Proces evropskih integracija podstiče razvoj i transformaciju svih društvenih sfera i sa sobom nosi brojne političke, socijalne i ekonomske benefite za građane i građanke našeg regiona. Evropska unija je istovremeno i najvažniji politički partner zemalja Zapadnog Balkana i najveći donator i investitor u regionu, stoga često nije moguće napraviti jasnu distinkciju između političkih, ekonomskih i socijalnih benefita, jer su politički benefiti često i socijalni i ekonomski, dok su ekonomski benefiti uvek i politički. Ipak, imajući u vidu da je EU prvenstveno nastala kao ekonomska unija, očekivano je da najveće benefite EU integracija pronalazimo upravo u sferi ekonomije. Pogledajmo šta sve građani i građanke našeg regiona dobijaju zahvaljujući procesu EU integracija:
POLITIČKI BENEFITI
Politička stabilnost: Stvaranjem Evropske zajednice za ugalj i čelik 1951. godine institucionalizovan je mir u Evropi sklopljen 1945. godine. Evropska unija je 2012. godine postala dobitnica Nobelove nagrade za mir, odnosno za unapređenje mira, demokratije i ljudskih prava na evropskom kontinentu. U saopštenju Nobelovog komiteta naglašeno je da je odluka bila zasnovana na „stabilizacionoj ulozi koju je EU odigrala u procesu transformacije najvećeg dela Evrope od kontinenta rata do kontinenta mira“.[1] Stoga je politička stabilnost jedan od najvažnijih političkih benefita procesa evropskih integracija za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, jer je članstvo u EU garancija mira i stabilnosti za države članice, što je od izuzetnog značaja za zemlje našeg regiona koje još uvek nose teret ne tako daleke ratne prošlosti iz 90-ih godina prošlog veka.
Regionalna saradnja: Imajući u vidu prethodno navedeno, potrebno je istaći i benefit regionalne saradnje jer je pomirenje i rešavanje bilateralnih sporova između zemalja Zapadnog Balkana jedan od preduslova za ulazak u EU, što posledično doprinosi stabilnosti i miru u regionu. Ipak, regionom i dalje dominiraju nacionalistički narativi koji održavaju tenzije, a politički lideri svih zemalja u regionu ih zloupotrebljavaju u cilju dobijanja političkih poena na domaćem terenu, sprečavajući time građane i građanke da u potpunosti budu svesni benefita regionalne saradnje. Ipak, regionalna saradnja najbolje rezultate ostvaruje na polju ekonomskih integracija, o čemu će više reči biti u nastavku teksta.
Demokratske reforme, vladavina prava i funkcionalne institucije: Proces evropskih integracija zahteva sprovođenje temeljnih reformi koje podrazumevaju usklađivanje pravnog i političkog sistema zemalja Zapadnog Balkana sa sistemom Evropske unije u cilju jačanja demokratije i funkcionalnih i odgovornih institucija koje su u službi građana i građanki. Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana moraju uskladiti svoje pravne sisteme sa evropskim pravnim tekovinama, što podrazumeva jačanje vladavine prava, nezavisnosti pravosuđa, slobodu medija, zaštitu ljudskih i manjinskih prava, borbu protiv korupcije i druge važne oblasti.
SOCIJALNI BENEFITI
Sloboda građana i građanki da putuju, žive, rade i studiraju u EU: Punopravno članstvo u EU omogućilo bi slobodno kretanje građana i građanki zemalja Zapadnog Balkana unutar Šengenskog prostora, što olakšava putovanja i pruža bolje poslovne i obrazovne prilike. Evropski obrazovni programi poput Erasmus+ omogućavaju studentima, mladima i nastavnicima iz zemalja Zapadnog Balkana da studiraju, stiču iskustvo ili se obučavaju u bilo kojoj od EU zemalja. Zahvaljujući EU integracijama Zapadnog Balkana i Berlinskom procesu, u novembru 2022. godine lideri Zapadnog Balkana potpisali su u Berlinu tri sporazuma o slobodi kretanja sa ličnim kartama, profesionalnim kvalifikacijama za doktore medicine, stomatologije i arhitekte i priznavanju kvalifikacija u obrazovanju na Zapadnom Balkanu. Ovim se zemlje regiona pripremaju za uključivanje u mnogo veće evropsko tržište.
Bolji životni standard: Članstvo u EU sa sobom nosi i zaštitu radnih prava, bolje radne uslove, veće plate, zaštitu prava potrošača, kao i zaštitu životne sredine. Takođe, kroz harmonizaciju standarda sa EU regulativama imali bismo bolju socijalnu politiku i pristup kvalitetnijoj zdravstvenoj zaštiti. EU je, takođe, značajno unapredila medicinske tretmane za pacijente njenih država članica.
Kulturna raznolikost: Integracija različitih nacionalnosti u EU doprinosi kulturnoj raznolikosti i jačanju interkulturalnog dijaloga, što dalje razvija tolerantnu političku kulturu u društvu. EU podstiče očuvanje i promociju kulturne baštine svojih članica, što uključuje očuvanje kulturnih spomenika, tradicionalnih običaja, jezika i slično. Tako bi članstvom u EU i zemlje regiona dobile priliku da unaprede zaštitu i promociju svoje izuzetno bogate kulturne baštine.
EKONOMSKI BENEFITI
Jedinstveno tržište: S obzirom na to da je Evropska unija inicijalno formirana kao ekonomska unija, najveći benefiti procesa EU integracija nalaze se upravo u oblasti ekonomije. Glavni pokretač Evropske unije je jedinstveno tržište u kom se slobodno kreću roba, usluge, ljudi i novac. Proces EU integracija omogućava kompanijama iz zemalja Zapadnog Balkana pristup jedinstvenom tržištu i lakši izvoz robe i usluga, što podstiče ekonomski rast. Spoljno-trgovinska razmena između zemalja Zapadnog Balkana i Evropske unije na godišnjem nivou iznosi oko 50 milijardi evra. Proces EU integracija Zapadnog Balkana za sada je doveo do uspostavljanja zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta, koje predstavlja okosnicu dublje regionalne integracije i korak ka jedinstvenom tržištu EU. Na Samitu Zapadnog Balkana koji je održan 10. novembra 2020. godine u Sofiji u okviru Berlinskog procesa, politički lideri zemalja Zapadnog Balkana podržali su kreiranje Zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta koje omogućava slobodno kretanje robe, usluga, kapitala i ljudi u regionu.
Investicije i finansijska stabilnost: Reforme koje su zemlje Zapadnog Balkana dužne da sprovedu kako bi postale članice EU podrazumevaju i usklađivanje sa ekonomskim politikama EU, što nacionalne ekonomije čini relativno stabilnim i smanjuje makroekonomske rizike. Ekonomska stabilnost, zajedno sa političkom, privlači strane direktne investicije koje doprinose ekonomskom rastu i razvoju privrede.
Pristup fondovima Evropske unije: Pridruživanjem Evropskoj uniji dobijamo pristup fondovima čija su sredstva usmerena ka realizaciji projekata koji su ključni za ekonomski razvoj regiona, kao što je razvoj infrastrukture (izgradnja puteva, železnica, telekomunikacione i energetske mreže), zatim ka razvoju poljoprivrede, zaštiti životne sredine i drugim sektorima. Ovakvi projekti sa sobom nose i socijalne i političke benefite kao što je unapređenje regionalne saradnje kroz umrežavanje i bolju povezanost građana i građanki regiona zbog lakšeg transporta i slično.
Telefonske usluge bez rominga: Zahvaljujući ukidanju rominga sada možemo da koristimo telefonske usluge bez dodatnih troškova širom EU. U okviru Berlinskog procesa sprovodi se Sporazum o romingu, na osnovu kog su usluge rominga smanjene za 86% do 96% na celokupnoj teritoriji Zapadnog Balkana.[2]
Plan rasta za Zapadni Balkan – sprovedi reforme i dobij nagradu
Kada kažem da su ekonomski benefiti EU integracija uvek i politički, mislim i na Plan rasta za Zapadni Balkan za period 2024-2027, koji je Evropska komisija usvojila u novembru 2023. godine, kako bi se Zapadnom Balkanu omogućilo da uživa određene benefite članstva u EU i pre formalnog stupanja u članstvo. Ako bismo Plan rasta mogli ukratko opisati, to bi bilo sledeće: Ko sprovede zadate reforme – taj dobije finansijsku nagradu.
Suštinski, cilj Plana rasta je da se zemlje regiona podrže za sprovođenje reformi putem novog finansijskog instrumenta u iznosu od 6 milijardi evra sa posebnim fokusom na Zajedničko regionalno tržište. Posledično, izgradnja Zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta može dovesti do uspostavljanja trajnog mira u regionu. Novi finansijski instrument biće naročito fokusiran na sektore od izuzetne važnosti za društveno-ekonomski razvoj, kao što je energetika, zelena agenda, digitalna tranzicija, transport, obrazovanje i razvoj veština, gde će posebna pažnja biti posvećena mladima.
Plan rasta se sastoji od četiri stuba:
Približavanje Zapadnog Balkana jedinstvenom tržištu EU
U okviru ovog stuba podrazumevano je da EU pre formalnog stupanja u članstvo omogući pristup određenim područjima jedinstvenog tržišta za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, ukoliko zemlje regiona ispune svoje obaveze u okviru Zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta sa fokusom na sedam prioritetnih oblasti:
Slobodno kretanje robe
Slobodno kretanje usluga i radnika
Plaćanje u eurima
Olakšavanje drumskog transporta
Integracija i dekarbonizacija energetskih tržišta
Jedinstveno digitalno tržište
Integracija u industrijske lance nabavke
Jačanje ekonomske integracije u okviru Zapadnog Balkana kroz Zajedničko regionalno tržište
Jačanje Zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta predstavlja odskočnu dasku ka jedinstvenom evropskom tržištu ukoliko se usvoje i implementiraju evropska pravila i standardi jedinstvenog tržišta, što će potencijalno dovesti do povećanja bruto društvenog proizvoda ekonomija Zapadnog Balkana za 10%.
Ubrzavanje temeljnih reformi
Da bi zemlje regiona stekle uslove za dobijanje finansijske podrške za reforme, neophono je da pripreme tzv. Reformsku agendu, odnosno plan reformi koje nastoje da sprovedu kako bi ostvarile postavljene ciljeve. Akcenat je na poštovanju demokratskih procedura, uključujući slobodne, fer i poštene izbore, višestranački parlamentarni sistem, slobodne medije, nezavisno pravosuđe, te poštovanje ljudskih i manjinskih prava. Očekuje se da će sprovođenje reformi dovesti do ekonomskog rasta kroz privlačenje investicija, ojačati regionalnu saradnju i pomoći zemljama regiona da postanu nekoliko koraka bliže članstvu u EU.
Povećanje finansijske pomoći za podršku reformama kroz Instrument za reforme i rast za Zapadni Balkan 2024-2027
Plan rasta predviđa dodatna sredstva u odnosu na ona koja već dobijamo u okviru IPA III pretpristupnih fondova. Instrument za reforme i rast obuhvata 6 milijardi evra, od čega 2 milijarde evra u grantovima i 4 milijarde evra u kreditima po povoljnim uslovima, koji podrazumevaju otplatu u maksimalnom periodu od 40 godina. Korisnici sredstava će dva puta godišnje upućivati zahtev za isplatu Evropskoj komisiji, koja će procenjivati da li su ispunjeni ciljevi i mere definisani tzv. Reformskom agendom, te će tek nakon ispunjenosti vršiti isplate.
Iako postoje brojni izazovi procesa evropskih integracija Zapadnog Balkana, uključujući potrebu za reformama same Evropske unije i nedostatak političke volje lidera zemalja regiona za ubrzavanjem i sprovođenjem reformi, EU integracije ostaju glavni pokretači razvoja i stabilnosti u regionu. Sve zemlje članice imale su impozantan ekonomski rast nakon pristupanja EU zahvaljujući pristupu jedinstvenom evropskom tržištu sa velikim povećanjem bruto društvenog proizvoda, čime je kvalitet života građana izuzetno unapređen. Ne smemo izgubiti nadu da će jednog dana i građani i građanke Zapadnog Balkana osetiti sve benefite koje sa sobom nosi punopravno članstvo u EU. Možda nije idealna, ali je najrazvijenija političko-ekonomska unija na svetu.
Autor: Marko Pantić, advokat
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
‘People often say with pride, I’m not interested in politics. They might as well say, I’m not interested in my standard of living, my health, my job, my rights, my freedoms, my future or any future. If we mean to keep any control over our world and lives, we must be interested in politics.’’ Martha Gelhorn,
American Novelist, Writer, and Journalist
Introduction
While I was exploring the significance of the European elections, I came across this inspiring ‘call to action’ quote, which serves as a reminder that engagement in political processes is not merely an option but a necessity for those who wish to influence the decisions that affect our daily existence. Being one day away from the European Elections which will take place in 27 member states between 6-9 June 2024, it is crucial to recall the importance of political awareness and active participation for maintaining and enhancing the people’s spirit to stand up for the issues that affect their lives and their role in election processes.
In a recent interview for The Economist, President Macron warned that Europe faces immediate threats deriving from external and internal factors. Because these elections come at a time when the Union is battling multiple challenges, including the conflict in Ukraine, rising inflation, defense and security and the enlargement project, we have our eyes wide open to see what the future holds for Europe. Reflecting on the lessons from the previous elections, understanding European political groups’ key priorities and manifestos, exploring the engagement of youth in the next European Parliament, and assessing the impact social media is playing in increasing youth voter turnout, are the main topics this blog aims to cover.
Lessons from the previous European Elections
After declining ever since the first European elections in 1979, the voter turnout for the 2019 European elections was marked at 50.6%, the highest since 1994 and a significant rise from 42.6% in 2014 Eurobarometer. This increase occurred in 19 Member States, with notable rises in Poland, Romania, Spain, Austria, Hungary, and Germany, as well as significant increases in Slovakia and Czech Republic, where turnout had previously been low. Despite this overall increase, turnout dropped slightly (by no more than 3%) in eight countries. As per the youth participation in the 2019 elections, the post-election Eurobarometer showed also that the boost in participation was predominantly driven by younger voters, particularly those under 25 and those aged 25 to 39 years old. This phenomenon came as a result of effective engagement strategies such as local volunteering and partnerships entered into with organizations like the European Youth Parliament and the Federation of Young European Greenswhich used non-formal education methods to increase awareness and participation of young people in those elections. Building on this, it is important to highlight that the voters in 2019 were better informed compared to 2014, and both voters and non-voters expressed a higher level of political interest, suggesting a solid foundation for further increasing voter turnout in future elections. Social media platforms were also considered as an essential tool that contributed to this increase. Specifically, this surge is attributed to parliamentary campaigns on platforms such as Snapchat. Given TikTok’s significant Gen-Z users, it could also play a crucial role in future elections. Recently, Ifop poll conducted in April, indicated that around one-third of young people use a specific application to keep up with election campaigns.
Also, the 2019 elections taught us that Eastern and Western Europe are significantly divided, raising concerns for the future of Europe. While Western Europe largely voted for change, the strong support for right-wing populists in Eastern countries like Hungary and Poland suggested these nations have a different vision of Europe compared to other EU members. This divergence could slow down the progress in European integration across various critical areas, including security cooperation, coping with mass migration, enlargement & institutional reforms of the EU. Moreover, the topics of the Eastern Partnership and enlargement to the Western Balkans were notably absent from the election campaigns. Probably, the lack of campaign discussion on these issues might stem from their low appeal to voters or a strategic choice to avoid empowering far-right populist factions.
In terms of promoting democratic elections, the 2019 European Parliament elections marked a significant moment, signaling a demand from voters for greater transparency and influence. The elections saw a slight dominance of Liberals and Greens, suggesting that if these groups can promote more accountable governance and greater public engagement, Europe could navigate through its current challenges more robustly(Heinrich Boll Stiftung)However, as in the previous two European elections, all eyes will be on the far right, which is expected to be the big winner this year. According to the poll’s projections, far-right parties are topping the polls in key European countries like France, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, and Poland, and influencing EU politics even from their national perspectives.(Politico)
How are European Parliamentary group’s manifestos attracting young people to vote?
Political parties are also recognizing the importance of appealing to younger voters and integrating young candidates into their ranks. Many parliamentary groups push for improvements on issues young people find the most urgent, such as climate change, working conditions, democracy, and representation of marginalized groups. For instance, many parties with anti-immigrant agendas are receiving noticeable support from first-time young voters in the upcoming European Parliament elections.
Recent analyses on political preferences indicate that in several EU member states (Belgium, France, Portugal, Germany, and Finland) young people are supporting anti-immigration and anti-establishment parties as much as, or even more than, older voters. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party secured victory in the 2023 election by orienting the focus towards affordable housing to immigration restrictions, issues that help them resonate strongly with young voters. (Politico). One of the young voters, Gerald, 24, was clear about his decision in the last weeks of the Dutch election stating for The Guardian:
“I voted for Wilders, and many of my friends did too,” he said. “I don’t want to live with my parents for ever. I want my own home, and to be able to provide for my family later. Wilders wants to figure out the housing crisis and make our healthcare better. Those are the most important topics for me.’’
Similarly, in Portugal, the far-right party Chega took advantage of the frustrations of young people regarding the housing crisis and other quality of life issues. André Azevedo Alves, a political scientist at the Catholic University of Portugal and St Mary’s University in London, explained for Politico that Chega, has successfully tapped into the frustrations of Portuguese youth regarding quality of life issues such as the housing crisis and lack of well-paying jobs. This dissatisfaction is further fueled by anger towards mainstream parties that have failed to address these challenges. “Chega’s leader, André Ventura, leveraged this discontent, portraying the Socialist Party and the center-right Social Democratic Party as the cause of the country’s problems and the stagnation that has driven many young Portuguese to emigrate,” he said. “He has attracted many supporters by presenting Chega as an anti-establishment party ready to challenge the system.”
If extremist or far-right groups were to gain significant influence in the upcoming elections, in the long run, it could have profound implications for candidate countries (including Albania), potentially affecting their EU integration prospects and their standing within the broader European political landscape. The stance of these groups on issues like immigration, national sovereignty, the European Enlargement project, and EU regulations could significantly negatively impact Western Balkan’s Integration Process. Most Radical Parties view enlargement critically, considering it costly and potentially leading to increased migration. In addition to their general skepticism toward enlargement, radical-right parties often endorse raising historical grievances and identity issues during EU accession negotiations. Their attempts to use EU enlargement to extract concessions from candidate countries have become one of the biggest obstacles to advancing the process. Even though far rights lack an essential schism over enlargement, the mainstrem parties must buy into the enlargement discourse and preach it with conviction to their citizens while supporting a merit-based enlargement process.(Balkaninsights)
Youth Quota
Political parties have been the primary vehicle for political engagement and representation in Europe for over a hundred years. However, there’s an increasing disconnect between political parties and the youth, highlighted by a significant decrease in party membership over the past two decades in Europe, only about 2% of young people are members of any political party.
A study of the European Parliament suggests that this growing skepticism towards parties stems from their failure to facilitate young people’s political involvement. Such low membership rates among youth now indicate too that party affiliation is no longer a reliable measure of political engagement. Today, the average age of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is 50, with national averages ranging from 44 to 60. Denmark boasts the youngest MEP, who was 21 at the time of the election, whereas in other countries, the youngest MEP is at least 30 years old. This noticeable disparity between the proportion of MEPs under 35 and the general population of Europeans in the same age group suggests a lack of descriptive representation, which carries significant implications for policymaking.
Just one day ahead from the next European elections, only two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are still under 30 which comprises only 0.28% of all MEPs. For the 2024 European Parliament elections, there are several young candidates actively participating, although exact numbers are not specified, as Euronews reports. European Greens are prioritizing young candidates under the age of 35, by placing them in electable positions to ensure their representation in the 2024 European Parliament.
On one hand The European Parliament through its Resolution 2015/2035(INL)has urged EU member states to take proactive steps to improve the representation of underrepresented groups at the supranational level. A proposed solution to ensure young people’s interests are better represented in European political arenas is the introduction of youth quotas in the European Parliament. These quotas address the underrepresentation of the younger generation by setting a flexible target percentage for MEPs under the age of 35. On the other hand, such an initiative is also requested from various groups, including the Youth for European people’s Party (YEPP). YEPP, along with other youth organizations and political groups, have been actively advocating for these quotas to address the underrepresentation of young people in the Parliament.
There is no doubt that to meet the challenges young people are facing today, we need to see more young candidates and youth representation in electoral lists which should not be a symbolic effort of filling a quota. Addressing the underrepresentation of young Europeans through the adoption of youth quotas and lowering the age to stand as a candidate may be a key impediment to young people’s participation. Instead, many European member states have lowered the age of voting. For the first time, German and Belgian 16 year olds will join young people from Malta and Austria to vote in the upcoming elections. This is great news for youth participation, but it results in discrimination for other 16-year-old Europeans who are not allowed to vote. This leads to decreased involvement of young people due to a lack of ownership over decisions and the decision-making process.
Social media as a mean to boost youth engagement in European Elections
In recent years, foreign governments have increasingly utilized social media and the internet to influence elections worldwide. A 2023 study by the European Parliament found that young people remain actively engaged in politics, often through diverse methods, with social media being their preferred medium. This platform allows them to quickly mobilize large numbers of people across borders and stay informed about political and current events relevant to them.
For the 2024 elections, the European Parliament is adopting various strategies to engage young voters, emphasizing the importance of digital platforms. The ‘Play your part, Europe’ campaign is streamed via Spotify to notify and remind all users over 18 about the EU election. Spotify has previously launched voting campaigns before elections. The Swedish company issued similar notifications for local elections in the United Kingdom, as well as for elections in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States.
According to Eurostat, TikTok has become popular in Europe, often serving as a constant news source against its competitors like X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Snapchat. The European far-right effectively utilizes platforms like TikTok to reach out to young voters, engaging content and utilising the platforms’ algorithms to maximize reach, especially among those who may feel disillusioned with traditional politics (Politico).
Renew Europe group, heavily utilizes Instagram and Snapchat to connect with young voters. They focus on liberal values like individual freedom, digital transformation, and European integration, using engaging visuals and quick, impactful stories. The European People’s Party also employs robust strategies, particularly in digital campaigning and educational content.
The Greens/European Free Alliance often stands out in effectively engaging young voters through Instagram and X. Their focus on pressing global issues including climate change, environmental sustainability, and social justice, are the issues that resonate strongly with many young Europeans today.
Being aware of the hard efforts needed to enhance youth participation in electoral politics, it is crucial to remember that young people are the key to bridging this gap. As a Young European Ambassador from the Western Balkans, I am well aware of the consequences of undermining the political systems’ representativeness and the resistance of young people to vote. I believe that one way to approach youngsters in political life is by encouraging youth activism which is less practiced by them, such as signing petitions, participating in legal demonstrations, and engaging in unofficial strikes. Additionally, advocating for the implementation of youth quotas in political institutions, like parliaments, is another strategy that young people should persistently pursue in their countries to increase their visibility and influence in decision-making bodies.
In the spirit of Martha Gelhorn’s call to action, I would prefer to embrace the European Parliament’s compelling appeal from the video, “Use your vote.” and encourage Young Europeans to voice the concerns of the European Youth generation, thus determining the direction of Europe by voting!
About the Author
Xhuljana Mucaj graduated from the University of Sheffield in the United Kingdom, obtaining a Master of Laws as a recipient of the prestigious Chevening Scholarship. This achievement adds to her previous successes, including a Law Degree from the University of Tirana and a degree in Business Administration from the Canadian Institute of Technology. As a Young European Ambassador, Xhuljana has considered this platform to champion EU values and advocate for the rule of law, democracy, and the integrity of public institutions. Noteworthy among her initiatives is the #IDECIDE awareness campaign, which aimed to raise awareness about the importance of free and fair elections while constantly opposing the culture of the vote-buying phenomenon. Xhuljana is eagerly committed to supporting vulnerable youth in rural areas and proposing substantial instruments that secure their presence in decision-making bodies.
*This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Academy of European Integrations and Negotiations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
by Ognjen Markovic, Team Leader of the RCC’s Western Balkans Youth Lab project
I was 13 years old when the first person from my close-knit circle of family announced she was leaving Montenegro. Back then I was not yet aware that it was the beginning of a ‘trend’ and that over the next few years I would keep witnessing more and more people I know leaving our homeland to find a living in the EU.
Reading that 71% of young people from the Western Balkans would consider working and living abroad, I was struck by a bittersweet feeling. To me, and to many citizens of the Western Balkans, the percentage is not just a number, because hidden behind it are the names of family members and loved ones who we will get to see only two or three times a year when they return home for the holidays.
On the other hand, the attractiveness of the EU is understandable. Beyond the promises of a higher pay, greater sense of stability and security and other socio-economic indicators, the EU offers mobility that most young people crave for. And while highways, fast trains and flight connections may sound banal, to a person who has entered adulthood only recently, they provide endless possibilities and new and exciting experiences.
For those who enjoy spending their time in nature, the EU commitment to the Green Deal and sustainable tourism provides clean air, water and easy access to well-marked hiking trails. Capitals of EU Member States have the infrastructural capacity to attract world-renowned musicians, film and art festivals. For the ambitious and career-oriented individuals, open labour market provides a broad range of opportunities, not least grounded in the process of recognition of academic and professional qualifications.
I have a deep admiration for the European Union as such, especially since I had the opportunity to experience it first hand during my study exchanges in Slovenia, Poland and Italy. It was then that I came to fully understand the benefits of cross-border initiatives that bring young people together.
It was particularly impressive that, along with the diversity of our backgrounds and interests, we could easily agree on the changes we wanted to see in the world around us. And it did not matter if students came from the Western Balkans or the EU, because we shared the same values and principles: freedom, democracy, equal opportunities. Most of all, we agreed that our voices should be heard.
I took this lesson with me as I returned to Montenegro.
Though I enjoyed and valued my time in the EU tremendously, still coming home felt right. When saying ‘coming home’, I do not mean only Montenegro but the entire region of the Western Balkans.
Namely, there is another aspect of my life through which I had the immense pleasure of developing a deep connection to our region. From a young age, I was a member of a folklore ensemble, which had taken me across the Western Balkans to numerous competitions and festivals. We would travel very often to small cities and rural areas in the region, eager to represent our culture, but even more enthusiastic to learn about the others. It is through that experience that I heard Albanian music for the first time, and loved it ever since; I revelled in Macedonian national dishes, which I still praise to everyone I meet; in Serbia I learned about hospitality and untouched sceneries, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina I discovered ceif and merak.
Everywhere I went I met brilliant people my age and I have been cherishing those friendships to this day. This made me sure that what we have in common is much more significant than what tells us apart.
From my student exchanges in Slovenia, Poland and Italy, I returned with a thought: “Where the EU has benefits, the Western Balkans has potential.”
Thus, when the opportunity to join Regional Cooperation Council’s Western Balkans Youth Lab project presented itself in 2020, I eagerly packed my bags and moved to Sarajevo, ready to assist the implementation of everything I believed in: giving young people of the Western Balkans a platform that makes their voices heard, and even more so, that involves them in the meaningful way in the decision-making processes, contributing to the fulfilment of the regional potential.
Now, in the winter of 2024, with the first phase of the project behind us, I can confidently say that it was a right decision to make.
Together with young people from across the region, we enacted real and substantial changes. From amending laws on youth employment tailored as per youth needs to creating national strategies on youth mental health, new generations in the Western Balkans can look forward to better conditions and a brighter future. Most importantly, they can find inspiration and motivation in the fact that the change comes from us – for us, as long as we stay committed to the joint perspective that we all share.
The fact that we made only the first steps on the long road that waits ahead is not discouraging. I am proud and honoured to work with incredible young people, and I do not doubt even for a second that they have what it takes to eventually turn the tides on the emigration waves, to transform the potential into benefits, and to lead the way to the family of EU Member States, where the Western Balkans rightly belongs.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
EU dijalog sa mladima (The EU Youth Dialogue – EUYD), prethodno Strukturirani dijalog, predstavlja mehanizam usvojen na nivou Evropske unije, čija je svrha rešavanje potreba mladih i problema sa kojima se oni susreću. Kroz ovaj dijalog, donosioci odluka stiču uvid u potrebe i zahteve mladih, što im omogućava da donose informisane odluke koje su u njihovom najboljem interesu. Ukratko, EUYD obezbeđuje platformu preko koje mladi učestvuju u procesima usvajanja politika i imaju priliku da se njihov glas čuje.
U skladu sa EU strategijom za mlade 2019-2027, EUYD podržava njenu implementaciju i podstiče saradnju zemalja EU u vezi sa pitanjima važnim za mladu populaciju, sa glavnim fokusom na tri oblasti – povezivanje, angažovanje i osnaživanje. Svaki ciklus dijaloga traje 18 meseci i posvećen je jednoj temi koja se odnosi na neki od 11 Ciljeva za mlade. Trojno predsedništvo upravlja implementacijom EUYD u bliskoj saradnji sa Evropskom komisijom, Nacionalnim agencijama, Evropskim omladinskim forumom i drugim nevladinim omladinskim organizacijama, pod okriljem grupe za koordinaciju. Tokom čitavog ciklusa, mišljenja mladih se prikupljaju na svim nivoima i kroz različite vidove konsultacija kao što su EU konferencije mladih, evropske ankete, nacionalni događaji, različiti projekti i lokalni događaji.
EU konferencija mladih je najvažniji događaj i organizuje se dva puta godišnje u zemlji koja predsedava Evropskom unijom. Tokom konferencija, mladi, donosioci odluka ali i stručnjaci, istraživači i predstavnici civilnog društva rade zajedno, objedinjuju rezultate aktivnosti EUYD i formulišu zajedničke poruke za EU. Savet EU može da usvoji dokument politike na osnovu ovih izlaznih informacija, usmeren na unapređenje položaja mladih u Evropskoj uniji.
Deseti ciklus dijaloga pod nazivom „We Need Youth“ (Potrebni su nam mladi) traje od 1. jula 2023. do 31. decembra 2024. godine, pod predsedništvom Španije, Belgije i Mađarske. Fokus ovog ciklusa je stavljen na implementaciju Cilja za mlade broj 3 „Inkluzivna društva“ i ima za cilj angažovanje mladih, podsticanje inkluzivnosti i slavljenje uspeha ostvarenih u okviru dijaloga.
Omladinska laboratorija Zapadnog Balkana: Utiranje puta inkluzivnom donošenju odluka
Na žalost, mladi i kreatori politika iz zemalja sa statusom kandidata za članstvo u EU su isključeni iz ovog procesa. Kako bi se premostio taj jaz, Regionalni savet za saradnju je pokrenuo Omladinsku laboratoriju Zapadnog Balkana (Western Balkans Youth Lab – WBYL), projekat koji finansira Evropska unija, a čija je svrha da se stvore prilike za učešće mladih u donošenju odluka u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana (WB).
WBYL se zasniva na metodologiji EUYD i nastoji da otvori dugoročni, strukturirani regionalni dijalog između omladinskih organizacija i nacionalnih organa uprave, usmeren na zajedničko razvijanje politika kojima se jača učešće mladih u donošenju odluka, uključuju pitanja mladih u same politike i unapređuje sveukupno društveno i ekonomsko okruženje i mobilnost mladih u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana.
Od 2020. godine, sprovedene su dve Omladinske laboratorije. Prva je bila posvećena nezaposlenosti mladih, a druga mentalnom zdravlju mladih. Na samom početku, mladi i kreatori politika iz zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, uključujući Srbiju, prošli su kroz obuku o metodologiji i modelu, nakon čega je usledilo formiranje regionalnog i nacionalnog stručnog tela. Stručnjaci su imali priliku da se sastaju putem online i offline sastanaka, kao i srednjoročnih i završnih konferencija, kako bi zajednički osmislili programe i politike relevantne za mlade.
StrukturiranjeEU dijaloga sa mladima u Srbiji
Tokom poslednje četiri godine, Srbija je nesumnjivo bila lider u implementaciji EUYD van granica EU, i kao takva, treba da služi kao ključna tačka za region (i druge zemlje sa statusom kandidata), pružajući vrstan uvid u to kako se različiti aspekti mehanizama mogu implemetirati u zemljama kandidatima.
Dva programa koja vodi Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije (KOMS), kako na nacionalnom tako i na lokalnim nivoima, zasnovana su na EUYD metodologiji. Na nacionalnom nivou, od 2019. godine, KOMS je vodila dijaloge sa mladima i ključnim donosiocima odluka, poput Dijaloga mladih sa premijerom/kom, (bivšim) ministrom za omladinu i sport i drugim akterima kao što je Poverenik za zaštitu ravnopravnosti. Ovi dijalozi stvaraju prilike za mlade ljude da istaknu izazove sa kojima se suočavaju u Srbiji i predlože konkretne mere, zasnovane na dokazima, za njihovo rešavanje. Na lokalnom nivou, KOMS sprovodi program pod nazivom „Odlučionice“. Program povezuje predstavnike jedinica lokalne samouprave (opštine i gradovi), studentske parlamente i organizacije civilnog društva, koji prolaze zajedničku obuku i uče o omladinskim politikama, aktivizmu i učešću mladih u lokalnim zajednicama. Nakon obuke, oni postaju deo mreže lokalnih koordinatora dijaloga sa mladima i rade na unapređenju saradnje između mlade populacije i donosioca odluka. Lokalni koordinatori počinju zajednički rad implementacijom inicijative zajednice koja je kreirana kroz program.
Za potrebe dalje standardizacije implementacije u Srbiji, 2021. godine je osnovan Stalni stručni tim za EUYD. Tim je formiran prema modelu nacionalnih radnih grupa za implementaciju EUYD, osnovanih u zemljama članicama EU za koordinaciju omladinskih politika i standardizovanih praksi za uključivanje mladih u procese donošenja odluka. U stalni stručni tim su uključeni predstavnici Ministarstva turizma i omladine, Ministarstva za evropske integracije, Nacionalne asocijacije praktičara/ki omladinskog rada, Fondacije Tempus i KOMS-a. Koordinaciona međusektorska grupa, koja postoji samo u zemljama članicama EU, predstavlja ujedno važan korak i potencijal za mlade i njihovu aktivnu participaciju. Institucionalizacija grupe u okviru Saveta za mlade Vlade Republike Srbije, kao savetodavnog tela, osigurava da se preporuke mladih postavljaju kao ključni elementi za razvoj omladinskih i drugih relevantnih politika.
Implementacija dijaloga u Srbiji – Hvatanje u koštac sa izazovima
EUYD podrazumeva aktivno učešće u procesima donošenja odluka i zasniva se na principu zajedničkog upravljanja. To znači da mladi ljudi i donosioci odluka diskutuju o temama relevantnim za mlade na strukturiran način i dogovaraju se o mogućim rešenjima. Ova vrsta dijaloga često nedostaje u lokalnim zajednicama a postojeći mehanizmi (ako uopšte postoje) često se ne koriste u praksi, te samim tim, ne ispunjavaju svoju svrhu. Podaci o lokalnim omladinskim politikama koje je objavila KOMS 2021. godine, ukazuje na činjenicu da 54,5% lokalnih saveta za mlade, kao instrumenata lokalnih omladinskih politika, niti su funkcionalni niti inkluzivni u velikoj većini jedinica lokalne samouprave. Ako pogledamo druge parametre, možemo da zaključimo da lokalni donosioci odluka često ne daju prioritet izazovima sa kojima se suočavaju mladi i ne pridaju im dovoljno pažnje u procesu kreiranja javnih politika.
Dijalozi mladih na lokalnom i nacionalnom nivou u Srbiji se isključivo finansiraju na osnovu projekata preko KOMS-a, a za sredstva je potrebno da se podnosi zahtev svake godine. Ovakva praksa ne garantuje njihovu implementaciju u budućnosti, što može biti izuzetno štetno za kvalitet informacija koje EUYD prikuplja, ali i za prostor za civilno društvo i kulturu dijaloga u Srbiji. Dijalozi su u prošlosti pružili konkretne rezultate, među kojima je program „Mоја prva plata“, odluka da se ne obustavi rad studentskih poliklinika u Srbiji, kao i nekoliko drugih dostignuća u procesu usvajanja nove Nacionalne strategije za mlade. Međutim, praćenje koraka na koje se donosioci odluka odluče nakon dijaloga, ostaje problematično.
Planiranje daljeg puta: Budućnost EU dijaloga sa mladima (u Srbiji)
Tokom prve konferencije desetog ciklusa, najavljena je ocena mehanizma. Ovu vest su toplo pozdravili, posebno mladi delegati, jer je praćenje rezultata procesa uobičajeno na svim nivoima implementacije. Delegati su sami oformili radnu grupu koja će raditi na povećanju transparentnosti procesa donošenja odluka koje se tiču mladih na nivou EU.
Jedan od ključnih izazova u implementaciji EUYD mehanizma u Srbiji je već pomenuti nedostatak integracije zemalja kandidata. Naime, članovi Stalnog stručnog tima su retko dobijali pozive za učešće u ciklusima EU dijaloga sa mladima na nivou EU, uključujući i pomenute EU konferencije mladih. Ipak, omladinski predstavnici Stalnog stručnog tima pozvani su da učestvuju na drugoj EU konferenciji mladih 2023. godine u Alikanteu, Španiji, što predstavlja značajan korak napred.
Sam EUYD čeka dug put daljeg unapređenja. Gledano iz perspektive Srbije i svih drugih zemalja kandidata, ovaj proces mora da uključi sve nas i na svim nivoima implementacije. Na ovaj način se jačaju kapaciteti mladih za zagovaranje, ali se i pripremaju predstavnici donosilaca odluka za odgovornosti koje će preuzeti kao buduće članice EU.
Autorka: Anja Jokić, master politikološkinja i omladinska aktivistkinja
Koautorka: Maša Vračar, diplomirana politikološkinja za međunarodne odnose i omladinska aktivistkinja
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
Over the last few years, the youth unemployment rate has continuously decreased in all WB economies. However, it varies from economy to economy and remains higher compared to EU member states. The highest youth unemployment rate is in North Macedonia, at 34.9%, while the lowest is in Kosovo* – 21.4%. According to Eurostat datafrom November 2023, youth unemployment in the EU stands at 14.5%. A decade ago, this rate was roughly 24%. How did youth unemployment decrease by approximately 10% over the past 10 years in the EU despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other crises affecting the European labour market?
Throughout 2013, the Youth Guarantee programme was initiated by the European Commission and was adopted by the European Council in the same year. The Youth Guarantee is the political commitment of all EU member states to provide all young people aged 15 to 29 with an offer of employment, an apprenticeship, internship, volunteering, or further education within four months of completing formal education or losing employment. The Youth Guarantee is a commitment of all relevant sectors in the country, including the executive authorities, employment agencies, civil society organisations, and the business sector, i.e. employers. The main goal of the programme is the inclusion of NEET youth, that is, those not in employment, education, or training.
With the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans published by the European Commission in October 2020, the Youth Guarantee programme became an obligation for Western Balkan economies aspiring to EU membership. They committed to implementing this programme, as stated in the Western Balkans Declaration on the Sustainable Integration of Youth into the Labour Market, adopted at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the European Union – Western Balkans held on 8 July 2021, in Slovenia. Western Balkan economies are at different stages of implementing the Youth Guarantee programme. North Macedonia, which initiated the programme in 2018, is the most successful regional example. Implementation plans for the Youth Guarantee have been adopted in Serbia, Kosovo*, and Albania, while Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still awaiting adoption.
As mentioned earlier, North Macedonia is the most successful country in the region in implementing the Youth Guarantee. From 2017 to 2019, youth unemployment decreased by nearly 9%. The new Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee for the period 2023-2026 was adopted by the Government of North Macedonia in March 2023. North Macedonia has set a target of 30%, meaning it considers the Youth Guarantee successful if a minimum of 30% of young people who go through the programme find employment, apprenticeships, volunteering, or further education and training within a four-month period. Out of 19,322 young people who participated in the Youth Guarantee programme in 2021, 41% were granted opportunities for employment, volunteering, or further education. In 2022, over 20,000 youths participated in the programme, and 43% were successful in securing employment or opportunities for training once they had completed the programme. Therefore, North Macedonia is considered exceptionally successful in implementing this programme, having achieved and exceeded the set goal of 30%.
Despite the successful integration of a large number of programme participants into the labour market, the implementation of the Youth Guarantee also contributes to strengthening institutions. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is the main driver of the implementation process, and a Coordination Council for the Youth Guarantee has been established to oversee the programme’s implementation. However, the youth unemployment rate in North Macedonia in 2022 stood at 34.9%, which is still nearly double the EU average, standing at 14.5%, and remains the highest youth unemployment rate in the entire region. The European Commission Progress Report on North Macedonia for 2023, states that active labour market measures and the Youth Guarantee programme are currently inadequately monitored, evaluated, and assessed. A key challenge of programme implementation is the limited financial resources the Government of North Macedonia is unable to secure.
The Youth Guarantee in Serbia has been recognised in the new National Employment Strategy for the period 2021-2026 and the Youth Strategy adopted in January 2023. The youth unemployment rate in Serbia for the year 2022 stood at 24.9%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET youth – those not employed, not in the educational system, nor in training – stood at roughly 15%. In late December 2023, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee. The pilot programme will be conducted in three branches of the National Employment Service – in Kruševac, Sremska Mitrovica, and Niš – from January 2024 to the end of 2026. The aim is to expand the programme across the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. During the EU Opportunities Week in 2023, the Republic of Serbia and the European Union signed a financial assistance agreement amounting to EUR 5.5 million, directed towards the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. This funding is specifically for piloting the programme in the mentioned three branches. Institutions in Serbia emphasise that there are currently insufficient capacities for the implementation of this programme throughout the entire country, but full implementation of the programme at the national level is one of the main priorities of the Operational Programme within IPA III 2023-2027. The programme is led by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans, and Social Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, which has established a Coordination Body to develop and monitor the implementation plan for the Youth Guarantee. They have also formed an Expert Group to carry out preparatory activities.
Kosovo* is still in the early preparatory phase regarding negotiating Chapter 19, which pertains to social policy and employment. However, the European Commission Progress Report on Kosovo* for 2023 notes that some progress has been made in preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, following the Implementation Plan adopted in November 2022. The report emphasises the need to continue with the Implementation Plan and creating conditions for piloting the programme in two municipalities – Mitrovica and Uroševac. The youth unemployment rate in Kosovo* saw a remarkable decrease of 16.6% in 2022. In 2021, the rate was 38%, dropping to 21.4% in 2022. The Employment Agency of Kosovo* is undergoing restructuring to enable the implementation of the programme. However, the European Commission’s report highlights the significant challenge of a lack of human resources in public employment services and an outdated information system.
According to the European Commission Progress Report on Albania for 2023, preparations for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme have progressed. It is deemed necessary to commence piloting the programme to enable its implementation across the entire country. Albania has adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee as an annex to the new National Youth Strategy for the period 2023-2030. The overall process is led by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Albania. The youth unemployment rate for 2022 stood at 27.8%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) youth stood at 23.4%.
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only countries in the region that have not yet adopted the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. The youth unemployment rate in Montenegro stood at 28.3% in May 2023. According to the Progress Report for Montenegro in 2023, the European Commission recommends strengthening the Employment Agency and preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. A Working Group for the Youth Guarantee programme has been formed to enhance the draft Implementation Plan, collaborating with experts from the International Labour Organisation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked last in the region relative to implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme. The Progress Report of the European Commission on Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2023, highlights that limited progress has been made regarding the finalisation and adoption of the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. In October 2023, the Employment Strategy in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2023-2030 was finally adopted, recognising the Youth Guarantee as a completely new youth employment model. The lengthy process of its adoption represented a major obstacle to the Youth Guarantee programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The programme’s pilot phase has already begun, with two smaller municipalities, Visoko and Čitluk, chosen for the pilot. After the pilot phase, expansion across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected. At the national level, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the implementation process, while the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is in charge of implementing the programme in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Information about the Youth Guarantee in the Republika Srpska entity is not available on the internet, nor is it mentioned in the annual reports of the European Commission. The youth unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the highest in the entire region, reaching 33.47% for the year 2022.
The key to the successful implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme lies in the intensive collaboration of all sectors in the country—from the governments responsible for providing financial resources for implementation to employers and civil society organisations. Once the Employment Strategy is adopted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina will adopt the Implementation Plan in the coming period. We hope that this will be followed by Montenegro, allowing all economies in the region to implement this ambitious programme for young people across their territories in the coming years. However, strong political will from all governments in the region will be essential for this, as only they can secure financial support for successful implementation.
Author: Nemanja Ivanović, Youth Activist and Member of the Governing Board of the Social Democratic Party
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Poslednjih nekoliko godina smanjuje se stopa nezaposlenoosti mladih u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, ali varira od zemlje do zemlje i još uvek je veća u odnosu na zemlje članice Evropske unije. Najveća stopa nezaposlenosti mladih je u Severnoj Makedoniji i iznosi 34,9%, dok je najniža na Kosovu* – 21,4%. Prema podacima Eurostata iz novembra 2023. godine, nezaposlenost mladih na nivou EU iznosi 14,5%. Pre 10 godina, ta stopa bila je oko 24%. Kako je došlo do smanjenja nezaposlenost mladih za oko 10% u proteklih 10 godina na nivou EU i pored izbijanja pandemije COVID-19, rata u Ukrajini i drugih kriza koje su ostavile posledice na evropsko tržište rada?
Tokom 2013. godine iniciran je program Garancija za mlade od strane Evropske komisije, a iste godine usvojio ga je i Evropski savet. Garancija za mlade je politička obaveza svih zemalja članica EU da svim mladim osobama od 15 do 29 godina obezbede ponudu za posao, pripravnički staž, volontiranje ili mogućnosti daljeg školovanja i to u roku od četiri meseca nakon završetka formalnog obrazovanja ili gubitka zaposlenja. Garancija za mlade je obaveza svih relevantnih sektora u zemlji – izvršne vlasti i zavoda za zapošljavanje, organizacija civilnog društva i biznis sektora, odnosno poslodavaca. Glavni cilj Programa je inkluzija NEET mladih, odnosno onih koji nisu zaposleni, nisu u sistemu obrazovanja, niti su na obuci.
Ekonomsko-investicionim planom za Zapadni Balkan objavljenim od strane Evropske komisije u oktobru 2020. godine, program Garancija za mlade postao je obaveza i za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana koje su kandidati za članstvo u EU. Obavezale su se na sprovođenje ovog Programa i na Drugom ministarskom sastanku Evropska unija – Zapadni Balkan, održanom 8. jula 2021. godine u Sloveniji, usvajanjem Deklaracije Zapadnog Balkana o održivoj integraciji mladih na tržište rada. Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana nalaze se u različitim fazama implementacije programa Garancija za mlade. Severna Makedonija, koja je još 2018. godine započela uvođenje ovog programa, predstavlja najuspešniji primer u regionu. Planovi implementacije Garancije za mlade usvojeni su u Srbiji, Kosovu* i Albaniji, dok Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina još uvek čekaju na usvajanje.
Kao što je već pomenuto, Severna Makedonija je najuspešnija zemlja u regionu kada je reč o implementaciji Garancije za mlade. U periodu od 2017. do 2019. godine nezaposlenost mladih smanjena je za oko 9%. Novi Plan za sprovođenje Garancije za mlade za period 2023-2026 Vlada Severne Makedonije usvojila je u martu 2023. godine. Severna Makedonija je postavila cilj od 30%, odnosno da se Garancija za mlade smatra uspešnom ako minimum 30% mladih koji prođu kroz Program dobiju zaposlenje, pripravnički staž, volontiranje ili mogućnost daljeg školovanja i usavršavanja u roku od 4 meseca. Od 19.322 mladih koji su tokom 2021. učestvovali u programu Garancija za mlade, 41% njih dobilo je priliku za zaposlednje, volontiranje ili usavršavanje. Tokom 2022. više od 20.000 mladih ljudi učestvovalo je u Programu, pri čemu je 43% njih nakon završetka programa uspešno pronašlo zaposlenje ili mogućnost za obuku. Stoga se smatra da je Severna Makedonija izuzetno uspešna u implementaciji ovog Programa, jer je uspela da dostigne i premaši postavljeni cilj od 30%.
Pored uspešnog uključivanja velikog broja učesnika Programa na tržište rada, implementacija Garancije za mlade doprinosi i jačanju institucija. Nosilac procesa implementacije je Ministarstvo rada i socijalne politike, a osnovan je i Koordinacioni savet za Garanciju za mlade čija je nadležnost nadgledanje sprovođenja ovog Programa. Ipak, procenat nezaposlenosti mladih u Severnoj Makedoniji u 2022. godini iznosio je 34,9%, što je i dalje skoro duplo više u odnosu na prosek u zemljama Evropske unije koji iznosi 14,5%, a ujedno je i najveća stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u celom regionu. U izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Severne Makedonije za 2023, navodi se da aktivne mere tržišta rada i program Garancija za mlade trenutno nisu dovoljno praćeni, evaluirani i procenjeni. Ključan izazov u implementaciji Programa je ograničenost finansijskih sredstava, koje Vlada Severne Makedonije nije u mogućnosti da obezbedi.
Garancija za mlade u Srbiji prepoznata je u novoj Nacionalnoj strategiji zapošljavanja za period 2021-2026 i Strategiji za mlade usvojenoj u januaru 2023. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u Srbiji za 2022. godinu iznosila je 24,9%, dok je stopa nezaposlenosti tzv. NEET mladih – onih koji nisu zaposleni, nisu u obrazovnom sistemu niti na obuci oko 15%. Krajem decembra 2023. godine Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila je Implementacioni plan Garancija za mlade. Pilotiranje programa u tri filijale Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje – Kruševcu, Sremskoj Mitrovici i Nišu trajaće od januara 2024. do kraja 2026. godine, sa ciljem proširenja programa na celu teritoriju Republike Srbije. Za vreme trajanja EU nedelje mogućnosti 2023. godine, Republika Srbija i Evropska unija potpisale su sporazum o finansijskoj pomoći u iznosu od 5,5 miliona evra koja je usmerena na implementaciju Garancije za mlade, odnosno za pilotiranje programa u pomenute tri filijale. Institucije u Srbiji ističu da trenutno ne postoje kapaciteti za realizaciju ovog programa na teritoriji cele Srbije, ali puna primena Programa na nacionalnom nivou je jedan od glavnih prioriteta Operativnog programa u okviru IPA III 2023-2027. Nosilac programa je Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalna pitanja Vlade Republike Srbije, koje je formiralo Koordinaciono telo za izradu i praćenje sprovođenja Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade, kao i Stručnu grupu za realizaciju pripremnih aktivnosti.
Kosovo* se još uvek nalazi u ranoj pripremnoj fazi kada je reč o pregovaračkom poglavlju 19 koje se odnosi na socijalnu politiku i zapošljavanje. Ipak, u Izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Kosova* za 2023. godinu napominje se da je postignut određeni napredak kada je reč o pripremama za implementaciju Garancije za mlade u skladu sa Implementacionim planom koji je usvojen u novembru 2022. godine. U Izveštaju se navodi da je neophodno nastaviti sa sprovođenjem Plana implementacije i obezbeđivanju uslova za pilotiranje programa u dve opštine – Mitrovica i Uroševac. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih na Kosovu* je tokom 2022. smanjena za neverovatnih 16,6% – 2021. godine taj procenat iznosio je 38%, dok se 2022. smanjio na 21,4%. Zavod za zapošljavanje Kosova* je u fazi restrukturiranja kako bi se ta institucija osposobila za implementaciju Programa. Ipak, u Izveštaju Evropske komisije ističe se da je najveći problem nedostatak ljudskih resursa u javnim službama za zapošljavanje, kao i zastareli informacioni sistem.
U izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Albanije za 2023. godinu navodi se da su pripreme za implementaciju Programa napredovale, te da je neophodno započeti pilotiranje programa kako bi se omogućila implementacija Programa na teritoriji cele zemlje. Albanija je usvojila Plan implementacije programa Garancija za mlade kao Aneks nove Nacionalne strategije za mlade za period 2023-2030. Nosilac celokupnog procesa je Ministarstvo finansija i ekonomije Republike Albanije. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih tokom 2022. bila je 27,8%, dok stopa nezaposlenosti tzv. NEET mladih iznosi 23,4%.
Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina su jedine zemlje u regionu koje još uvek nisu usvojile Plan implementacije Garancije za mlade. Udeo nezaposlenosti mladih u Crnoj Gori u maju 2023. iznosio je 28,3%. Prema Izveštaju o napretku Crne Gore za 2023, preporuke Evropske komisije su da se ojača Zavod za zapošljavanje i pripremi za sprovođenje Garancije za mlade. Formirana je Radna grupa za program Garancija za mlade sa ciljem unapređenja nacrta Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade, koja radi i sa stručnjacima iz Međunarodne organizacije rada.
Bosna i Hercegovina je poslednja zemlja u regionu kada je u pitanju sprovođenje programa Garancija za mlade. U Izveštaju Evropske komisije o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine za 2023. godinu ističe se da je postignut ograničen napredak kada je reč o finalizaciji i usvajanju Plana implementacije Garancije za mlade. U oktobru 2023. konačno je usvojena Strategija zapošljavanja u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine za period 2023-2030, koja prepoznaje Garanciju za mlade kao potpuno novi model zapošljavanja mladih, a dugačak proces njenog usvajanja predstavljao je glavnu prepreku za program Garancija za mlade u Bosni i Hercegovini. Pilotiranje programa je već počelo, a za pilot opštine izabrane su dve manje sredine Visoko i Čitluk. Nakon pilotiranja programa očekuje se proširenje na celu teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine. Na nacionalnom nivou Ministarstvo civilnih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine je nosilac procesa implementacije Programa, dok je za implementaciju programa u Federaciji BiH nadležno Federalno ministarstvo rada i socijalne politike. Informacije o Garanciji za mlade u entitetu Republika Srpska nije moguće pronaći na internetu, niti se pominju u godišnjim izveštajima Evropske komisije. Stopa nezaposlenosti mladih u Bosni i Hercegovini najveća je u celom regionu i iznosi 33,47% za 2022. godinu.
Ključ uspešne primene programa Garancija za mlade leži u intenzivnoj saradnji svih sektora u zemlji – od izvršne vlasti koja je dužna da obezbedi finansijska sredstva za implementaciju, preko poslodavaca, pa sve do OCD. Nakon usvajanja Strategije zapošljavanja u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine očekuje se da će i Bosna i Hercegovina u narednom periodu usvojiti Plan implementacije, koju će, nadamo se, slediti i Crna Gora, kako bi sve zemlje regiona u narednim godinama mogle da primenjuju ovaj ambiciozni program za mlade na celoj teritoriji. Ipak, za to će biti neophodna snažna politička volja svih vlada u regonu, jer samo one mogu da obezbede finansijsku podršku za uspešnu implementaciju.
Nemanja Ivanović, omladinski aktivista i član Glavnog odbora Socijaldemokratske stranke
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
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