity-building as well as integration in other local societies beyond the national borders. In the globalized context where we are living in, ensuring the adoption of such practices is two-fold convenient for any government, as it opens up the local market to incoming specialized fluxes of professionals as well as it contributes to its integration to those of other economies. Nonetheless, the direct beneficiaries of these agreements are young professionals in the early stage of their career, who seek to gain international experience, technical knowledge and new skills, in line with the requests of the job market.
The signature of these agreements is seen as a breakthrough for region’s cooperation and economic integration, which fosters trust between the local societies and overcomes ethnic divisions and hate. The inclusion of these agreements within the wider framework of Common Regional Market sends a positive signal to the constituencies that there is a political will to bring forward the process of deeper regional economic integration and create new opportunities for the younger generations.
“The concerted efforts we put towards mutual recognition of a new set of professions, which now amount to 7 in total, fully based on EU rules – is another symbolic entry ticket to the single market as it can be a crucial step towards recognition of professional qualifications with the EU”, noted Majlinda Bregu, Secretary General of Regional Cooperation Council.
The removal of obstacles for these categories of professionals and the free movement with ID cards contribute to boosting region’s competitiveness and growth, as a first step towards the greater ambition to join the EU Single Market. The process of economic growth and competitiveness, expansion of the regional job market goes hand in hand with the human resources’ development.
In this perspective, an important contribution is expected from the recently adopted New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which targets the economic convergence of the region. Within this ambitious plan of measures, which is accompanied by a 6 billion euros financial envelop, due attention has been paid to the pillars on the free movement of services and workers. The priority action on the recognition of skills and qualifications between the WB6 and the EU builds on the four mobility agreements already signed in the context of Common Regional Market, which will lead to wider a reduction of time and costs for the process as well as an equal treatment of those youngsters graduated in the WB countries and in the rest of the European space. This priority action makes it easier for youth to move abroad for study or mobility purposes, removing the existing barriers to learning and working. Furthermore, it contributes also to bringing closer the Balkan graduates with their peers around EU, and incentivizes the brain circulation process. Differently from the past, the future generations are expected to be more prone to acquiring new experiences in multiple countries throughout their lifespan, and the new knowledge can lead to positive spill-over effects for the WB6 convergence. Now it remains to be seen which are the specific measures that will encourage and financially support the youngsters to move in the region for given period of time. Certainly, some financial schemes are deemed essential for the spin off phase of regional mobility, which will later on generate new spill-over effects on the national economies.
The leaders of tomorrow: Better education and skills
2023 is being celebrated across Europe as the European Year of Skills, with the aim to boost a new momentum and specific attention to all those policy initiatives that promote quality education, technical knowledge as well as address skills shortage in the job market.
Under the Berlin Process framework, particular attention has been paid over time to youth, education and research, recognizing the importance that access to education and removal of barriers to learning are contributing factors to region’s overall development. On the same line stand also the Commission’s New Growth Plan that seeks to prioritize the shared commitment to include the Western Balkans in the wider European Education Area and bridge close cooperation between academic institutions.
An important advocacy work in this direction has been done by the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), a Balkan-wide non-governmental body born out of the Berlin Process. An analysis of RYCO annual youth forum conclusions shows that youth constantly demand for more empowerment and collaboration with the decision-makers so as to bring forward the issue of better education, which in turn would allow for greater chances of employment and better quality of life.
As noted also in the Chair’s Conclusions of 2023, region’s youth recognize the importance of and underlines the need to take actions on “strengthening and expanding current regional mechanisms and EU schemes to further benefit youth mobility and cultural exchanges in the Western Balkans”. Such investments would be beneficial for their personal skills development as well as general reconciliation of the region. However, none of such opportunities would be materialized if the region’s government do not allocate adequate funding to improving existing infrastructure and supporting the access of different categories of the society.
Quality education and accessibility should be offered to anyone, for a just and equal society. In this perspective, the opening of the third branch of the College of Europe in Tirana and the issuing of more than 15 scholarships out of 31 places is commendable since it allows greater accessibility based on personal achievements and merits. The postgraduate studies at the College will both prepare new professionals on the EU integration process -a sensitive issue for the current public administrations of the Balkans that suffer from a lack of skills-, as well as will bring closer youngsters coming from the region and beyond. Moreover, it is a new initiative to reverse the general trend of educational mobility, as the region’s youth is not the only one migrating for study purposes in the EU member states, but also their citizens are coming to the Balkans. While in political terms this new trend contributes to the improvement of the image of the region, in practice it is also beneficial for mutual cooperation and understanding.
One step at a time
The signature of three agreements on the recognition of the higher education qualifications and given professional qualifications marks a positive step forward, since it facilitates the administrative procedures for the recognition of the degree in the other countries. Once the agreements enter into force, the approval process will last up to fourteen days and there will be no processing fees for the applicants. The main beneficiaries will be the students, academic staff and in general professionals interested in acquiring new experiences and technical skills in the region. The specific procedures of diploma recognition in each country will be made available in the respective websites of the ministries dealing with education portfolio, once the agreements enter into force.
The higher the mobility of human resources in the region is expected to lead to greater competitiveness between the countries, pushing so each government to invest more in making the respective country more attractive in terms of social security benefits, improved working conditions, competitive wages, etc.
Furthermore, in face of the digitalisation process that is currently taking place in Europe, particular categories of professionals active in the IT sector can be among the first beneficiaries of the mobility agreements, since the request for such expertise and technical capacities ranks high in the Balkans and beyond.
At the moment, the ratification of the mobility agreements is progressing, although initially with a slow pace. This year’s agreement concerning nurses, pharmacists, etc. has not entered yet the ratification procedures in any of the six countries. Whereas regarding the previous three agreements, Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia have successfully concluded the ratification process. In the case of Montenegro, the three agreements got ratified by the parliament in mid-December 2023 and within a short period of time the President will sign them. Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation is somehow more complexed due to the multi-level governing system between the national authorities and the federations. Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded the ratification process of the two agreements on the recognition of academic qualifications and of the professional qualifications of doctors of medicine, dentists and architects, but there is no progress regarding the one on travelling with ID cards. The resistance comes from the authorities of Republika Srpska due to the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence Herzegovina.
In conclusion, young people from the region and youth organizations in general should continue to monitor and advocate for a swift ratification and implementation of the mobility agreements. This is only a first step that will allow to the young professionals to start gaining some experience and skills in the region. The second step is to continue advocating for financial supporting schemes that allow to everyone to participate in the educational and/or professional experiences in the region, besides the recognition of the social security contributions accumulated during one’s temporary stays in the six countries of the region.
About the Author
Gentiola Madhi works as researcher and media writer at OBC Transeuropa in Italy. She has an extensive research experience in the Balkans, focusing on regional cooperation and European integration process, with a particular attention on youth and civil society dimension. Gentiola is part of the first cohort of AIEN alumni and regularly contributes with policy analyses and talks. She graduated from the College of Europe (Belgium) and the University of Florence (Italy).
*This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Academy of European Integrations and Negotiations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
The realisation of the rights of young people to actively participate in the decision-making process is an integral part of every developed democratic society and is guaranteed by the European Charter on the Participation of Young People at the Local and Regional Levels adopted by the Council of Europe. Young people have the right, and should have the opportunity, to fully participate in decision-making that affects their lives at the local and/or regional level.
However, due to the insufficient democratic capacity of WB countries, still burdened by the legacy of the last decade of the 20th century, young people in the entire region have very little trust in state institutions and political organisations. Despite the existence of a normative and institutional framework, young people are inadequately represented in institutions and lack an encouraging framework for participating in decision-making processes. Therefore, civil society organisations in the region play a crucial role in mobilising young people for political and social participation.
What is youth participation and why is it important?
In his well-known work Children’s Participation: From tokenism to citizenship, published by UNICEF in 1992, Roger Hart developed the so-called Hart’s ladder of youth participation with 8 levels, which has gained widespread use in the field in the subsequent years. The term ‘participation,’ as used by the author, refers to the process of making decisions that affect one’s own life and the life of the community to which they belong (Hart, 1992). Hart also states that a nation is democratic to the extent that its citizens are involved in processes, particularly at the community level (Hart, 1992). The author believes that young people should be engaged in significant activities with adults, but it is unrealistic to expect them to become responsible overnight. At the ages of 16, 18, or 21, they cannot participate without acquiring skills and responsibilities, gradually, through practice. Hart also emphasises that the involvement of young people in decision-making processes is particularly important for those belonging to vulnerable groups. Through participation, they learn to combat discrimination and repression.
Roger Hart, like many other authors in this field, believes in the dual importance of genuine youth participation in these processes: internal development of the young person, acquiring critical thinking skills, and comparing perspectives necessary for forming beliefs, and the contribution to the democratisation of society. Barry Chechkoway shares the same view, asserting that participation in political and social processes contributes to improving the civil rights of young people, democratising society, promoting their personal development, and providing them with meaningful knowledge and practical skills (Chechkoway, 2011).
Maria Grasso bases the political participation of young people on a crucial division into conventional (voting in elections, membership in political parties) and unconventional forms of participation (participation in protests, signing petitions, etc.). In her work “Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises,” the author argues that young people are less active in conventional forms of participation compared to adults, while they are much more active in non-institutional models of participation, highlighting online activism as an increasingly important form of action (Grasso, 2018). She attributes the causes of this trend to the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008, as young people are perceived as the group most affected by the crisis. Young people are more inclined to choose non-institutional means because they are fluid, provide them with more freedom, and are linked to their identities.
Considering the above trend of young people moving away from conventional participation models, the Council of Europe commissioned a study in 2017 to identify alternative and innovative forms of youth participation. Anne Crowley and Dan Moxon, the authors of the study, found that young people are not apathetic and uninterested but are more inclined to participate in unconventional ways. Key findings indicate that co-management, co-production, digital participation, and deliberation represent innovative forms of participation for young people (Crowley & Moxon, 2017). Other global studies indicate that the majority of young people have a strong desire to actively engage with their community but lack sufficient knowledge concerning the decision-making process.
Youth Engagement at the European Level
Throughout the past decade, there has been talk of a crisis in European democracy, with many democratic policies worldwide facing challenges, as evidenced by the decline in traditional forms of political engagement, party membership, youth voter turnout, and the decline in electoral support for major parties. However, the last European Parliament elections held in 2019 were marked by higher youth turnout than in the previous period.
A Survey conducted by the European Youth Parliament in 2021 shows that nearly nine out of ten respondents (87%) have participated in at least one civic or political activity. Almost half of the respondents (46%) voted in the last local, national, or European elections, 42% initiated or signed a petition, while 24% participated in street protests or demonstrations. Approximately 29% of young people in the EU believe they have at least some influence on European policies, and this percentage increases to 44% where influencing local politics is in question.
The mechanism within the European Union that enables youth participation in decision-making processes is the EU Youth Dialogue, formerly known as the EU Structured Dialogue. It represents a consultative process between government representatives and young people, ensuring that the opinions and needs of youth are considered when adopting youth policies at the EU level. The EU does not have the mandate to create youth policies to replace those of its member states but consistently emphasises the importance of involving young generations and aims to formulate youth policies as responses to challenges faced by the youth.
It is worth noting that European research indicates that participants in Erasmus+ mobility projects for youth highlight a very clear and positive impact of their participation in projects on their competencies, behaviours, and values (Salto Youth, 2014). However, such projects have a significantly greater effect on young people with fewer opportunities, specifically those belonging to vulnerable groups. These projects contribute to the personal and professional development of participants, helping them appreciate cultural diversity and engage in decision-making processes on issues that affect their lives.
Western Balkans Youth – Passive Observers or Initiators of Change?
Legally, ‘youth’ are considered to be individuals between the ages of 15 to 29 in North Macedonia and Albania, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the term encompasses young people aged 15 to 30, and from 15 to 24 years of age in Kosovo*. The generations of young people in the region born in the 1990s and later are growing up in very turbulent social circumstances. As stated in a publication by the Regional Youth Participation and Dialogue Platform for the Balkans, young people in the region have become marginalised socially, economically, and politically. This has made them one of the most vulnerable social groups, significantly affected by the legacy of past conflicts and delayed transitions to democracy. Recent scientific research has shown that the social and political changes of the 1990s did not increase the chances of young people socially integrating or participating in decision-making processes. Engagement and active participation of young people are more than ever prerequisites for building democratic societies and ensuring peace and stability in the Western Balkans. Approximately half of the young people in the region do not see a perspective for staying in their country and wish to leave in the near future.
When discussing the passivity of youth in the context of civic and political activism, we refer to it from the perspective of conventional or traditional models of participation (membership in political parties, participation in elections, etc.). Young people in the region are now most easily and quickly mobilised through social networks, especially when they perceive an issue to be extremely important. All regional research in recent years shows that topics such as ecology and environmental protection are much more in their focus than before. Therefore, we can say that young people in the region largely participate in political and social processes, mainly through unconventional participation mechanisms such as participating in protests and engaging on social media (signing petitions, etc.). Civic and political engagement of young people through social networks may be insufficient, but it certainly expresses their desire to be actors in the political sphere whose voices need to be heard. Furthermore, online activism is not at the same level in all Western Balkan countries (e.g., it is much more significant in Serbia compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The Regional Youth Participation Index for the Western Balkans for 2021, presented as part of the regional project Western Balkan and Turkey for EmploYouth, supported by the EU, measures three dimensions of youth participation in public life: political, economic, and social participation. According to the report, the youth participation index is 69% for Serbia, 64.4% for Montenegro, 63.4% for Albania, and 63.2% for North Macedonia, out of a maximum of 100%. The project was not implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*, so there are no such data measured by unified indicators for all economies in the region. According to the aforementioned research, political participation indicates the degree of young people’s involvement in government bodies, the ability to obtain information and address state authorities, and the existence of youth institutions at local and national levels. Indicators of political participation include: a) the percentage of young ministers in the government; b) the percentage of assistant ministers in the government; c) the percentage of young members of parliament; d) the percentage of young mayors; e) the use of online tools for information and participation in decision-making processes of government, parliamentary institutions, and local self-government institutions; f) the existence of youth structures at the national and local levels (councils, parliaments, etc.). Regarding political participation of young people, Serbia has the highest level at 50.4%, while North Macedonia has the lowest at 40%. The index for Montenegro is 46.8%, and for Albania, it is 44.7%.
Young people are still insufficiently represented in political life in all economies covered by this Research. The number of young people in executive government roles in all economies is zero. During the research period, there were no ministers in the government and practically not a single mayor under the age of thirty. Deputy ministers under the age of thirty were present in Albania and Serbia only. The results for 2021 showed that in all countries, the majority of ministries and parliaments used online tools for public information, which is crucial for empowering young people for political participation. However, the report notes that the use of online tools by municipalities at the local level needs significant improvement in Albania and North Macedonia.
The above data indicate that all the economies in the surveyed region are far from reaching the goal. The Young Parliamentarians Forum of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a global organisation of national parliaments, has set a goal of achieving 15% of parliamentarians under the age of 30 by 2030. The highest number of parliamentarians in any of the countries in the region was recorded in Serbia, with a percentage of 11.2% in the 2020 term when 28 young parliamentarians were elected to the Parliament. In the current term of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (elected in 2022), out of a total of 250 members of parliament, only 9, or 3.6%, are young parliamentarians aged 15 to 29. Unfortunately, these numbers in our country don’t mean much, as their participation is mostly a formality, especially in terms of young parliamentarians from the ruling party. As Barry Chechkoway claims: “The quality of participation is not measured solely by its extent or the number of young people involved in activities but rather by the actual impact on the process and a specific decision that produces a favourable outcome for youth. Youth participation refers to their active engagement and real influence on processes, rather than their passive presence or symbolic roles in processes led by adults” (Chechkoway, 2011). After Serbia, the second-highest percentage of youth participation was recorded in Montenegro in 2018, reaching 8.6%. The highest registered percentage of young mayors in any of the countries in the last five years was 6% in Albania from 2016 to 2018, although this percentage has dropped to zero in the last three years, following the latest local elections.
According to the latest population census in Serbia from 2022, young people aged 15 to 29 make up 15.8% of the total population in Serbia, which is a decrease of nearly 4%, compared to the previous census. The Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth in the Republic of Serbia for 2023, regularly published by the National Youth Council of Serbia, shows that young people lack faith in any of the institutions examined in the study. The media, political parties, and political institutions – the President of the Republic, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia – stand out with the least trust. However, Serbia is the first non-European Union member country to establish the EU Youth Dialogue mechanism (formerly the Structured Dialogue), institutionalised through the work of the National Youth Council. The report also shows that young people in Serbia do not follow local politics and believe that the political system does not enable them to influence political processes and decisions. The fact that youths in Serbia have very little influence on the decision-making process is among the top five issues facing this group and has increased over the past six year by 10%. The majority of respondents participating in the study are not political party activists, while 23% of them are members of some form of association.
Nevertheless, all is not lost concerning youth activism in Serbia. When we discuss unconventional mechanisms of political participation, the situation is somewhat different, especially concerning ‘digital activism’. Young people in Serbia, students in particular, often organise and lead protest gatherings, as well as initiate and sign petitions or public initiatives. A relevant example is the student protests held in Serbia in July 2020, organised over social media when the authorities took the decision to evict them from student dormitories as a result of the worsening situation with the COVID-19 pandemic. Only a few hours had passed from the moment the first complaints were published on social media until the time the students took to the streets. Regarding petitions or public initiatives, over 46% of respondents in the National Youth Council of Serbia’s survey highlighted that they had signed petitions or public initiatives over the previous two years (e.g., at the EU level, this percentage is 42%). In addition to signing petitions, the percentage of participants who engaged in other political or social activities in the last two years is as follows:
42.4% of young people participated in a protest organised by an association, students, an informal group, or citizens.
19.4% of young people participated in forums.
12.5% of young people supported someone in elections (participation in a campaign, signing support).
7.4% of young people participated in a protest organised by a political party.
Respondents note that youth organisations improve the position of young people and encourage and stimulate their activism. However, they emphasise that youth organisations are not visible enough among young people, and student organisations often have a political background, leading to students’ disappointment and demotivation to participate in any other organisations.
In terms of Albania, a study by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Tirana from 2019 indicates that young people are distancing themselves from political parties, where 80% of respondents were not involved in parties either as members or activists.. Only 10.8% of them were members, while 9.2% were activists. Approximately 40% of young people in Albania had never been involved in public hearings or the signing of petitions. However, 23% of young people then expressed their belief that youth participation in the public sphere in Albania had increased. As in other Western Balkan economies, youth and other non-governmental organisations working with young people are considered key actors in the field and often serve to fill the gap in youth-related issues not covered by public institutions.
A similar situation is observed with young people in Kosovo*. Research indicates an extremely low level of trust among young people in Kosovar institutions, raising questions about their effectiveness and integrity. Youth organisations are active, but they operate mainly in large urban areas, while young people from rural areas are excluded from the processes. Despite efforts to increase youth participation and promote volunteering, the number of young people actively participating in society and volunteer work is very low. Existing mechanisms for direct youth participation in decision-making processes are deemed insufficient and ineffective.
In North Macedonia, young people generally believe that they cannot influence government decisions and do not participate to a satisfactory extent in social and political processes. According to a study conducted by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Skopje in 2019, 85% of young people stated that they had never been consulted by authorities, neither at the local or the national level. Nearly 71% of young people perceive themselves as socially inactive, with only 7% identifying as members of a political party. Approximately 90% of young people have never been part of a non-governmental organisation dealing with social issues. Approximately 70% of young people consider online activism more important than conventional participation mechanisms. Only 8% of young people have taken steps to address a specific social issue. However, the research shows that 64% of young people always vote in elections, even though every other young citizen does not believe that voting can influence the situation in the country.
According to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s research in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2018/2019, the majority of young respondents expressed that they have voted and consider it a civic duty. They have a clear understanding of their role in legitimising the rule of representative democracy but are generally politically uninvolved, whether in terms of participating in protests and petitions or working for political parties. Trust in political institutions, including the Presidency of BiH, the Parliamentary Assembly, the government, and political parties, is at an exceptionally low level. The specific way of direct participation in decision-making processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina also depends on which part of the country the young people come from. At the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no law on local self-government, as these laws are enacted at the entity level.
According to the latest Research and assessments of local policies related to youth and the needs of young people in 15 local self-governments in Montenegro, conducted by the Institute for Strategic Studies and Projections from Podgorica in 2022, on average, every other young inhabitant of Montenegro believes that young people are interested in being involved in decision-making on matters that directly impact them, and a quarter of young people state that they are very willing to participate in decision-making processes. However, they are not familiar with the mechanisms available to them for involvement in decision-making. The research has shown that the previous experience of young people is generally negative regarding participation in such activities, and involvement is formal, often limited to those already recognised as more active community members, or is carried out along political lines.
Despite their rebellious natures, young people in the WB region are alienated from politics and do not believe they can influence decision-making which impacts their future. They are distanced from political parties, with only a small percentage actively engaged political parties or organisations. Throughout the region, politics is generally viewed as a ‘dirty game’, a game young people do not wish to participate in. The poor functioning of democratic institutions, nepotism, corruption, and slow economic growth have contributed to a negative perception of political engagement among young people, leading to abstention as a form of resistance to the system. While their expectations are often justified, the Western Balkans youth need to understand that they are the main drivers of societal change and should participate in processes which have a direct or indirect impact on their quality of life. The world and everything in it belongs to the young.
Author: Andrea Trajković, Project Manager and Youth Activist
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Ostvarenje prava mladih da aktivno participiraju u procesu donošenja odluka je sastavni dio svakog razvijenog demokratskog društva i garantovano je Evropskom poveljom o učešću mladih na lokalnom i regionalnom nivou usvojenom od strane Savjeta Evrope. Mladi imaju pravo, a trebalo bi da imaju i priliku za punopravno učešće u donošenju odluka koje utiču na njihov život, a koje se donose na lokalnom ili regionalnom nivou.
Međutim, zbog nedovoljnog demokratskog kapaciteta zemalja Zapadnog Balkana koje su i dalje opterećene nasljeđem prošlosti iz posljednje decenije prošlog veka, mladi u celom regionu imaju veoma nizak nivo poverenja u državne institucije i političke organizacije. I pored postojanja normativnog i institucionalnog okvira, mladi nisu zastupljeni u institucijama i nemaju podsticajan okvir za učešće u procesima donošenja odluka. Stoga organizacije civilnog društva u regionu imaju važnu ulogu u mobilizaciji mladih za političku i društvenu participaciju.
Šta je participacija mladih i zašto je važna?
Rodžer Hart je u svom čuvenom delu Children’s Participation: From tokenism to citizenship, objavljenom od strane UNICEF-a 1992. godine, razvio tzv. Hartovu lestvicu participacije mladih na 8 nivoa, koja je ušla u široku upotrebu u predmetnoj oblasti u godinama koje su usledile. Pod terminom „učešće“ autor podrazumeva proces donošenja odluka koje utiču na sopstveni život i život zajednice kojoj se pripada (Hart, 1992). Hart, takođe, navodi da je nacija demokratska u onoj meri u kojoj su njeni građani uključeni u procese, posebno na nivou zajednice (Hart, 1992). Autor smatra da bi mladi trebalo da budu uključeni u značajne aktivnosti sa odraslima, ali da nije realno očekivati da oni mogu preko noći postati odgovorni, te sa 16, 18 ili 21 godinu učestvovati bez prethodnog sticanja veština i odgovornosti, već da se to može steći samo postepeno kroz praksu. Hart je, takođe, stava da je učešće mladih u procesu donošenja odluka posebno važno za one koji pripadaju osetljivim grupama, jer kroz učešće sa drugima uče da se bore protiv diskriminacije i represije.
Rodžer Hart je jedan od mnogobrojnih autora iz ove oblasti koji smatraju da postoji dvostruka važnost istinskog učešća mladih u ovim procesima: jedna je unutrašnji razvoj mlade osobe i sticanje veštine kritičkog razmišljanja i poređenja perspektiva koje su neophodne za formiranje uverenja, a druga je doprinos demokratizaciji društva. Istog stanovišta je i Barry Chechoway. On smatra da učešće u političkim i društvenim procesima doprinosi unapređenju građanskih prava mladih osoba i demokratizaciji društva, te promoviše njihov lični razvoj i obezbeđuje im sadržajna znanja i praktične veštine (Chechkoway, 2011).
Maria Grasso političku participaiju mladih zasniva na ključnoj podeli na konvencionalne (glasanje na izborima, članstvo u političkim partijama) i nekonvencionalne oblike participacije (učešće na protestima, potpisivanje peticija i sl.). U svom delu Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises autorka tvrdi da su mladi manje aktivni u konvencionalnim oblicima participacije u odnosu na odrasle, dok su mnogo više aktivni u vaninstitucionalnim modelima učešća, te posebno ističe online aktivizam kao sve važniji oblik delovanja (Grasso, 2018). Uzroke toga pripisuje svetskoj ekonomskoj krizi koja je nastupila 2008. godine, jer se mladi percipiraju kao grupa koju je kriza najviše pogodila. Mladi imaju veću sklonost da biraju neinstitucionalna sredstva zbog toga što su ona fluidna, daju im više slobode i povezuju se sa njihovim identitetima.
Imajući u vidu gore navedeni trend udaljavanja mladih od konvencionalnih modela participacije, Savet Evrope je 2017. godine poručio istraživanje o identifikaciji alternativnih i inovatinih oblika učešća mladih. Anne Crowley i Dan Moxon, autori istraživanja, došli su do nalaza da mladi nisu apatični i nezainteresovani, već im je bliže učešće na nekonvencionalne načine. Takođe, ključni nalazi su da zajedničko upravljanje, koprodukcija, digitalno učešće i deliberacija predstavljaju inovativne oblike učešća za mlade osobe (Crowley & Moxon, 2017). Druga istraživanja na svetskom nivou pokazuju da većina mladih ljudi ima snažnu želju da se aktivno bavi svojom zajednicom, ali nemaju dovoljno znanja o procesu donošenja odluka.
Angažman mladih na evropskom nivou
Još tokom protekle decenije govorilo se i o krizi evropske demokratije, te da su mnoge demokratske politike širom sveta u problemu, što dokazuje i pad tradicionalnih oblika političkog angažmana, članstva u partijama, izlaznosti mladih na izborima, kao i pad izborne podrške glavnim strankama. Ipak, poslednje izbore za Evropski parlament održane 2019. godine obeležila je veća izlaznost mladih nego što je to ranije bio slučaj.
Istraživanje koje je sproveo Evropski parlament mladih 2021. godine pokazuje da je skoro devet od deset ispitanika (87%) barem jednom učestvovalo u nekoj građanskoj ili političkoj aktivnosti. Skoro polovina ispitanika (46%) glasala je na poslednjim lokalnim, nacionalnim ili evropskim izborima, 42% njih je iniciralo ili potpisalo neku peticiju, dok je 24% ispitanika učestvovalo u uličnim protestima ili demonstracijama. Oko 29% mladih u EU smatra da ima barem neki uticaj na evropske politike, dok taj procenat ide i to 44% kada je u pitanju uticaj na politiku na lokalnom nivou.
Mehanizam koji na nivou Evropske unije omogućava učešće mladih u procesu donošenja odluka jeste EU Dijalog sa mladima, odnosno nekadašnji Strukturni dijalog EU, koji predstavlja konsultativni proces između predstavnika vlasti i mladih ljudi, te osigurava da mišljenje i potrebe mladih budu uzete u obzir prilikom usvajanja omladinskih politika na nivou EU. EU nema mandat da kreira omladinsku politiku koja bi mogla da zameni politike država članica, ali stalno naglašava važnost učešća mladih generacija i nastoji da formuliše omladinske politike kao odgovore na izazove sa kojima se mladi suočavaju.
Korisno je napomenuti da evropska istraživanja pokazuju da učesnici Erasmus+ projekata za mobilnost mladih ističu veoma jasan i pozitivan uticaj njihovog učešća na projektima na njihove kompetencije, ponašanje i vrednosti (Salto Youth, 2014). Ipak, ovakvi projekti imaju znatno veći efekat na mlade ljude sa manje mogućnosti, odnosno za one koji pripadaju osetljivim grupama. Ovakvi projekti doprinose ličnom i profesionalnom razvoju učesnika i pomažu im da cene kulturnu raznolikost i uključe se u procese donošenja odluka o pitanjima koja utiču na njihove živote.
Mladi u regionu Zapadnog Balkana – pasivni posmatrači ili inicijatori promena?
Zakonski posmatrano, pod kategorijom „mladi“ smatraju se osobe od 15 do 29 godina u Severnoj Makedoniji i Albaniji, dok u Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Srbiji taj uzrast obuhvata mlade od 15 do 30 godina, a na Kosovu* od 15 do 24 godine. Generacije mladih u regionu rođene 90-ih godina prošlog veka i kasnije odrastaju u veoma turbulentnim društvenim okolnostima. Kao što se navodi u publikaciji izrađenoj od strane Regionalne platforme za participaciju i dijalog mladih Balkana, mladi ljudi u regionu postali su marginalizovani – socijalno, ekonomski i politički, postajući tako jedna od najranjivijih društvenih kategorija u velikoj meri pogođena nasleđem sukoba iz prošlosti i odloženom tranzicijom ka demokratiji. Novija naučna istraživanja pokazala su da društvene i političke promene koje su se desile 90-ih godina nisu povećale šanse mladih da se društveno integrišu, niti da učestvuju u procesima donošenja odluka. Angažman i aktivno učešće mladih postaje više nego ikada preduslov za izgradnju demokratskih društava, kao i garancija mira i stabilnosti na Zapadnom Balkanu. Približno polovina mladih ljudi u regionu ne vidi perspektivu ostanka u svojoj zemlji i želi da je napusti u skorijoj budućnosti.
Kada govorimo o pasivizaciji mladih u kontekstu građanskog i političkog aktivizma, govorimo iz ugla konvencionalnih, odnosno tradicionalnih modela participacije (članstvo u političkim partijama, učešće na izborima i sl.). Mladi u regionu se danas najlakše i najbrže mobilizuju preko društvenih mreža, posebno kada su u pitanju određene teme koje oni percipiraju kao izuzetno važne. Sva regionalna istraživanja u poslednjih nekoliko godina pokazuju da su teme poput ekologije i zaštitne životne sredine mnogo više u njihovom fokusu nego što je to bio slučaj ranije. Stoga možemo da kažemo da mladi u regionu u velikoj meri participiraju u političkim i društvenim procesima uglavnom kroz nekonvencionalne mehanizme participacije poput učešća na protestima i angažovanjem na društvenim mrežama (potpisivanje peticija i sl.). Građanski i politički angažman mladih preko društvenih mreža možda nije dovoljan, ali svakako izražava njihovu težnju da budu akteri u političkoj sferi čiji glas treba da se čuje. Takođe, onlajn aktivizam nije na istom nivou u svim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana (npr. u Srbiji je mnogo veći u odnosu na Bosnu i Hercegovinu).
Regionalni indeks participacije mladih na Zapadnom Balkanu za 2021. godinu, predstavljen u okviru regionalnog projekta „Western Balkan and Turkey for EmploYouth“ podržanog od strane Evropske unije, kao jedinstveni metod praćenja učešća mladih u javnom životu meri tri dimenzije: političku, ekonomsku i društvenu participaciju mladih. Prema ovom izveštaju, indeks participacije mladih iznosi 69% za Srbiju, 64,4% za Crnu Goru, 63,4% za Albaniju i 63,2% za Severnu Makedoniju od maksimalnih 100%. Projekat nije realizovan u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu*, stoga ne postoje takvi podaci mereni jedinstvenim indikatorima za sve zemlje u regionu. Prema pomenutom istraživanju, politička participacija pokazuje stepen uključenosti mladih u organe vlasti, mogućnost dobijanja informacija i obraćanja državnim organima i postojanje omladinskih institucija u lokalnim i republičkim organima. Indikatori političke participacije su: a) procenat mladih ministara/ki u Vladi; b) procenat pomoćnika/ca ministara/ki u Vladi; c) procenat mladih poslanika/ca u Parlamentu; d) procenat mladih gradonačelnika/ca; e) korišćenje onlajn alata za informisanje i učešće u procesu donošenja odluka vladinih, skupštinskih institucija i institucija lokalne samouprave; f) postojanje omladinskih struktura na nacionalnom i lokalnom nivou (saveti, parlamenti, itd.). Kada govorimo o političkoj participaciji mladih, najviši nivo ima Srbija – 50,4%, a najniži Severna Makedonija – 40%. Indeks za Crnu Goru je 46,8%, dok za Albaniju iznosi 44,7%.
Mladi su i dalje nedovoljno zastupljeni u političkom životu u svim zemljama koje su bile obuhvaćene istraživanjem. Broj mladih u izvršnoj vlasti u svim zemljama je ravan nuli. Tokom perioda istraživanja nije bilo ministara u Vladi i skoro nijedan gradonačelnik ispod trideset godina u bilo kojoj od zemalja. Zamenici ministara mlađi od trideset godina bili su prisutni samo u Albaniji i Srbiji. Rezultati za 2021. godinu pokazali su da je u svim zemljama većina ministarstava i parlamenata koristila onlajn alate za informisanje javnosti, što je važno za osposobljavanje mladih za političku participaciju. Ipak, u izveštaju se navodi da korišćenje onlajn alata od strane opština na lokalnom nivou mora biti značajno poboljšano u Albaniji i Severnoj Makedoniji.
Gorenavedeni podaci govore da su sve zemlje u regionu koje su bile predmet istraživanja daleko od dostizanja cilja. Forum mladih parlamentaraca Interparlamentarne unije, globalne organizacije nacionalnih parlamenata, postavio je cilj od 15% poslanika mlađih od 30 godina koji treba da bude dostignut do 2030. godine. Najveći broj poslanika u bilo kojoj od zemalja u regionu registrovan je u Srbiji kada je taj procenat iznosio 11,2% i to u sazivu iz 2020. godine kada je 28 mladih poslanika i poslanica bilo izabrano u Parlament. U aktuelnom sazivu Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije (izabranom 2022. godine), od ukupno 250 narodnih poslanika, samo 9 njih, odnosno 3,6%, čine mladi poslanici od 15 do 29 godina. Nažalost, te brojke u našoj zemlji ne znače mnogo, jer se njihovo učešće uglavnom svodi na formalnost, naročito kada su u pitanju mladi poslanici i poslanice iz vladajuće partije. Kao što navodi Barry Chechoway: „Kvalitet učešća ne meri se samo njegovim obimom, odnosno brojem mladih koji učestvuju u aktivnostima, već se meri stvarnim uticajem na proces i određenu odluku koja proizvodi povoljan ishod po mlade. Učešće mladih odnosi se na njihovo aktivno angažovanje i stvaran uticaj na procese, a ne na njihovo pasivno prisustvo ili simbolične uloge u procesima koji vode odrasli“ (Chechkoway, 2011). Posle Srbije, najveći procenat učešća mladih zabeležen je u Crnoj Gori 2018. godine i iznosio je 8,6%. Najveći registrovani procenat mladih gradonačelnika u nekoj od zemalja u poslednjih pet godina bio je 6% u Albaniji u periodu od 2016. do 2018. godine, iako je u poslednje tri godine ovaj procenat pao na nulu nakon poslednjih lokalnih izbora.
Prema poslednjem popisu stanovništva u Srbiji iz 2022. godine, mladi od 15 do 29 godina čine 15,8 odsto ukupne populacije u Srbiji, što je smanjenje od skoro 4 odsto u odnosu na prethodni popis. Alternativni izveštaj o položaju i potrebama mladih u Republici Srbiji za 2023. godinu, koji redovno objavljuje Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije, pokazuje da mladi nemaju poverenja ni u jednu od institucija koje su ispitivane u istraživanju. Sa najmanjim poverenjem se ističu mediji, političke partije i političke institucije – predsednik Republike, Vlada Republike Srbije i Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. Ipak, Srbija je prva zemlja koja nije članica Evropske unije, koja je uspostavila mehanizam Dijaloga mladih u EU (nekadašnji Strukturni dijalog), koji je institucionalizovan kroz rad Nacionalnog saveta za mlade. Izveštaj, takođe, pokazuje da mladi u Srbiji ne prate politiku na lokalnom nivou, te da smatraju da im politički sistem ne omogućava da utiču na političke procese i odluke. Mali uticaj na proces donošenja odluka nalazi se među top pet problema sa kojima se suočavaju mladi u Srbiji i u poslednjih šest godina porastao je za 10%. Velika većina ispitanika koji su učestvovali u istraživanju nisu aktivisti političkih partija, dok su njih 23% članovi nekog udruženja.
Ipak, nije sve tako crno kada je u pitanju omladinski aktivizam u Srbiji. Kada govorimo o nekonvencionalnim mehanizmima političke participacije, situacija je nešto drugačija, posebno kada govorimo o „digitalnom aktivizmu“. Mladi u Srbiji, naročito studenti, često su organizatori i predvodnici protestnih skupova i inicijatori i potpisnici peticija ili narodnih inicijativa. Kao relevantan primer mogu da se navedu protesti studenata u Srbiji tokom jula 2020. godine, koji su organizovani na društvenim mrežama nakon odluke vlasti da budu iseljeni iz studentskih domova zbog pogoršanja situacije sa pandemijom COVID-19. Od izražavanja nezadovoljstva i poziva na društvenim mrežama do izlaska na ulice prošlo je samo nekoliko sati. Kada je reč o peticijama ili narodnim inicijativama, preko 46% ispitanika KOMS-ovog istraživanja istaklo je da su u prethodne dve godine učestvovali u potpisivanju neke peticije ili narodne inicijative (npr. na nivou EU taj procenat iznosi 42%). Procenat ispitanika KOMS-ovog istraživanja koji su, pored potpisivanja peticija, učestvovali u drugim političkim ili društvenim aktivnostima u poslednje dve godine iznosi:
42,4% mladih učestvovalo je u protestu koji je organizovan od strane nekog udruženja, studenata, neformalne grupe ili građana
19,4% mladih učestvovalo je na tribinama
12,5% mladih pružilo je podršku nekome na izborima (učešće u kampanji, potpis podrške)
7,4% mladih učestvovalo je u protestu koji je organizovan od strane neke političke partije
Ispitanici navode da omladinske organizacije unapređuju položaj mladih i ohrabruju i podstiču njihov aktivizam. Ipak, ističu da omladinske organizacije nisu dovoljno vidljive među mladima, kao i da studentske organizacije često imaju političku pozadinu, što dovodi do razočaranja studenata u njih i demotivišuće deluje na učešće u bilo kojim drugim organizacijama.
Kada je reč o Albaniji, istraživanje Vestminsterske fondacije za demokratiju u Tirani iz 2019.godine pokazalo je da su mladi distancirani od političkih partija, gde 80% ispitanika nije angažovano u partijama ni kao članovi niti kao aktivisti. Samo 10,8% njih su članovi, dok je 9,2% aktivista. Oko 40% mladih u Albaniji nikada nije bilo angažovano u javnom saslušanju ili potpisivanju peticija. Ipak, 23% mladih se tada izjasnilo da veruje da je povećano učešće mladih u javnom životu u Albaniji. Kao i u drugim zapadnobalkanskim zemljama, i u Albaniji se omladinske i druge nevladine organizacije koje rade sa mladima smatraju ključnim akterima na terenu i često služe da popune prazninu u pitanjima vezanim za mlade koja nisu pokrivena javnim institucijama.
Slična situacija je i sa mladima na Kosovu*. Istraživanja pokazuju izuzetno nizak nivo poverenja mladih u kosovske institucije, dovodeći u pitanje njihovu efikasnost i integritet. Omladinske organizacije civilnog društva su aktivne, ali one deluju u velikim urbanim sredinama, dok su mladi iz ruralnih područja isključeni iz procesa. Uprkos naporima da se poveća učešće mladih i promocija volontiranja, broj mladih koji učestvuju u društvu i volontiraju je veoma nizak. Postojeći mehanizmi za direktno učešće mladih u procesima donošenja odluka nisu dovoljni i efikasni.
I u Severnoj Makedoniji mladi uglavnom veruju da oni ne mogu uticati na odluke vlasti i ne učestvuju u zadovoljavajućoj meri u društvenim i političkim procesima. Prema istraživanju koje je 2019. godine sprovela Vestminsterska fondacija za demokratiju u Skoplju, 85% mladih je navelo da nikada nisu bili konsultovani od strane vlasti ni na lokalnom ni na nacionalnom nivou. Skoro 71% mladih sebe percipira kao društveno neaktivne, dok se samo 7% mladih izjasnilo da su članovi političke partije. Oko 90% mladih nikada nije bilo deo neke nevladine organizacije koja se bavi socijalnim pitanjima. Približno 70% mladih smatra da je onlajn aktivizam važniji od konvencionalnih mehanizama participacije. Samo 8% mladih preduzelo je neke korake da reši određeni društveni problem. Ipak, istraživanje pokazuje da 64% mladih navodi da uvek glasaju na izborima, iako svaki drugi mladi građanin ne veruje da glasanjem može da utiče na situaciju u zemlji.
Prema istraživanju Fridrih Ebert Fondacije u Bosni i Hercegovini za 2018/2019. godinu, većina mladih ispitanika se izjasnila da su glasali i smatraju to građanskom dužnošću. Oni imaju jasno razumevanje svoje uloge u legitimizaciji vladavine predstavničke demokratije, ali su pored glasanja slabo politički angažovani bilo u smislu učešća u protestima i peticijama ili rada za političke stranke. Poverenje u političke institucije, uključujući Predsedništvo BiH, Parlamentarnu skupštinu, vladu i političke stranke je na izuzetno niskom nivou. Specifičan način direktnog učešća u procesima odlučivanja u Bosni i Hercegovini zavisi i od toga iz kog dela države mladi dolaze. Na nivou Bosne i Hercegovine ne postoji zakon o lokalnoj samoupravi, već su ti zakoni doneti na nivou entiteta.
Prema najnovijem Istraživanju i procenama lokalnih politika koje se odnose na mlade i potrebe mladih u 15 lokalnih samouprava u Crnoj Gori, koje je sproveo Institut za strateške studije i projekcije iz Podgorice tokom 2022. godine, u proseku svaki drugi mladi građanin ili građanka Crne Gore smatra da su mladi zainteresovani da budu uključeni u donošenje odluka o stvarima koje ih se direktno tiču, a četvrtina mladih izjavljuje da je u velikoj meri spremna da učestvuje u procesima donošenja odluka. Takođe, ne poznaju mehanizme koji su im na raspolaganju za uključivanje u donošenje odluka. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je dosadašnje iskustvo mladih uglavnom negativno po pitanju učešća u takvim aktivnostima, a uključenost je formalna i svodi se na uključivanje onih koji su već prepoznati kao aktivniji članovi zajednice ili se vrši po političkoj liniji.
Iako buntovni, mladi ljudi u regionu Zapadnog Balkana otuđeni su od politike i ne veruju da mogu da utiču na donošenje odluka koje se tiču njihove budućnosti. Distancirani su od političkih partija, te je samo mali procenat njih angažovan u nekoj političkoj partiji ili organizaciji. U celom regionu dominantan je narativ da je politika „prljava igra“ u kojoj mladi ne žele da učestvuju. Slabo funkcionisanje demokratskih institucija, nepotizam, korupcija i spor ekonomski rast uticali su na negativnu percepciju političkog angažovanja kod mladih što je dovelo do apstinencije kao vida otpora mladih prema sistemu. Iako u velikoj meri opravdano imaju izneverena očekivanja, mladi u regionu treba da postanu svesni da su oni glavni nosioci promena u društvu i da treba da učestvuju u procesima koji direktno ili indirektno utiču na kvalitet njihovog života. Na mladima sve(t) ostaje.
Andrea Trajković, diplomirana projektna menadžerka i omladinska aktivistkinja
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
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