Tackling climate requires ambition and inclusivity. Climate crisis in no exception. Some progress is made on ambition. Constant failure is noted on inclusivity.
WB Green Agenda is no exception.
Introduction
The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, is a growth strategy developed for the region, which aims to address challenges related to climate change and green transition. It is developed based on the European Green Deal which aims to achieve “no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050, economic growth decoupled from resource use, and no person and no place left behind”. Implementation of the WB Green Agenda is supported by the Economic Investment Plan and further detailed by the Guidelines issued by the European Commission.
By signing the Sofia Declaration, countries of the region committed to implement the Green Agenda, whereas the Regional Cooperation Council will keep the torchlit of implementation, by also developing an action plan. The Green Agenda, includes five main pillars: climate, energy and mobility; circular economy; pollution prevention; sustainable agriculture and food production; and biodiversity.
Why is the Green Agenda important for the Western Balkans?
The Western Balkans comprises six countries and as a region it has a pristine landscape and a wealth of natural resources. It is, however, one of the most vulnerable regions to the negative consequences of climate change. From raising temperatures, to floods and fires, communities and governments are attesting the challenges, which are no longer distant.
It is now well-known that climate change does not have borders and ambitions under the European Green Deal cannot be achieved only within EU – calling for cross-border cooperation. This is when the WB Green Agenda comes into play. Its implementation, however, requires complex changes in the field of legislation, strategic planning, implementation, and monitoring.
It is also known that tackling the climate crisis requires both ambition and inclusivity.
While sometimes progress is made is announcing impressing ambitions, when it comes to inclusivity, failure has become a pattern.
Lack of meaningful youth engagement
Youth is one of the most vulnerable target groups of climate change and thus the sustainability agenda in general. Because of the actions of previous generations, young people are facing direct and indirect effects on their physical and mental health, but also on their socio-economic conditions.
In some countries, young people represent the largest share of the population. They are also the future. Which should make their meaningful engagement a priority.
In many countries, youth has taken a leading role in the climate action with Greta Thunberg becoming the face of powerful demonstration and the voice of many communities. Elsewhere, groups of young people are taking government to the courts, through strategic litigation efforts.
Many international bodies are taking concrete steps to engage with youth within the sustainability agenda. Although in many cases these steps appearing to be tokenistic, rather than providing for meaningful engagement, they still provide the basis of inclusivity.
The WB Green Agenda provides little opportunities for youth engagement, despite the vast potential.
The Guidelines provide that: “With proper information and education, the youth of the region can contribute decisively to the implementation of the Green Agenda. The European Green Deal will also have to be translated into the different components of Erasmus+, the EU flagship programme for education available in the region.”
Whereas the Action Plan, indicates that: “Another significant actor in the GAWB implementation is youth, as important change agent. It is the youth who will be most affected by the actions of today, particularly concerning the climate emergency, nature crisis, waste management and so forth.”
The Action Plan also vests the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) and the Youth Lab of RCC, as the main partners for ‘cooperation in this area’. However, both of these key documents fail to elaborate on concrete measures for the meaningful engagement of youth.
Such lack of meaningful youth engagement is recognized by young people themselves, as indicated in the Berlin Declaration of the Western Balkans Youth Forum 2022: “We request to be involved and acknowledged as key-partners in all phases of policy making that will arise from the implementation of the Green Agenda.”
During the WB Youth Forum in 2023, held in parallel to the Berlin Summit, young people across the region embarked on a train ride (the Balkan Youth Express) to discuss and agree on action points for the implementation of the Berlin Declaration, including the Green Agenda. Amongst others, one of the most interesting proposals is to establish ‘green seats’ within the Local Youth Councils, which would support implementation of green agenda in local level and also foster regional cooperation between councils in the region.
All in all, their proposals confirm two things: (i) good awareness of the challenges under the sustainability agenda and (ii) failure of decision makers to meaningfully engage with youth.
Such proposals are also a call for reflection.
Listen, listen again… and take action!
Youth engagement requires consistent efforts to incorporate youth perspectives across all stages of decision-making. Invitation to participate in ‘soft’ issues such as awareness-raising campaigns does not amount to meaningful engagement, rather risks of being tokenizing. With the increasing access to information, young people can be involved in topics such as energy transition or climate finance and come up with creative solutions, based on system thinking methodologies.
Youth can drive progress, by being fearless and push for radical change, from the streets to the courts and everywhere in between. This calls for the need to address intersectionality and address systemic settings that hinder youth engagement – including often-times patronizing behaviour.
In the context of WB Green Agenda, stakeholders can address some of these challenges, but it appears that little is done so far. Regional institutions such as RCC and RYCO can set the agenda and channel adequate resources towards the empowerment of youth within the WB Green Agenda, but only few projects are doing so, reconfirming the pattern of putting sustainability on the bottom of the priorities’ pyramid.
About the Author
Armando Bode is a senior lawyer and manager. He practiced law for 7 years, worked as Private Sector Partnerships & Programme Manager for the UK Government and held various research and teaching positions. Armando studied law at the University of Tirana and holds a LLM from the University of Westminster. His research areas are sustainable development, responsible business conduct and multi-stakeholder partnerships.
*This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Academy of European Integrations and Negotiations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
During the last decade the European integration process of the Western Balkans has proceeded rather slowly, leading to disappointment and disillusion among the local population. The governments’ delivering on reform agendas has been characterized of hiccup progress and over time thousands of people –many highly qualified- have decided to move out of their countries and settle for study or work purposes in EU member states.
According to Eurostat, out of 236.000 first residence permits issued by the EU member states in 2021 to Western Balkan and Turkish citizens, 23% are Albanians, followed by 19% Serbians and 14% from Bosnia and Herzegovina. When compared to the residence permits issued back in 2013, the figures are almost doubled, with a constant haemorrhage of work force moving out of the region. Focusing particularly on Albania, the preferred destinations of the last five years remain Germany and France, with respectively almost 77.000 and 33.000 new residence permits issued only in 2021.
In front of the Russian aggression still ongoing in Ukraine, the reinvigoration of the enlargement process in 2023 has provided for an opportunity to defy the status quo in the region. In particular, the Berlin Process is moving forward the promotion of enlargement objectives in the Balkans, thanks also to the Union’s recently adopted growth plan for the region. The Berlin Process seeks to provide a concrete mechanism that can push forward the operationalization of regional cooperation in concrete policy areas among the six countries.
By focusing on concrete initiatives that transversally cross the interests of the countries of the region, the Berlin Process today is paving the way towards the regional economic integration, as well as to its prospective integration into the EU Single Market – considered a clear carrot for the reforms. This is a significative development that can contribute to delineating a revived perspective for the younger generations to remain in their countries. Aware that the EU membership will take time, via the sectoral integration in the EU Single Market, the region’s inhabitants will have the chance to ripe off the first benefits from the implementation of the four freedoms, namely the freedom of movement of citizens, goods, capitals and services.
Regional mobility agreements
The coupling of the current demographic decline and youth migration trends from the region has raised serious concerns not only for the work and life perspective of the younger generations, but also for the future of the WB6 countries and the region in a mid- to long-term perspective. The WB6 leaders to a certain extent have understood that there is no time left to lose and the moment has come to turn their verbal promises into tangible results.
“Our young people want a brighter, more optimistic future. A future that is fair, prosperous and full of opportunities”, declared Charles Michel, President of the European Council, during the Summit of the leaders in Tirana on 15 October.
The Chair’s Conclusions adopted at the 2023 summit recognize that the advancement of a gradual integration at the regional level of the WB6 education, science and youth policies, as well as within the wider EU space, reflects a grounded demand raised by the youngsters in different occasions. In this regard, the Western Balkans Youth Forum declaration 2023 -an annual event that sees the participation of youth representatives from the region-, highlights two essential cross-cutting themes, namely the issue of quality education and youth mobility.
Reinforcing connectivity in education matters remains key to derail from the current worrying trends in the Western Balkans, as well as to fuelling hope that everyone can be a “European citizen” in his/her home country. The improvement of existing practices and boosting of new regional initiatives are expected to positively affect young people’s skills development and civic participation, with positive spill-over effects on greater public awareness and democracy enhancement at the domestic level.
At the Summit of Sofia back in November 2020, the WB6 governments, facilitated by the European Commission, embarked on the establishment of a Common Regional Market, which mirrors the Union’s single market and related four freedoms. In this framework, after two years of negotiations, in 2022 it was made possible the signature of three mobility agreements, namely: (i) on recognition of higher education qualifications; (ii) on recognition of professional qualifications for doctors of medicine, dentists and architects; and, (iii) on freedom of movement with identity cards. A fourth agreement on the recognition of professional qualifications for nurses, veterinary surgeons, midwives and pharmacists was signed during this year’s summit of the Berlin Process in Tirana.
The recognition of higher education qualifications in multiple countries in the wider European space remains a vital development for many professionals, since it facilitates brain circulation, capacity-building as well as integration in other local societies beyond the national borders. In the globalized context where we are living in, ensuring the adoption of such practices is two-fold convenient for any government, as it opens up the local market to incoming specialized fluxes of professionals as well as it contributes to its integration to those of other economies. Nonetheless, the direct beneficiaries of these agreements are young professionals in the early stage of their career, who seek to gain international experience, technical knowledge and new skills, in line with the requests of the job market.
The signature of these agreements is seen as a breakthrough for region’s cooperation and economic integration, which fosters trust between the local societies and overcomes ethnic divisions and hate. The inclusion of these agreements within the wider framework of Common Regional Market sends a positive signal to the constituencies that there is a political will to bring forward the process of deeper regional economic integration and create new opportunities for the younger generations.
“The concerted efforts we put towards mutual recognition of a new set of professions, which now amount to 7 in total, fully based on EU rules – is another symbolic entry ticket to the single market as it can be a crucial step towards recognition of professional qualifications with the EU”, noted Majlinda Bregu, Secretary General of Regional Cooperation Council.
The removal of obstacles for these categories of professionals and the free movement with ID cards contribute to boosting region’s competitiveness and growth, as a first step towards the greater ambition to join the EU Single Market. The process of economic growth and competitiveness, expansion of the regional job market goes hand in hand with the human resources’ development.
In this perspective, an important contribution is expected from the recently adopted New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which targets the economic convergence of the region. Within this ambitious plan of measures, which is accompanied by a 6 billion euros financial envelop, due attention has been paid to the pillars on the free movement of services and workers. The priority action on the recognition of skills and qualifications between the WB6 and the EU builds on the four mobility agreements already signed in the context of Common Regional Market, which will lead to wider a reduction of time and costs for the process as well as an equal treatment of those youngsters graduated in the WB countries and in the rest of the European space. This priority action makes it easier for youth to move abroad for study or mobility purposes, removing the existing barriers to learning and working. Furthermore, it contributes also to bringing closer the Balkan graduates with their peers around EU, and incentivizes the brain circulation process. Differently from the past, the future generations are expected to be more prone to acquiring new experiences in multiple countries throughout their lifespan, and the new knowledge can lead to positive spill-over effects for the WB6 convergence. Now it remains to be seen which are the specific measures that will encourage and financially support the youngsters to move in the region for given period of time. Certainly, some financial schemes are deemed essential for the spin off phase of regional mobility, which will later on generate new spill-over effects on the national economies.
The leaders of tomorrow: Better education and skills
2023 is being celebrated across Europe as the European Year of Skills, with the aim to boost a new momentum and specific attention to all those policy initiatives that promote quality education, technical knowledge as well as address skills shortage in the job market.
Under the Berlin Process framework, particular attention has been paid over time to youth, education and research, recognizing the importance that access to education and removal of barriers to learning are contributing factors to region’s overall development. On the same line stand also the Commission’s New Growth Plan that seeks to prioritize the shared commitment to include the Western Balkans in the wider European Education Area and bridge close cooperation between academic institutions.
An important advocacy work in this direction has been done by the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), a Balkan-wide non-governmental body born out of the Berlin Process. An analysis of RYCO annual youth forum conclusions shows that youth constantly demand for more empowerment and collaboration with the decision-makers so as to bring forward the issue of better education, which in turn would allow for greater chances of employment and better quality of life.
As noted also in the Chair’s Conclusions of 2023, region’s youth recognize the importance of and underlines the need to take actions on “strengthening and expanding current regional mechanisms and EU schemes to further benefit youth mobility and cultural exchanges in the Western Balkans”. Such investments would be beneficial for their personal skills development as well as general reconciliation of the region. However, none of such opportunities would be materialized if the region’s government do not allocate adequate funding to improving existing infrastructure and supporting the access of different categories of the society.
Quality education and accessibility should be offered to anyone, for a just and equal society. In this perspective, the opening of the third branch of the College of Europe in Tirana and the issuing of more than 15 scholarships out of 31 places is commendable since it allows greater accessibility based on personal achievements and merits. The postgraduate studies at the College will both prepare new professionals on the EU integration process -a sensitive issue for the current public administrations of the Balkans that suffer from a lack of skills-, as well as will bring closer youngsters coming from the region and beyond. Moreover, it is a new initiative to reverse the general trend of educational mobility, as the region’s youth is not the only one migrating for study purposes in the EU member states, but also their citizens are coming to the Balkans. While in political terms this new trend contributes to the improvement of the image of the region, in practice it is also beneficial for mutual cooperation and understanding.
One step at a time
The signature of three agreements on the recognition of the higher education qualifications and given professional qualifications marks a positive step forward, since it facilitates the administrative procedures for the recognition of the degree in the other countries. Once the agreements enter into force, the approval process will last up to fourteen days and there will be no processing fees for the applicants. The main beneficiaries will be the students, academic staff and in general professionals interested in acquiring new experiences and technical skills in the region. The specific procedures of diploma recognition in each country will be made available in the respective websites of the ministries dealing with education portfolio, once the agreements enter into force.
The higher the mobility of human resources in the region is expected to lead to greater competitiveness between the countries, pushing so each government to invest more in making the respective country more attractive in terms of social security benefits, improved working conditions, competitive wages, etc.
Furthermore, in face of the digitalisation process that is currently taking place in Europe, particular categories of professionals active in the IT sector can be among the first beneficiaries of the mobility agreements, since the request for such expertise and technical capacities ranks high in the Balkans and beyond.
At the moment, the ratification of the mobility agreements is progressing, although initially with a slow pace. This year’s agreement concerning nurses, pharmacists, etc. has not entered yet the ratification procedures in any of the six countries. Whereas regarding the previous three agreements, Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia have successfully concluded the ratification process. In the case of Montenegro, the three agreements got ratified by the parliament in mid-December 2023 and within a short period of time the President will sign them. Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation is somehow more complexed due to the multi-level governing system between the national authorities and the federations. Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded the ratification process of the two agreements on the recognition of academic qualifications and of the professional qualifications of doctors of medicine, dentists and architects, but there is no progress regarding the one on travelling with ID cards. The resistance comes from the authorities of Republika Srpska due to the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence Herzegovina.
In conclusion, young people from the region and youth organizations in general should continue to monitor and advocate for a swift ratification and implementation of the mobility agreements. This is only a first step that will allow to the young professionals to start gaining some experience and skills in the region. The second step is to continue advocating for financial supporting schemes that allow to everyone to participate in the educational and/or professional experiences in the region, besides the recognition of the social security contributions accumulated during one’s temporary stays in the six countries of the region.
About the Author
Gentiola Madhi works as researcher and media writer at OBC Transeuropa in Italy. She has an extensive research experience in the Balkans, focusing on regional cooperation and European integration process, with a particular attention on youth and civil society dimension. Gentiola is part of the first cohort of AIEN alumni and regularly contributes with policy analyses and talks. She graduated from the College of Europe (Belgium) and the University of Florence (Italy).
*This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Academy of European Integrations and Negotiations and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
The realisation of the rights of young people to actively participate in the decision-making process is an integral part of every developed democratic society and is guaranteed by the European Charter on the Participation of Young People at the Local and Regional Levels adopted by the Council of Europe. Young people have the right, and should have the opportunity, to fully participate in decision-making that affects their lives at the local and/or regional level.
However, due to the insufficient democratic capacity of WB countries, still burdened by the legacy of the last decade of the 20th century, young people in the entire region have very little trust in state institutions and political organisations. Despite the existence of a normative and institutional framework, young people are inadequately represented in institutions and lack an encouraging framework for participating in decision-making processes. Therefore, civil society organisations in the region play a crucial role in mobilising young people for political and social participation.
What is youth participation and why is it important?
In his well-known work Children’s Participation: From tokenism to citizenship, published by UNICEF in 1992, Roger Hart developed the so-called Hart’s ladder of youth participation with 8 levels, which has gained widespread use in the field in the subsequent years. The term ‘participation,’ as used by the author, refers to the process of making decisions that affect one’s own life and the life of the community to which they belong (Hart, 1992). Hart also states that a nation is democratic to the extent that its citizens are involved in processes, particularly at the community level (Hart, 1992). The author believes that young people should be engaged in significant activities with adults, but it is unrealistic to expect them to become responsible overnight. At the ages of 16, 18, or 21, they cannot participate without acquiring skills and responsibilities, gradually, through practice. Hart also emphasises that the involvement of young people in decision-making processes is particularly important for those belonging to vulnerable groups. Through participation, they learn to combat discrimination and repression.
Roger Hart, like many other authors in this field, believes in the dual importance of genuine youth participation in these processes: internal development of the young person, acquiring critical thinking skills, and comparing perspectives necessary for forming beliefs, and the contribution to the democratisation of society. Barry Chechkoway shares the same view, asserting that participation in political and social processes contributes to improving the civil rights of young people, democratising society, promoting their personal development, and providing them with meaningful knowledge and practical skills (Chechkoway, 2011).
Maria Grasso bases the political participation of young people on a crucial division into conventional (voting in elections, membership in political parties) and unconventional forms of participation (participation in protests, signing petitions, etc.). In her work “Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises,” the author argues that young people are less active in conventional forms of participation compared to adults, while they are much more active in non-institutional models of participation, highlighting online activism as an increasingly important form of action (Grasso, 2018). She attributes the causes of this trend to the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008, as young people are perceived as the group most affected by the crisis. Young people are more inclined to choose non-institutional means because they are fluid, provide them with more freedom, and are linked to their identities.
Considering the above trend of young people moving away from conventional participation models, the Council of Europe commissioned a study in 2017 to identify alternative and innovative forms of youth participation. Anne Crowley and Dan Moxon, the authors of the study, found that young people are not apathetic and uninterested but are more inclined to participate in unconventional ways. Key findings indicate that co-management, co-production, digital participation, and deliberation represent innovative forms of participation for young people (Crowley & Moxon, 2017). Other global studies indicate that the majority of young people have a strong desire to actively engage with their community but lack sufficient knowledge concerning the decision-making process.
Youth Engagement at the European Level
Throughout the past decade, there has been talk of a crisis in European democracy, with many democratic policies worldwide facing challenges, as evidenced by the decline in traditional forms of political engagement, party membership, youth voter turnout, and the decline in electoral support for major parties. However, the last European Parliament elections held in 2019 were marked by higher youth turnout than in the previous period.
A Survey conducted by the European Youth Parliament in 2021 shows that nearly nine out of ten respondents (87%) have participated in at least one civic or political activity. Almost half of the respondents (46%) voted in the last local, national, or European elections, 42% initiated or signed a petition, while 24% participated in street protests or demonstrations. Approximately 29% of young people in the EU believe they have at least some influence on European policies, and this percentage increases to 44% where influencing local politics is in question.
The mechanism within the European Union that enables youth participation in decision-making processes is the EU Youth Dialogue, formerly known as the EU Structured Dialogue. It represents a consultative process between government representatives and young people, ensuring that the opinions and needs of youth are considered when adopting youth policies at the EU level. The EU does not have the mandate to create youth policies to replace those of its member states but consistently emphasises the importance of involving young generations and aims to formulate youth policies as responses to challenges faced by the youth.
It is worth noting that European research indicates that participants in Erasmus+ mobility projects for youth highlight a very clear and positive impact of their participation in projects on their competencies, behaviours, and values (Salto Youth, 2014). However, such projects have a significantly greater effect on young people with fewer opportunities, specifically those belonging to vulnerable groups. These projects contribute to the personal and professional development of participants, helping them appreciate cultural diversity and engage in decision-making processes on issues that affect their lives.
Western Balkans Youth – Passive Observers or Initiators of Change?
Legally, ‘youth’ are considered to be individuals between the ages of 15 to 29 in North Macedonia and Albania, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the term encompasses young people aged 15 to 30, and from 15 to 24 years of age in Kosovo*. The generations of young people in the region born in the 1990s and later are growing up in very turbulent social circumstances. As stated in a publication by the Regional Youth Participation and Dialogue Platform for the Balkans, young people in the region have become marginalised socially, economically, and politically. This has made them one of the most vulnerable social groups, significantly affected by the legacy of past conflicts and delayed transitions to democracy. Recent scientific research has shown that the social and political changes of the 1990s did not increase the chances of young people socially integrating or participating in decision-making processes. Engagement and active participation of young people are more than ever prerequisites for building democratic societies and ensuring peace and stability in the Western Balkans. Approximately half of the young people in the region do not see a perspective for staying in their country and wish to leave in the near future.
When discussing the passivity of youth in the context of civic and political activism, we refer to it from the perspective of conventional or traditional models of participation (membership in political parties, participation in elections, etc.). Young people in the region are now most easily and quickly mobilised through social networks, especially when they perceive an issue to be extremely important. All regional research in recent years shows that topics such as ecology and environmental protection are much more in their focus than before. Therefore, we can say that young people in the region largely participate in political and social processes, mainly through unconventional participation mechanisms such as participating in protests and engaging on social media (signing petitions, etc.). Civic and political engagement of young people through social networks may be insufficient, but it certainly expresses their desire to be actors in the political sphere whose voices need to be heard. Furthermore, online activism is not at the same level in all Western Balkan countries (e.g., it is much more significant in Serbia compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The Regional Youth Participation Index for the Western Balkans for 2021, presented as part of the regional project Western Balkan and Turkey for EmploYouth, supported by the EU, measures three dimensions of youth participation in public life: political, economic, and social participation. According to the report, the youth participation index is 69% for Serbia, 64.4% for Montenegro, 63.4% for Albania, and 63.2% for North Macedonia, out of a maximum of 100%. The project was not implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*, so there are no such data measured by unified indicators for all economies in the region. According to the aforementioned research, political participation indicates the degree of young people’s involvement in government bodies, the ability to obtain information and address state authorities, and the existence of youth institutions at local and national levels. Indicators of political participation include: a) the percentage of young ministers in the government; b) the percentage of assistant ministers in the government; c) the percentage of young members of parliament; d) the percentage of young mayors; e) the use of online tools for information and participation in decision-making processes of government, parliamentary institutions, and local self-government institutions; f) the existence of youth structures at the national and local levels (councils, parliaments, etc.). Regarding political participation of young people, Serbia has the highest level at 50.4%, while North Macedonia has the lowest at 40%. The index for Montenegro is 46.8%, and for Albania, it is 44.7%.
Young people are still insufficiently represented in political life in all economies covered by this Research. The number of young people in executive government roles in all economies is zero. During the research period, there were no ministers in the government and practically not a single mayor under the age of thirty. Deputy ministers under the age of thirty were present in Albania and Serbia only. The results for 2021 showed that in all countries, the majority of ministries and parliaments used online tools for public information, which is crucial for empowering young people for political participation. However, the report notes that the use of online tools by municipalities at the local level needs significant improvement in Albania and North Macedonia.
The above data indicate that all the economies in the surveyed region are far from reaching the goal. The Young Parliamentarians Forum of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a global organisation of national parliaments, has set a goal of achieving 15% of parliamentarians under the age of 30 by 2030. The highest number of parliamentarians in any of the countries in the region was recorded in Serbia, with a percentage of 11.2% in the 2020 term when 28 young parliamentarians were elected to the Parliament. In the current term of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (elected in 2022), out of a total of 250 members of parliament, only 9, or 3.6%, are young parliamentarians aged 15 to 29. Unfortunately, these numbers in our country don’t mean much, as their participation is mostly a formality, especially in terms of young parliamentarians from the ruling party. As Barry Chechkoway claims: “The quality of participation is not measured solely by its extent or the number of young people involved in activities but rather by the actual impact on the process and a specific decision that produces a favourable outcome for youth. Youth participation refers to their active engagement and real influence on processes, rather than their passive presence or symbolic roles in processes led by adults” (Chechkoway, 2011). After Serbia, the second-highest percentage of youth participation was recorded in Montenegro in 2018, reaching 8.6%. The highest registered percentage of young mayors in any of the countries in the last five years was 6% in Albania from 2016 to 2018, although this percentage has dropped to zero in the last three years, following the latest local elections.
According to the latest population census in Serbia from 2022, young people aged 15 to 29 make up 15.8% of the total population in Serbia, which is a decrease of nearly 4%, compared to the previous census. The Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth in the Republic of Serbia for 2023, regularly published by the National Youth Council of Serbia, shows that young people lack faith in any of the institutions examined in the study. The media, political parties, and political institutions – the President of the Republic, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia – stand out with the least trust. However, Serbia is the first non-European Union member country to establish the EU Youth Dialogue mechanism (formerly the Structured Dialogue), institutionalised through the work of the National Youth Council. The report also shows that young people in Serbia do not follow local politics and believe that the political system does not enable them to influence political processes and decisions. The fact that youths in Serbia have very little influence on the decision-making process is among the top five issues facing this group and has increased over the past six year by 10%. The majority of respondents participating in the study are not political party activists, while 23% of them are members of some form of association.
Nevertheless, all is not lost concerning youth activism in Serbia. When we discuss unconventional mechanisms of political participation, the situation is somewhat different, especially concerning ‘digital activism’. Young people in Serbia, students in particular, often organise and lead protest gatherings, as well as initiate and sign petitions or public initiatives. A relevant example is the student protests held in Serbia in July 2020, organised over social media when the authorities took the decision to evict them from student dormitories as a result of the worsening situation with the COVID-19 pandemic. Only a few hours had passed from the moment the first complaints were published on social media until the time the students took to the streets. Regarding petitions or public initiatives, over 46% of respondents in the National Youth Council of Serbia’s survey highlighted that they had signed petitions or public initiatives over the previous two years (e.g., at the EU level, this percentage is 42%). In addition to signing petitions, the percentage of participants who engaged in other political or social activities in the last two years is as follows:
42.4% of young people participated in a protest organised by an association, students, an informal group, or citizens.
19.4% of young people participated in forums.
12.5% of young people supported someone in elections (participation in a campaign, signing support).
7.4% of young people participated in a protest organised by a political party.
Respondents note that youth organisations improve the position of young people and encourage and stimulate their activism. However, they emphasise that youth organisations are not visible enough among young people, and student organisations often have a political background, leading to students’ disappointment and demotivation to participate in any other organisations.
In terms of Albania, a study by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Tirana from 2019 indicates that young people are distancing themselves from political parties, where 80% of respondents were not involved in parties either as members or activists.. Only 10.8% of them were members, while 9.2% were activists. Approximately 40% of young people in Albania had never been involved in public hearings or the signing of petitions. However, 23% of young people then expressed their belief that youth participation in the public sphere in Albania had increased. As in other Western Balkan economies, youth and other non-governmental organisations working with young people are considered key actors in the field and often serve to fill the gap in youth-related issues not covered by public institutions.
A similar situation is observed with young people in Kosovo*. Research indicates an extremely low level of trust among young people in Kosovar institutions, raising questions about their effectiveness and integrity. Youth organisations are active, but they operate mainly in large urban areas, while young people from rural areas are excluded from the processes. Despite efforts to increase youth participation and promote volunteering, the number of young people actively participating in society and volunteer work is very low. Existing mechanisms for direct youth participation in decision-making processes are deemed insufficient and ineffective.
In North Macedonia, young people generally believe that they cannot influence government decisions and do not participate to a satisfactory extent in social and political processes. According to a study conducted by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Skopje in 2019, 85% of young people stated that they had never been consulted by authorities, neither at the local or the national level. Nearly 71% of young people perceive themselves as socially inactive, with only 7% identifying as members of a political party. Approximately 90% of young people have never been part of a non-governmental organisation dealing with social issues. Approximately 70% of young people consider online activism more important than conventional participation mechanisms. Only 8% of young people have taken steps to address a specific social issue. However, the research shows that 64% of young people always vote in elections, even though every other young citizen does not believe that voting can influence the situation in the country.
According to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s research in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2018/2019, the majority of young respondents expressed that they have voted and consider it a civic duty. They have a clear understanding of their role in legitimising the rule of representative democracy but are generally politically uninvolved, whether in terms of participating in protests and petitions or working for political parties. Trust in political institutions, including the Presidency of BiH, the Parliamentary Assembly, the government, and political parties, is at an exceptionally low level. The specific way of direct participation in decision-making processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina also depends on which part of the country the young people come from. At the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no law on local self-government, as these laws are enacted at the entity level.
According to the latest Research and assessments of local policies related to youth and the needs of young people in 15 local self-governments in Montenegro, conducted by the Institute for Strategic Studies and Projections from Podgorica in 2022, on average, every other young inhabitant of Montenegro believes that young people are interested in being involved in decision-making on matters that directly impact them, and a quarter of young people state that they are very willing to participate in decision-making processes. However, they are not familiar with the mechanisms available to them for involvement in decision-making. The research has shown that the previous experience of young people is generally negative regarding participation in such activities, and involvement is formal, often limited to those already recognised as more active community members, or is carried out along political lines.
Despite their rebellious natures, young people in the WB region are alienated from politics and do not believe they can influence decision-making which impacts their future. They are distanced from political parties, with only a small percentage actively engaged political parties or organisations. Throughout the region, politics is generally viewed as a ‘dirty game’, a game young people do not wish to participate in. The poor functioning of democratic institutions, nepotism, corruption, and slow economic growth have contributed to a negative perception of political engagement among young people, leading to abstention as a form of resistance to the system. While their expectations are often justified, the Western Balkans youth need to understand that they are the main drivers of societal change and should participate in processes which have a direct or indirect impact on their quality of life. The world and everything in it belongs to the young.
Author: Andrea Trajković, Project Manager and Youth Activist
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Ostvarenje prava mladih da aktivno participiraju u procesu donošenja odluka je sastavni dio svakog razvijenog demokratskog društva i garantovano je Evropskom poveljom o učešću mladih na lokalnom i regionalnom nivou usvojenom od strane Savjeta Evrope. Mladi imaju pravo, a trebalo bi da imaju i priliku za punopravno učešće u donošenju odluka koje utiču na njihov život, a koje se donose na lokalnom ili regionalnom nivou.
Međutim, zbog nedovoljnog demokratskog kapaciteta zemalja Zapadnog Balkana koje su i dalje opterećene nasljeđem prošlosti iz posljednje decenije prošlog veka, mladi u celom regionu imaju veoma nizak nivo poverenja u državne institucije i političke organizacije. I pored postojanja normativnog i institucionalnog okvira, mladi nisu zastupljeni u institucijama i nemaju podsticajan okvir za učešće u procesima donošenja odluka. Stoga organizacije civilnog društva u regionu imaju važnu ulogu u mobilizaciji mladih za političku i društvenu participaciju.
Šta je participacija mladih i zašto je važna?
Rodžer Hart je u svom čuvenom delu Children’s Participation: From tokenism to citizenship, objavljenom od strane UNICEF-a 1992. godine, razvio tzv. Hartovu lestvicu participacije mladih na 8 nivoa, koja je ušla u široku upotrebu u predmetnoj oblasti u godinama koje su usledile. Pod terminom „učešće“ autor podrazumeva proces donošenja odluka koje utiču na sopstveni život i život zajednice kojoj se pripada (Hart, 1992). Hart, takođe, navodi da je nacija demokratska u onoj meri u kojoj su njeni građani uključeni u procese, posebno na nivou zajednice (Hart, 1992). Autor smatra da bi mladi trebalo da budu uključeni u značajne aktivnosti sa odraslima, ali da nije realno očekivati da oni mogu preko noći postati odgovorni, te sa 16, 18 ili 21 godinu učestvovati bez prethodnog sticanja veština i odgovornosti, već da se to može steći samo postepeno kroz praksu. Hart je, takođe, stava da je učešće mladih u procesu donošenja odluka posebno važno za one koji pripadaju osetljivim grupama, jer kroz učešće sa drugima uče da se bore protiv diskriminacije i represije.
Rodžer Hart je jedan od mnogobrojnih autora iz ove oblasti koji smatraju da postoji dvostruka važnost istinskog učešća mladih u ovim procesima: jedna je unutrašnji razvoj mlade osobe i sticanje veštine kritičkog razmišljanja i poređenja perspektiva koje su neophodne za formiranje uverenja, a druga je doprinos demokratizaciji društva. Istog stanovišta je i Barry Chechoway. On smatra da učešće u političkim i društvenim procesima doprinosi unapređenju građanskih prava mladih osoba i demokratizaciji društva, te promoviše njihov lični razvoj i obezbeđuje im sadržajna znanja i praktične veštine (Chechkoway, 2011).
Maria Grasso političku participaiju mladih zasniva na ključnoj podeli na konvencionalne (glasanje na izborima, članstvo u političkim partijama) i nekonvencionalne oblike participacije (učešće na protestima, potpisivanje peticija i sl.). U svom delu Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises autorka tvrdi da su mladi manje aktivni u konvencionalnim oblicima participacije u odnosu na odrasle, dok su mnogo više aktivni u vaninstitucionalnim modelima učešća, te posebno ističe online aktivizam kao sve važniji oblik delovanja (Grasso, 2018). Uzroke toga pripisuje svetskoj ekonomskoj krizi koja je nastupila 2008. godine, jer se mladi percipiraju kao grupa koju je kriza najviše pogodila. Mladi imaju veću sklonost da biraju neinstitucionalna sredstva zbog toga što su ona fluidna, daju im više slobode i povezuju se sa njihovim identitetima.
Imajući u vidu gore navedeni trend udaljavanja mladih od konvencionalnih modela participacije, Savet Evrope je 2017. godine poručio istraživanje o identifikaciji alternativnih i inovatinih oblika učešća mladih. Anne Crowley i Dan Moxon, autori istraživanja, došli su do nalaza da mladi nisu apatični i nezainteresovani, već im je bliže učešće na nekonvencionalne načine. Takođe, ključni nalazi su da zajedničko upravljanje, koprodukcija, digitalno učešće i deliberacija predstavljaju inovativne oblike učešća za mlade osobe (Crowley & Moxon, 2017). Druga istraživanja na svetskom nivou pokazuju da većina mladih ljudi ima snažnu želju da se aktivno bavi svojom zajednicom, ali nemaju dovoljno znanja o procesu donošenja odluka.
Angažman mladih na evropskom nivou
Još tokom protekle decenije govorilo se i o krizi evropske demokratije, te da su mnoge demokratske politike širom sveta u problemu, što dokazuje i pad tradicionalnih oblika političkog angažmana, članstva u partijama, izlaznosti mladih na izborima, kao i pad izborne podrške glavnim strankama. Ipak, poslednje izbore za Evropski parlament održane 2019. godine obeležila je veća izlaznost mladih nego što je to ranije bio slučaj.
Istraživanje koje je sproveo Evropski parlament mladih 2021. godine pokazuje da je skoro devet od deset ispitanika (87%) barem jednom učestvovalo u nekoj građanskoj ili političkoj aktivnosti. Skoro polovina ispitanika (46%) glasala je na poslednjim lokalnim, nacionalnim ili evropskim izborima, 42% njih je iniciralo ili potpisalo neku peticiju, dok je 24% ispitanika učestvovalo u uličnim protestima ili demonstracijama. Oko 29% mladih u EU smatra da ima barem neki uticaj na evropske politike, dok taj procenat ide i to 44% kada je u pitanju uticaj na politiku na lokalnom nivou.
Mehanizam koji na nivou Evropske unije omogućava učešće mladih u procesu donošenja odluka jeste EU Dijalog sa mladima, odnosno nekadašnji Strukturni dijalog EU, koji predstavlja konsultativni proces između predstavnika vlasti i mladih ljudi, te osigurava da mišljenje i potrebe mladih budu uzete u obzir prilikom usvajanja omladinskih politika na nivou EU. EU nema mandat da kreira omladinsku politiku koja bi mogla da zameni politike država članica, ali stalno naglašava važnost učešća mladih generacija i nastoji da formuliše omladinske politike kao odgovore na izazove sa kojima se mladi suočavaju.
Korisno je napomenuti da evropska istraživanja pokazuju da učesnici Erasmus+ projekata za mobilnost mladih ističu veoma jasan i pozitivan uticaj njihovog učešća na projektima na njihove kompetencije, ponašanje i vrednosti (Salto Youth, 2014). Ipak, ovakvi projekti imaju znatno veći efekat na mlade ljude sa manje mogućnosti, odnosno za one koji pripadaju osetljivim grupama. Ovakvi projekti doprinose ličnom i profesionalnom razvoju učesnika i pomažu im da cene kulturnu raznolikost i uključe se u procese donošenja odluka o pitanjima koja utiču na njihove živote.
Mladi u regionu Zapadnog Balkana – pasivni posmatrači ili inicijatori promena?
Zakonski posmatrano, pod kategorijom „mladi“ smatraju se osobe od 15 do 29 godina u Severnoj Makedoniji i Albaniji, dok u Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Srbiji taj uzrast obuhvata mlade od 15 do 30 godina, a na Kosovu* od 15 do 24 godine. Generacije mladih u regionu rođene 90-ih godina prošlog veka i kasnije odrastaju u veoma turbulentnim društvenim okolnostima. Kao što se navodi u publikaciji izrađenoj od strane Regionalne platforme za participaciju i dijalog mladih Balkana, mladi ljudi u regionu postali su marginalizovani – socijalno, ekonomski i politički, postajući tako jedna od najranjivijih društvenih kategorija u velikoj meri pogođena nasleđem sukoba iz prošlosti i odloženom tranzicijom ka demokratiji. Novija naučna istraživanja pokazala su da društvene i političke promene koje su se desile 90-ih godina nisu povećale šanse mladih da se društveno integrišu, niti da učestvuju u procesima donošenja odluka. Angažman i aktivno učešće mladih postaje više nego ikada preduslov za izgradnju demokratskih društava, kao i garancija mira i stabilnosti na Zapadnom Balkanu. Približno polovina mladih ljudi u regionu ne vidi perspektivu ostanka u svojoj zemlji i želi da je napusti u skorijoj budućnosti.
Kada govorimo o pasivizaciji mladih u kontekstu građanskog i političkog aktivizma, govorimo iz ugla konvencionalnih, odnosno tradicionalnih modela participacije (članstvo u političkim partijama, učešće na izborima i sl.). Mladi u regionu se danas najlakše i najbrže mobilizuju preko društvenih mreža, posebno kada su u pitanju određene teme koje oni percipiraju kao izuzetno važne. Sva regionalna istraživanja u poslednjih nekoliko godina pokazuju da su teme poput ekologije i zaštitne životne sredine mnogo više u njihovom fokusu nego što je to bio slučaj ranije. Stoga možemo da kažemo da mladi u regionu u velikoj meri participiraju u političkim i društvenim procesima uglavnom kroz nekonvencionalne mehanizme participacije poput učešća na protestima i angažovanjem na društvenim mrežama (potpisivanje peticija i sl.). Građanski i politički angažman mladih preko društvenih mreža možda nije dovoljan, ali svakako izražava njihovu težnju da budu akteri u političkoj sferi čiji glas treba da se čuje. Takođe, onlajn aktivizam nije na istom nivou u svim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana (npr. u Srbiji je mnogo veći u odnosu na Bosnu i Hercegovinu).
Regionalni indeks participacije mladih na Zapadnom Balkanu za 2021. godinu, predstavljen u okviru regionalnog projekta „Western Balkan and Turkey for EmploYouth“ podržanog od strane Evropske unije, kao jedinstveni metod praćenja učešća mladih u javnom životu meri tri dimenzije: političku, ekonomsku i društvenu participaciju mladih. Prema ovom izveštaju, indeks participacije mladih iznosi 69% za Srbiju, 64,4% za Crnu Goru, 63,4% za Albaniju i 63,2% za Severnu Makedoniju od maksimalnih 100%. Projekat nije realizovan u Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu*, stoga ne postoje takvi podaci mereni jedinstvenim indikatorima za sve zemlje u regionu. Prema pomenutom istraživanju, politička participacija pokazuje stepen uključenosti mladih u organe vlasti, mogućnost dobijanja informacija i obraćanja državnim organima i postojanje omladinskih institucija u lokalnim i republičkim organima. Indikatori političke participacije su: a) procenat mladih ministara/ki u Vladi; b) procenat pomoćnika/ca ministara/ki u Vladi; c) procenat mladih poslanika/ca u Parlamentu; d) procenat mladih gradonačelnika/ca; e) korišćenje onlajn alata za informisanje i učešće u procesu donošenja odluka vladinih, skupštinskih institucija i institucija lokalne samouprave; f) postojanje omladinskih struktura na nacionalnom i lokalnom nivou (saveti, parlamenti, itd.). Kada govorimo o političkoj participaciji mladih, najviši nivo ima Srbija – 50,4%, a najniži Severna Makedonija – 40%. Indeks za Crnu Goru je 46,8%, dok za Albaniju iznosi 44,7%.
Mladi su i dalje nedovoljno zastupljeni u političkom životu u svim zemljama koje su bile obuhvaćene istraživanjem. Broj mladih u izvršnoj vlasti u svim zemljama je ravan nuli. Tokom perioda istraživanja nije bilo ministara u Vladi i skoro nijedan gradonačelnik ispod trideset godina u bilo kojoj od zemalja. Zamenici ministara mlađi od trideset godina bili su prisutni samo u Albaniji i Srbiji. Rezultati za 2021. godinu pokazali su da je u svim zemljama većina ministarstava i parlamenata koristila onlajn alate za informisanje javnosti, što je važno za osposobljavanje mladih za političku participaciju. Ipak, u izveštaju se navodi da korišćenje onlajn alata od strane opština na lokalnom nivou mora biti značajno poboljšano u Albaniji i Severnoj Makedoniji.
Gorenavedeni podaci govore da su sve zemlje u regionu koje su bile predmet istraživanja daleko od dostizanja cilja. Forum mladih parlamentaraca Interparlamentarne unije, globalne organizacije nacionalnih parlamenata, postavio je cilj od 15% poslanika mlađih od 30 godina koji treba da bude dostignut do 2030. godine. Najveći broj poslanika u bilo kojoj od zemalja u regionu registrovan je u Srbiji kada je taj procenat iznosio 11,2% i to u sazivu iz 2020. godine kada je 28 mladih poslanika i poslanica bilo izabrano u Parlament. U aktuelnom sazivu Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije (izabranom 2022. godine), od ukupno 250 narodnih poslanika, samo 9 njih, odnosno 3,6%, čine mladi poslanici od 15 do 29 godina. Nažalost, te brojke u našoj zemlji ne znače mnogo, jer se njihovo učešće uglavnom svodi na formalnost, naročito kada su u pitanju mladi poslanici i poslanice iz vladajuće partije. Kao što navodi Barry Chechoway: „Kvalitet učešća ne meri se samo njegovim obimom, odnosno brojem mladih koji učestvuju u aktivnostima, već se meri stvarnim uticajem na proces i određenu odluku koja proizvodi povoljan ishod po mlade. Učešće mladih odnosi se na njihovo aktivno angažovanje i stvaran uticaj na procese, a ne na njihovo pasivno prisustvo ili simbolične uloge u procesima koji vode odrasli“ (Chechkoway, 2011). Posle Srbije, najveći procenat učešća mladih zabeležen je u Crnoj Gori 2018. godine i iznosio je 8,6%. Najveći registrovani procenat mladih gradonačelnika u nekoj od zemalja u poslednjih pet godina bio je 6% u Albaniji u periodu od 2016. do 2018. godine, iako je u poslednje tri godine ovaj procenat pao na nulu nakon poslednjih lokalnih izbora.
Prema poslednjem popisu stanovništva u Srbiji iz 2022. godine, mladi od 15 do 29 godina čine 15,8 odsto ukupne populacije u Srbiji, što je smanjenje od skoro 4 odsto u odnosu na prethodni popis. Alternativni izveštaj o položaju i potrebama mladih u Republici Srbiji za 2023. godinu, koji redovno objavljuje Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije, pokazuje da mladi nemaju poverenja ni u jednu od institucija koje su ispitivane u istraživanju. Sa najmanjim poverenjem se ističu mediji, političke partije i političke institucije – predsednik Republike, Vlada Republike Srbije i Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. Ipak, Srbija je prva zemlja koja nije članica Evropske unije, koja je uspostavila mehanizam Dijaloga mladih u EU (nekadašnji Strukturni dijalog), koji je institucionalizovan kroz rad Nacionalnog saveta za mlade. Izveštaj, takođe, pokazuje da mladi u Srbiji ne prate politiku na lokalnom nivou, te da smatraju da im politički sistem ne omogućava da utiču na političke procese i odluke. Mali uticaj na proces donošenja odluka nalazi se među top pet problema sa kojima se suočavaju mladi u Srbiji i u poslednjih šest godina porastao je za 10%. Velika većina ispitanika koji su učestvovali u istraživanju nisu aktivisti političkih partija, dok su njih 23% članovi nekog udruženja.
Ipak, nije sve tako crno kada je u pitanju omladinski aktivizam u Srbiji. Kada govorimo o nekonvencionalnim mehanizmima političke participacije, situacija je nešto drugačija, posebno kada govorimo o „digitalnom aktivizmu“. Mladi u Srbiji, naročito studenti, često su organizatori i predvodnici protestnih skupova i inicijatori i potpisnici peticija ili narodnih inicijativa. Kao relevantan primer mogu da se navedu protesti studenata u Srbiji tokom jula 2020. godine, koji su organizovani na društvenim mrežama nakon odluke vlasti da budu iseljeni iz studentskih domova zbog pogoršanja situacije sa pandemijom COVID-19. Od izražavanja nezadovoljstva i poziva na društvenim mrežama do izlaska na ulice prošlo je samo nekoliko sati. Kada je reč o peticijama ili narodnim inicijativama, preko 46% ispitanika KOMS-ovog istraživanja istaklo je da su u prethodne dve godine učestvovali u potpisivanju neke peticije ili narodne inicijative (npr. na nivou EU taj procenat iznosi 42%). Procenat ispitanika KOMS-ovog istraživanja koji su, pored potpisivanja peticija, učestvovali u drugim političkim ili društvenim aktivnostima u poslednje dve godine iznosi:
42,4% mladih učestvovalo je u protestu koji je organizovan od strane nekog udruženja, studenata, neformalne grupe ili građana
19,4% mladih učestvovalo je na tribinama
12,5% mladih pružilo je podršku nekome na izborima (učešće u kampanji, potpis podrške)
7,4% mladih učestvovalo je u protestu koji je organizovan od strane neke političke partije
Ispitanici navode da omladinske organizacije unapređuju položaj mladih i ohrabruju i podstiču njihov aktivizam. Ipak, ističu da omladinske organizacije nisu dovoljno vidljive među mladima, kao i da studentske organizacije često imaju političku pozadinu, što dovodi do razočaranja studenata u njih i demotivišuće deluje na učešće u bilo kojim drugim organizacijama.
Kada je reč o Albaniji, istraživanje Vestminsterske fondacije za demokratiju u Tirani iz 2019.godine pokazalo je da su mladi distancirani od političkih partija, gde 80% ispitanika nije angažovano u partijama ni kao članovi niti kao aktivisti. Samo 10,8% njih su članovi, dok je 9,2% aktivista. Oko 40% mladih u Albaniji nikada nije bilo angažovano u javnom saslušanju ili potpisivanju peticija. Ipak, 23% mladih se tada izjasnilo da veruje da je povećano učešće mladih u javnom životu u Albaniji. Kao i u drugim zapadnobalkanskim zemljama, i u Albaniji se omladinske i druge nevladine organizacije koje rade sa mladima smatraju ključnim akterima na terenu i često služe da popune prazninu u pitanjima vezanim za mlade koja nisu pokrivena javnim institucijama.
Slična situacija je i sa mladima na Kosovu*. Istraživanja pokazuju izuzetno nizak nivo poverenja mladih u kosovske institucije, dovodeći u pitanje njihovu efikasnost i integritet. Omladinske organizacije civilnog društva su aktivne, ali one deluju u velikim urbanim sredinama, dok su mladi iz ruralnih područja isključeni iz procesa. Uprkos naporima da se poveća učešće mladih i promocija volontiranja, broj mladih koji učestvuju u društvu i volontiraju je veoma nizak. Postojeći mehanizmi za direktno učešće mladih u procesima donošenja odluka nisu dovoljni i efikasni.
I u Severnoj Makedoniji mladi uglavnom veruju da oni ne mogu uticati na odluke vlasti i ne učestvuju u zadovoljavajućoj meri u društvenim i političkim procesima. Prema istraživanju koje je 2019. godine sprovela Vestminsterska fondacija za demokratiju u Skoplju, 85% mladih je navelo da nikada nisu bili konsultovani od strane vlasti ni na lokalnom ni na nacionalnom nivou. Skoro 71% mladih sebe percipira kao društveno neaktivne, dok se samo 7% mladih izjasnilo da su članovi političke partije. Oko 90% mladih nikada nije bilo deo neke nevladine organizacije koja se bavi socijalnim pitanjima. Približno 70% mladih smatra da je onlajn aktivizam važniji od konvencionalnih mehanizama participacije. Samo 8% mladih preduzelo je neke korake da reši određeni društveni problem. Ipak, istraživanje pokazuje da 64% mladih navodi da uvek glasaju na izborima, iako svaki drugi mladi građanin ne veruje da glasanjem može da utiče na situaciju u zemlji.
Prema istraživanju Fridrih Ebert Fondacije u Bosni i Hercegovini za 2018/2019. godinu, većina mladih ispitanika se izjasnila da su glasali i smatraju to građanskom dužnošću. Oni imaju jasno razumevanje svoje uloge u legitimizaciji vladavine predstavničke demokratije, ali su pored glasanja slabo politički angažovani bilo u smislu učešća u protestima i peticijama ili rada za političke stranke. Poverenje u političke institucije, uključujući Predsedništvo BiH, Parlamentarnu skupštinu, vladu i političke stranke je na izuzetno niskom nivou. Specifičan način direktnog učešća u procesima odlučivanja u Bosni i Hercegovini zavisi i od toga iz kog dela države mladi dolaze. Na nivou Bosne i Hercegovine ne postoji zakon o lokalnoj samoupravi, već su ti zakoni doneti na nivou entiteta.
Prema najnovijem Istraživanju i procenama lokalnih politika koje se odnose na mlade i potrebe mladih u 15 lokalnih samouprava u Crnoj Gori, koje je sproveo Institut za strateške studije i projekcije iz Podgorice tokom 2022. godine, u proseku svaki drugi mladi građanin ili građanka Crne Gore smatra da su mladi zainteresovani da budu uključeni u donošenje odluka o stvarima koje ih se direktno tiču, a četvrtina mladih izjavljuje da je u velikoj meri spremna da učestvuje u procesima donošenja odluka. Takođe, ne poznaju mehanizme koji su im na raspolaganju za uključivanje u donošenje odluka. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je dosadašnje iskustvo mladih uglavnom negativno po pitanju učešća u takvim aktivnostima, a uključenost je formalna i svodi se na uključivanje onih koji su već prepoznati kao aktivniji članovi zajednice ili se vrši po političkoj liniji.
Iako buntovni, mladi ljudi u regionu Zapadnog Balkana otuđeni su od politike i ne veruju da mogu da utiču na donošenje odluka koje se tiču njihove budućnosti. Distancirani su od političkih partija, te je samo mali procenat njih angažovan u nekoj političkoj partiji ili organizaciji. U celom regionu dominantan je narativ da je politika „prljava igra“ u kojoj mladi ne žele da učestvuju. Slabo funkcionisanje demokratskih institucija, nepotizam, korupcija i spor ekonomski rast uticali su na negativnu percepciju političkog angažovanja kod mladih što je dovelo do apstinencije kao vida otpora mladih prema sistemu. Iako u velikoj meri opravdano imaju izneverena očekivanja, mladi u regionu treba da postanu svesni da su oni glavni nosioci promena u društvu i da treba da učestvuju u procesima koji direktno ili indirektno utiču na kvalitet njihovog života. Na mladima sve(t) ostaje.
Andrea Trajković, diplomirana projektna menadžerka i omladinska aktivistkinja
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Good things come to those who wait – on 8th November 2023, the European Commission published the annual progress reports for the Western Balkan economies for 2023 – the new enlargement package and the Progress Report on European integration process for all WB6. How do these reports assess the progress made by these economies in 2023? To what extent do they address the issues and needs of young people, and do they take into account the involvement of youth in decision-making processes? Just to remind ourselves – Western Balkans consist of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo*[1] and this document conducts a comparative analysis of the reports for these economies, with focus on the youth perspective.
Are we in Serbia all reading the same the European Commission’s Report?
Public reaction to the Report in Serbia was as expected, given the election fervour – which is something we are not unfamiliar with. Serbia’s Prime Minister Ms. Ana Brnabić did not hide her satisfaction with the fact that the European Commission, as she said, “recognised the evident progress Serbia has made” in all key areas. On the other hand, civil society in Serbia does not share the same optimism as its decision-makers, and I’m uncertain whether the people of Serbia perceive the benefits of specific advancements. Whether due to the election campaign or the traditional avoidance of responsibility by public authorities, there has been a notable lack of more thorough commitment to the recommendations of the European Commission and the proposal of more concrete solutions. The impression lingers that we are not sure how to interpret this year’s EC’s Progress Report, or, legitimately, we raise the question: Are we all reading the sameReport? For nearly a decade, Serbia’s preparedness for EU membership has stagnated at the same level, and achieving substantial advancement requires more than superficial assessment that masks the reality.
We rarely receive a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ progress score, while for years now the discourse surrounding us concerns the limited progress score Serbia has made. Based on the Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth for 2023, annual research conducted by the National Youth Council of Serbia, youths who follow political situation in the country say they are most interested in corruption, criminal activity, and topics of national interest such as: Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia’s foreign policy, as well as economic topics concerning employment, the state of democracy and environmental protection.
We must remember that, to date, 22 out of 35 chapters have been opened, of which two have been temporarily closed. The opening of chapters, their closure, and the analysis of recommendations in the accession process to the European Union may seem like mere administrative activities, which they often are. However, what we must not lose sight of is that they relate to areas that affect the lives of each of us, regardless of our interests, occupation, place of residence, or personal values. In respect of EU accession and the sustainability of this type of supranational organisation, we may have different views, yet the defined chapters and criteria directly relate to our standard of living, health, rights, and participation. As such, they must not remain mere words on paper, regardless of our sentiments towards the EU.
The (un)important 16 percent of youth
Based on Serbia’s Law on Youth, anyone between the ages of 15 to 30 belong to the youth category. According to the 2022 census in Serbia, young people (15–29 years old) make up 15.76% of the population. Are our needs visible? And if so, to what extent?
In its report on economic criteria and the functionality of the market economy, the European Commission addresses the Youth Guarantee programme. Given that one of the most pressing issues facing youths is unemployment, implementation of the Youth Guarantee Plan should serve to facilitate entry into the labour market and the acquisition of the necessary skills. Why is this important and what is the Youth Guarantee exactly?
According to official data of the National Employment Service, the number of unemployed youths in May 2023 amounted to 75,526, which is 18.43% of the total number of unemployed persons. It is vital to mention that transition from school to the first stable and/or satisfactory job in the Republic of Serbia is very lengthy, taking almost two years, which means that we actively seek employment for a lot longer than our peers in EU countries[2]. Most youths don’t work in jobs they were educated to perform. Most believe that they need to know someone or to join a political party to secure employment, and at the same time, ‘under the table’ labour is prevalent in our country.
Youth Guarantee is a European mechanism intended to assist youths in overcoming the transition period between school, seeking employment and internships or further education and vocational training, and they function as a political requirement. What does this mean? This programme is a political requirement of all EU member governments ensuring that young people receive quality offers in reference to: employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship, and given that the period of entry into the labour market for youths is not easy, we can easily understand the significance of this type of systemic support. This obligation must be fulfilled by governments within four months upon the loss of employment or upon the completion of education. A portion of the responsibility and decision-making is on us as individuals, but the state is the one obligated to facilitate this process and ensure the collaboration of all societal sectors – the public sector, employers, the civil sector, local self-governments, etc. The Protocol on Cooperation in the Youth Guarantee Program is signed between Serbia and the EU in July 2023.
The Progress Report for Serbia also refers to the continuation of the My First Salary programme which supports youth employment. The programme is implemented through four phases. The first phase is intended for employers interested in participating in the programme. Following this is the registration of unemployed persons, while the third phase deals with candidate selection. The fourth phase of programme implementation is the signing of a three-party contract between the National Employment Service, the employer and the chosen candidate. A ‘detail’ that clouds the idyllic image of state intervention is that this programme is implemented over a period of nine months without the candidate establishing an employment relationship. This means that young people lack proper working conditions and the right to social security, regulated days off, and the health insurance they receive is limited in scope. Furthermore, the state will pay out monthly cash compensation to youths with a secondary education in the amount of RSD 28,000, while youths with a higher education will receive RSD 34,000. And, considering that the average consumer basket in August of 2023 amounted to over RSD 100,000, the title of the programme which includes the word ‘salary’, should be altered, as it’s hardly the case that we can legitimately call the provided compensations ‘salaries’. Based on the Research, most youths consider a salary of over RSD 110,000 sufficient to secure a decent living[3]. Add to this that nearly 18% of youths are employed ‘under the table’, and combine this with the fact that youths do not trust our government institutions, and on top of all this that they are exposed to physical and other forms of abuse on a daily basis – what we are left with is a situation where 50% of youths plan on leaving Serbia, while 40% do not yet plan to leave but have not written-off the possibility entirely. We must also take into account that economic migrations have contributed to reducing the youth unemployment rate.
The European Commission has provided recommendations on how to increase youth activity levels and reduce unemployment in the form of temporary employment which is the subject of the closed Chapter 26 – Education and Culture. These recommendations provide an overview of the situation and recommendations referring to secondary and higher education. They also address the development of necessary skills required for the labour market, insufficient opportunities for requalification, and the importance of career guidance and counselling.
Good things come to those who (don’t) wait
The above mentioned Chapter refers also to the previously adopted laws and strategies – at the start of the year, the new, long awaited National Youth Strategy governing the priorities of youth policies until 2030 was adopted. This was followed by the adoption of the Action Plan for the period 2030 to 2050, concerning the implementation of the Youth Strategy. The Action Plan, as a public policy document, operationalises the overall and special goals established in the Strategy; it prioritises the time needed to achieve concrete measures and defines necessary financial assets required for its implementation. On the other hand, we’re still awaiting the adoption of relevant laws which will improve the position and rights of youths.
How far have we come in terms of the Law on Youth? The new Law on Youth has yet to be adopted. However, unlike the previous ministry responsible for youth, the Ministry of Tourism and Youth has started working on the development of a new law through working groups which are currently reviewing a draft copy of the law. Following this, we can expect a public debate to be held. The group is currently working on amendments to the Law on Volunteering, and when it comes to the Law on Internships, a draft copy exists, yet there seems to be a lack of political will. It isn’t unheard of in our country for all further traces of draft laws and the continuation of other processes to be lost in the election process. Furthermore, even when expected to take place, it isn’t unfamiliar for public debates to be held over the holidays or summer months, and information regarding when/where they are to be held is provided as though state secrets are in question.
About Youths – with youths
One point in Serbia’s favour – the European Commission prised the renewed activity of the Youth Council of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, an advisory body which encourages activities concerning the development, realisation, and implementation of youth policy, proposing measures for its improvement. Alongside government bodies, members of the Council include experts and other actors, as well as youth representatives who advocate for the views of young people in Serbia. While there is a noticeable difference in the frequency and methods of holding sessions of the current Council compared to previous terms, there is still room for improvement, given that the new Law on Youth emphasises the importance of this opportunity. Council sessions are a platform for youth representatives to address important youth issues. Therefore, it is crucial that representatives of other ministries, as well as other Council members, actively participate and demonstrate a willingness to implement agreed-upon measures. The mandate of the current Council lasts under the current government’s term, and frequent electoral processes in our country hinder a more in-depth commitment to problem-solving due to the frequency of institutional changes.
The newly designated ministry responsible for youth is the Ministry of Tourism and Youth. This institutional change did not entail a systematic change that would further stimulate intersectoral cooperation. What does this mean? According to the latest date, currently there are 11 of a total of 17 envisaged posts filled in the Youth Sector. The situation is somewhat improved in comparison to the previous ministry but we still face a lack of human resources which impedes processes and implementation.
Additionally, we must always bear in mind that youth are a heterogenous group, meaning that even among youths, needs and lifestyles vary. In particular, we are referring to youths who live in urban areas and their peers living in smaller communities in Serbia. This is why mechanisms that will enable youth participation at the local level are crucial. Almost 50% of local self-government units lack local youth councils, and those that do have them, have councils that are often dysfunctional and non-inclusive bodies. To summarise, just as there is a national youth council, we also need functional participation mechanisms locally, such as youth councils, youth offices, local action plans, the financing of local youth policies and youth spaces.
Progress Report concerning neighbouring economies
What do the reports of neighbouring WB economy indicate? In terms of Albania and the fulfilment of this country’s economic criteria, the Report also refers to its readiness to implement the Youth Guarantee. Let us remind you that in 2022, Tirana held the title of European Youth Capital, resulting in a diverse range of content and activities for youth residing in this city and the region. As highlighted by the European Commission, the title enhanced both local and national ecosystem relative to youth policy development. In addition to indicators which show that it has not yet secured systemic functionality in social services, innovation, and employability, Albania made sound progress in these areas over the reporting period.
In line with the previous report’s recommendations, the National Employment and Skills Development Strategy for 2023-2030 was adopted. The strategy focuses on quality employment, skills’ development and better harmonisation in terms of demand and supply on the labour market. The strategy prioritises systematic engagement of the private sector in vocational education and training, as well as the development of green and digital skills through a lifelong learning system. Furthermore, the National Youth Guarantee Action Plan was approved, and in the coming year Albania should start with the piloting of the Youth Guarantee, with particular focus on NEET youth (those who are Not in Education, Employment, or Training education). The National Youth Strategy for 2022-2029 was adopted in October 2022 and also addresses the issue of gender-based violence, fostering skills that promote the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of young women and men.
In the European Commission’s Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina, focus is also on youth employment issues. Youth unemployment (15-24 years of age) has returned to pre Covid pandemic levels, at nearly 30%. High unemployment has persisted for years due to challenges related to skill mismatches, slow job creation rates, and inadequate tax solutions. Also, there is a significant gender gap present, with women’s unemployment rates higher than those for men. At the same time necessary reforms in public employment services are hindered by limited budgetary and human resources.
Bosnia and Herzegovina still holds ‘low quality’ scores in innovation and education due to unyielding skills mismatches. What does this mean, in fact? The education system in BiH fails to provide the work force with the skills and know-how required for unhindered integration into the labour market. Thus, inadequate education is an important factor impacting the exceptionally high level of unemployment among youths. Curriculum plans and programmes remain outdated and are insufficiently compliant with the real needs of the country, while in terms of the entire population, there continues to be a large share of underqualified individuals.
In respect of social policies and employment, BiH has achieved a certain level of preparedness, mostly in terms of the recommendation referring to the drafting of an Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee. The Commissions’ previous year’s recommendations have been implemented only partially and thusly remain in force. In the coming year, this country should adopt an Employment strategy at both the legal entity and state levels, and to also adopt an Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee which is in line with EU guidelines. Emphasis is placed on the drafting of a Youth National Strategy which should ensure the equal treatment of youth in society.
The situation in Montenegro is quite similar to that of the region, with youth unemployment issues, i.e., nearly 30% of youths fall under this category. Readiness for reforms by the Employment Agency of Montenegro is regarded by the European Commission as an important step towards implementing the Youth Guarantee and achieving a functional labour market. In July 2021, Montenegro adopted the Western Balkans Declaration on ensuring the sustainable integration of young people into the labour market, committing to taking concrete steps for the gradual introduction and implementation of the Youth Guarantee.
Similar to Serbia, the inhabitants of Montenegro are awaiting the completion of important legislative processes that would normatively regulate the rights of young people in the country. The agenda includes the adoption of amendments to the Law on Youth, a new Youth Strategy (as the previous version covered the period until 2020), and the adoption of an Action Plan for its implementation. As stated in the report, this strategy would operationalise youth centres in the country, emphasising their importance as one of the mechanisms of youth policy.
Concerning North Macedonia, young people are also recognised as a vulnerable target group facing difficulties in the labour market. North Macedonia was the first economy in the Western Balkans to introduce a form of Youth Guarantee in 2018. From 2018 to 2022, the youth unemployment rate decreased by almost 13%, despite the Employment Agency operating with insufficient human resources. Although North Macedonia serves as an example of good practice for neighbouring countries, the European Commission emphasises that labour market inactivity remains particularly high for women compared to men. The recommendation is to intensively continue the implementation of this plan, with focus on society’s vulnerable groups. The country has a National Employment Strategy 2021-2027, an Employment Action Plan 2021-2023, and a new plan for the implementation of Youth Guarantees 2023-2026, which was adopted in March 2023. The Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policy, adopted in 2020, regulates various issues in the field of youth policy, particularly youth organisation, youth participation in decision-making, documents of youth practical policy, activities, and measures at the national and local levels. During the reporting period, the National Youth Strategy for 2023-2027 was developed and is awaiting adoption. An open question remains regarding the alignment of the adopted regulatory acts with the country’s real capacities for their implementation.
The European Commissions’ Kosovo* report addresses the volunteering environment, aiming for improvement. This includes establishing an appropriate legislative framework in line with international standards and allocating financial and human resources for youth volunteering programmes. A multi-year plan for the implementation of Youth Guarantees has been adopted, and reforms of public employment services are underway, with the Kosovo Employment Agency appointed as the coordinating body. Key efforts were made during the initial phase of scheme implementation. The Ministry of Culture, Youth, Sports, and Innovation established a working group to act as a focal point for implementing Youth Guarantees. Factors directly complicating the situation of improving employability in Kosovo* include the intensive presence of the informal economy and education system deficiencies. Throughout the year, work has been done to secure conditions for piloting Youth Guarantees in two municipalities, amending relevant legislation, and restructuring the public employment service.
The recommendations are there, but where does the responsibility lie?
Various chapters of European Commission reports touch upon the position and issues of young people, providing a brief overview of past achievements and further recommendations. Understandably, due to the extensive nature of the reports, thematic areas, and recommendations, there isn’t more specific focus on young people as a distinct target group. On the other hand, in practice, the youth issue is dealt with in other defined chapters, meaning that we are a horizontal group that should be included in social policy, employment, freedom, security, education, environmental protection, climate change, and other areas.
The conclusion of this comparative analysis is that none of the WB economies stand out particularly where youth policy is concerned. The focuses of the presented European Commission packages are youth employability, innovative approaches to employability and education, reducing the NEET rate among youth, and gender inequalities. Differences mainly exist in normative processes, namely the timeliness of adopting legislative acts. While some economies are still awaiting draft laws and their adoption, others can serve as examples of good or bad practices from which processes may be learned. This mutual strength and source of information, both among decision-makers and young people in the region exchanging experiences, are crucial. Successful youth policy involving young people in decision-making lies in having both regional and cross-sectoral cooperation, encompassing all societal actors from the public, private, civil sectors, media, professional communities, and young people themselves.
The European Commission’s legitimacy lies in actively engaging young people at every stage of decision-making processes, emphasising the establishment and oversight of mechanisms that facilitate youth involvement in these processes. European Commission recommendations hold both political and legal significance. Nevertheless, the implementation of measures and responsibility lie with decision-makers and other state actors. Still, policies aimed at young people should be created by us, the young people. Aligning European and national expertise with the actual needs of young people should be standard practice. Involving young people in decision-making can impact the existing level of trust in institutions, interest and activism in the politics around us, and youth attitudes toward the European Union. For example, the positive reaction of young people in Serbia to the EU is at a record low, with 41% of youths who do not support Serbia’s entry into the EU. Therefore, due to the geopolitical situation in the region and the general decline in support for the accession process, it appears that the European Commission has used the momentum of the reports to gain stronger sympathies and strengthen influence on WB economies. The conclusion of the Youth Progress Index 2023 research, conducted by the European Youth Forum, the largest platform of European youth organisations, indicates that despite progress in certain areas, stagnation persists concerning the rights and freedoms of young people, equal access to education, justice, political freedoms, freedom of religion, air quality, and housing policy.
It is important for us to discuss young people as a distinct target group and for them to be involved in making both national and local decisions. Within such a system, we have our rights and obligations, as well as responsibilities. However, the responsibility of young people and decision-makers in these processes cannot be at the same level.
Author: Jelena Dadić, Youth Policy and Communication Consultant
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
[1] Note: The asterisk does not prejudge Kosovo’s status and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/1999, as well as the International Court of Justice opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of independence.
[2] Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth for 2023, National Youth Council of Serbia
[3] Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth, Youth Umbrella Organisation of Serbia, 2023.
Čekali i dočekali – Evropska komisija je 8. novembra objavila godišnji izvještaj o napretku regiona za 2023. godinu, odnosno, novi paket proširenja i Izvještaj o evrointegraciji za sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana. Kakva je ocjena napretka ovih zemalja u ovogodišnjim izvještajima, u kojoj mjeri se oni bave i pitanjima i potrebama mladih, odnosno, uzimaju li u obzir učešće mladih u procesima donošenja odluka? Podsjetimo se, Zapadni Balkan čine Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Crna Gora, Sjeverna Makedonija, Srbija i Kosovo*[1], a tekst se bavi uporednom analizom izvještaja za navedene zemlje sa fokusom na omladinsku perspektivu.
Čitamo li svi u Srbiji isti izjveštaj Evropske komisije?
Reakcije javnosti na izvještaj u Srbiji bile su očekivane, uzimajući u obzir izbornu poletnost, koja nam nije strana. Premijerka Srbije Ana Brnabić nije krila zadovoljstvo, jer je Evropska komisija, kako kaže, „prepoznala jasan napredak Srbije“ u svim ključnim oblastima. Sa druge strane, civilno društvo u Srbiji ne izražava jednaku pozitivnost kao donosioci odluka, a nisam sigurna ni da građani i građanke Srbije osjećaju blagodeti određenog napretka. Da li zbog same izborne kampanje ili tradicionalnog bijega od odgovornosti javnih vlasti, izostalo je temeljnije posvećivanje preporukama Evropske komisije i predlaganje konkretnijih rješ0nja. Ostaje utisak da nismo sigurni kako da čitamo ovogodišnje izvještaje Evropske komisije, odnosno, legitimno postavljamo pitanje: Čitamo li svi isti izvještaj? Skoro deceniju, pripremljenost Srbije za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji stagnira na istom mjestu, a za ozbiljan pomak potrebno nam je više od prolazne ocene kojom ćemo zamaskirati realnost.
Ocjenu veoma dobrog i dobrog napretka rijetko kada čujemo, dok se godinama oko nas vrti diskurs o ograničenom napretku Srbije. Na osnovu Alternativnog izvještaja o položaju i potrebama mladih za 2023. godinu, istraživanja koje svake godine sprovodi Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije, mladi koji prate politička dešavanja izjašnjavaju se da ih najviše interesuju teme korupcije i kriminala, zatim nacionalne teme – Kosovo, spoljna politika Srbije, ali i ekonomske teme zapošljavanja, stanja demokratije i zaštite životne sredine.
Podsjetimo se, do danas je otvoreno 22 od 35 poglavlja od čega su dva privremeno zatvorena. Otvaranje poglavlja, zatvaranje istih, kao i analiza preporuka izvještaja u procesu pristupanja Uniji naizgled deluju kao puke administrativne aktivnosti, što često i jesu, ali ono što ne smijemo izgubiti iz vida jeste da se one odnose na oblasti koje utiču na živote svakoga od nas, bez obzira na naša interesovanja, vrstu zanimanja, mjesto stanovanja ili naše lične vrijednosti. U vezi sa procesom pristupanja Evropskoj uniji, kao i o održivosti ovakve nadnacionalne organizacije možemo imati različite stavove, ali definisana poglavlja i kriterijumi u direktnoj su vezi sa našim životnim standardom, zdravljem, pravima i participacijom i kao takvi ne smiju ostati mrtvo slovo na papiru, bez obzira na naše sentimente ka Evropskoj uniji.
(Ne)važnih 16 odsto
Na osnovu Zakona o mladima u Srbiji, sva lica od 15 do navršenih 30 godina života smatraju se mladim, a prema popisu iz 2022. godine, mladi (15–29 godina) čine 15,76 odsto populacije u Srbiji. Jesu li i koliko naše potrebe vidljive?
Evropska komisija se, u svom izvještaju u okviru ekonomskih kriterijuma i funkcionisanja tržišne ekonomije, osvrće na program Garancija za mlade. Uzimajući u obzir da je jedan od najvećih problema mladih upravo nezaposlenost, implementacija plana Garancija za mlade trebalo bi da nam olakša sam ulazak na tržište rada i sticanje potrebnih vještina. Zbog čega je ovo važno i šta su tačno Garancije za mlade?
Prema zvaničnim podacima Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje broj mladih koji su nezaposleni u maju 2023. godine iznosio je 75.526 što predstavlja ukupno 18,43 odsto od celokupnog broja nezaposlenih. Važno je pomenuti i da tranzicija od škole do prvog stabilnog i/ili zadovoljavajućeg posla u Republici Srbiji traje veoma dugo, skoro dvije godine, što znači da posao u Srbiji aktivno tražimo mnogo duže nego naši vršnjaci u zemljama Evropske unije.[2] Većina mladih ne radi na poziciji za koju su se školovali, mnogi vjeruju da su za dobijanje posla primarna lična poznanstva i članstvo u političkoj partiji, dok su u našoj zemlji i dalje prisutni slučajevi „rada na crno“, odnosno neprijavljivanja zaposlenih lica.
Garancije za mlade jesu evropski mehanizam koji treba da pomogne mladima da što lakše prebrode prelazni period nakon završenog školovanja, traženja posla, prakse ili dodatnog školovanja i usavršavanja, a funkcionišu u vidu političke obaveze. Šta to znači? Ovaj program predstavlja političku obavezu svih vlada država članica Evropske unije da obezbijede mladim ljudima kvalitetnu ponudu za: zapošljavanje, nastavak obrazovanja, praksu ili obuku, a uzimajući u obzir da period ulaska na tržište rada mladima nije nimalo lak, neće nam biti teško da shvatimo značaj ove sistemske podrške. Država ovu obavezu mora ispuniti u roku od četiri meseca od gubitka posla, odnosno, završetka školovanja. Dio odgovornosti i odluke je svakako na nama, ali država je ta koja ima obavezu da nam olakša ovaj proces i obezbijedi saradnju svih sektora u društvu – javnog sektora, poslodavaca, civilnog sektora, lokalnih samouprava, itd. Srbija je sa Evropskom unijom potpisala Protokol o saradnji na programu Garancija za mlade u julu ove godine.
Izvještaj se dotiče i nastavka programa Moja prva plata koji podstiče zapošljavanje mladih. Program se realizuje kroz četiri faze, a prva je namjenjena isključivo poslodavcima koji su zainteresovani da učestvuju u programu. Potom je na redu prijava nezaposlenih lica, dok će se treća faza programa odnositi na izbor kandidata od strane poslodavaca. Četvrta faza realizacije programa podrazumeva potpisivanje trojnog ugovora između Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje, poslodavca i izabranog kandidata. „Detalj“ koji remeti idiličnu sliku državne intervencije jeste da se ovaj program realizuje u trajanju od devet meseci bez zasnivanja radnog odnosa, što znači da mladi nemaju adekvatne uslove rada i pravo na socijalno osiguranje, regulisane slobodne dane, a zdravstveno osiguranje koje dobijaju je ograničenog karaktera. Takođe, država će na mjesečnom nivou isplaćivati mladima sa srednjim obrazovanjem novčanu naknadu u iznosu od 28.000 dinara, dok će mladi sa visokim obrazovanjem dobijati 34.000 dinara. Uzimajući u obzir da je prosječna potrošačka korpa u avgustu 2023. godine iznosila više od 100.000 dinara, naziv programa koji sadrži riječ plata trebalo bi redefinisati, jer se legitimno pitamo da li ovo uopšte možemo nazvati platom. Na osnovu istraživanja, najveći procenat mladih smatra da je plata od više od 110.000 dinara dovoljna za pristojan život[3]. Na ovo dodajte podatak da skoro 18 odsto mladih ljudi radi na crno, promešajte sa informacijom da mladi nemaju povjerenja u institucije u našoj zemlji, začinite time da su na dnevnom nivou izloženi fizičkom i drugim oblicima nasilja i dobićete odličan recept kako 50 odsto mladih planira da napusti Srbiju, dok 40 odsto njih ne planira trenutno, ali ne otpisuje tu mogućnost. Moramo uzeti u obzir i da zasluge za smanjenje stope nezaposlenosti mladih imaju i ekonomske migracije.
Evropska komisija ukratko daje preporuke za povećanje stope aktivnosti mladih i smanjenje nezaposlenosti u okviru privremeno zatvorenog Poglavlja 26 – Obrazovanje i kultura. U njima se daje pregled stanja i preporuka u oblasti srednjeg i visokog obrazovanja, ali se dotiče i razvoja neophodnih vještina za tržište rada, nedovoljnih mogućnosti za prekvalifikaciju i značaja karijernog vođenja i savetovanja.
Ko (ne) čeka – taj dočeka
Gore pomenuto poglavlje ukratko se dotiče i prethodno usvojenih zakona i strategija – početkom godine je usvojena nova dugoočekivana Nacionalna strategija za mlade koja određuje prioritete omladinske politike do 2030. godine, a potom je usvojen i Akcioni plan za period od 2023. do 2025. godine za sprovođenje Strategije za mlade. Akcioni plan, kao dokument javne politike, operacionalizuje opšte i posebne ciljeve postavljene Strategijom, definiše prioritete u pogledu vremena ostvarivanja konkretnih mera i precizira neophodna finansijska sredstava za njihovo sprovođenje. Sa druge strane, još uvek čekamo na bitne zakone koji se tiču unapređenja položaja i prava mladih.
Dokle smo stigli sa Zakonom o mladima? Novi Zakon o mladima još uvek nije usvojen, ali za razliku od prethodnog resornog ministarstva za mlade, Ministarstvo turizma i omladine otpočelo je rad na izradi novog zakona, kroz rad Radnih grupa koje razmatraju nacrt zakona, nakon čega nas očekuje održavanje javne rasprave. U toku je rad radne grupe za izmjene i dopune Zakona o volontiranju, a kada se radi o Zakonu o radnoj praksi – nacrt postoji, ali očigledno ne i politička volja. Nije nam strano da se u kontekstu procesa izbora, nacrtima zakona i nastavku započetih procedura u našoj zemlji gubi svaki trag. Takođe, nije nam strano da se čak i kada dočekamo proces javnih rasprava, one održavaju za vrijeme praznika ili sezona odmora, a informacije o njihovom održavanju nerijetko dobijamo kao da su u pitanju tajni državni podaci.
O mladima sa mladima
Jedan plus za Srbiju – Evropska komisija pohvalila je obnovljenu aktivnost Saveta za mlade Vlade Republike Srbije, savjetodavnog tijela koje podstiče aktivnosti u vezi sa razvojem, ostvarivanjem i sprovođenjem omladinske politike i predlaže mjere za njeno unapređivanje. Članovi Savjeta pored organa državne uprave, kancelarija za mlade jesu eksperti/kinje i drugi akteri, ali i predstavnici mladih koji zastupaju stavove mladih u Srbiji. Iako možemo primetiti osetnu razliku u učestalosti i načinima održavanja sednica aktuelnog Savjeta za razliku od prethodnih saziva, a ako uzmemo u obzir da se i novi Zakon o mladima dotiče važnosti postojanja ove mogućnosti, prostor za unapređenje još uvijek postoji. Sjednice Savjeta jesu mjesto za predstavnike mladih da adresiraju važna omladinska pitanja, stoga je važno da i predstavnici drugih ministarstava, kao i drugi članovi Savjeta budu aktivan dio ovog tijela i pokažu spremnost da dogovorene mjere zaista budu i primjenjene. Mandat tekućeg Savjeta traje do vremena aktuelnog saziva Vlade, a učestali izborni procesi u našoj zemlji onemogućavaju dublje posvećivanje rješavanju problema, usljed frekventnosti institucionalnih promjena.
Novo resorno ministarstvo zaduženo za mlade jeste Ministarstvo turizma i omladine, a ova institucionalna promjena nije podrazumijevala i sistemsku promenu koja bi još više podstakla međusektorsku saradnju. Šta to znači? Prema posljednjim podacima, u Sektoru za omladinu trenutno radi 11 zaposlenih od ukupno 17 predviđenih radnih mjesta. Situacija jeste nešto bolja u odnosu na prethodno ministarstvo, ali i dalje se suočavamo sa nedostatkom ljudskih resursa koji koči procese i implementaciju.
Takođe, ono što uvijek treba imati u vidu jeste da su mladi heterogena grupacija, što znači da i među samim mladima postoje razlike u potrebama i načinu života, najprije govoreći o mladima koji žive u gradovima i o njihovim vršnjacima u manjim mjestima u Srbiji. Zato su nam veoma važni mehanizmi učešča mladih i na lokalnom nivou. Skoro 50 odsto jedinica lokalne samouprave nema formirane lokalne savjete za mlade, a one koje imaju, često se radi o nefunkcionalnim i neinkluzivnim telima. Dakle, kao što postoji nacionalni Savjet za mlade, tako su nam i na lokalu potrebni funkcionalni mehanizmi učešća kao što su savjeti za mlade, kancelarije za mlade, lokalni akcioni planovi, finansiranje lokalne omladinske politike i omladinski prostori.
Analiza napretka u komšiluku
Šta kažu izvještaji ostalih zemalja na Zapadnom Balkanu? Kada se radi o Albaniji i o ispunjenosti ekonomskih kriterijuma za ovu državu, izvještaj se takođe dotiče pripremljenosti ove zemlje za implementaciju Garancija za mlade. Podsetimo se, u 2022. godini Tirana je nosila titulu Evropske prijestonice mladih, što je rezultiralo postojanjem raznolikih sadržaja i aktivnosti za mlade iz ovog grada, ali i iz regiona, a kako ističe i Evropska komisija, ova titula unaprijedila je lokalni i nacionalni ekosistem za razvoj omladinskih politika. Pored naznake da još uvijek nije obezbijedila sistemsku funkcionalnost na poljima socijalnih usluga, inovacija i zapošljivosti, Albanija je ostvarila dobar napredak u ovim oblastima u toku izvještajnog perioda.
U skladu sa preporukama iz posljednjeg izveštaja, usvojena je nova Nacionalna strategija zapošljavanja i vještina 2023-2030 koja se fokusira se na kvalitet poslova, razvoj vještina i bolje usklađivanje potražnje i ponude na tržištu rada. Ona daje prioritet sistematskom angažovanju privatnog sektora u stručnom obrazovanju i obuci, kao i razvoju zelenih i digitalnih vještina kroz sistem celoživotnog učenja. Takođe, odobren je Nacionalni plan implementacije šeme Garancija za mlade, dok bi u narednoj godini Albanija trebalo da započne pilotiranje Garancija za mlade, sa posebnim fokusom na NEET mlade (one koji nisu u obrazovnom sistemu, zaposleni ili na obuci/neformalnom obrazovanju). Nacionalna strategija za mlade 2022-2029 usvojena je u oktobru 2022. godina i dotiče se i oblasti rodno zasnovanog nasilja, njegovanjem vještina koje promovišu emocionalnu, psihološku i fizičku sigurnost mladih žena i muškaraca.
U izvještaju za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, takođe je u fokusu problem zapošljivosti mladih. Nezaposlenost mladih (15-24 godine) vratila se na nivo prije pandemije Kovida i na stopu od skoro 30 odsto nezaposlenih mladih. Visoka nezaposlenost traje godinama zbog izazova povezanih sa neusklađenošću vještina, nedovoljnim tempom otvaranja radnih mesta i neadekvatim poreskim rešenjima. Takođe, postoji značajan rodni jaz, sa stopama nezaposlenosti žena većim od onih za muškarce, dok neophodne reforme javne službe za zapošljavanje onemogućavaju ograničeni budžetski i ljudski resursi.
U oblasti inovacija i obrazovanja, BiH i dalje ima ocjenu lošeg kvaliteta zbog kontinuirane neusklađenosti vještina. Šta ovo, u stvari znači? Obrazovni sistem u BiH ne uspjeva da radnoj snazi obezbijedi vještine i znanja neophodna za nesmetanu integraciju na tržište rada, te je neadekvatno obrazovanje važan faktor za posebno visoku stopu nezaposlenosti mladih. Nastavni planovi i programi i dalje su zastareli i još uvijek nisu dovoljno usklađeni sa realnim potrebama zemlje, dok u cjelokupnoj populaciji i dalje postoji veliki udio niskokvalifikovanih ljudi.
U oblasti socijalne politike i zapošljavanja, BiH je ostvarila određeni nivo pripremljenosti, najviše u vezi sa preporukom koja se odnosi na izradu plana implementacije Garancija za mlade. Preporuke Komisije od prošle godine su samo djelimično sprovedene i stoga ostaju na snazi. U narednoj godini ova država bi trebalo da usvoji strategije zapošljavanja na nivou entiteta i na nivou cijele zemlje, ali i da usvoji plan implementacije Garancija za mlade u skladu sa smernicama EU. Naglasak se stavlja i na izradu Nacionalne strategije za mlade koja bi trebalo da obijezbedi ravnopravan tretman mladih u društvu.
Situacija u Crnoj Gori ne odskače mnogo od situacije u regionu, sa problemom nezaposlenosti mladih od skoro 30 odsto. Spremnost na reforme od strane Zavoda za zapošljavanje Crne Gore, Evropska komisija vidi kao važnu stepenicu ka implementaciji Garancija za mlade, ali i za funkcionalno tržište rada. Crna Gora je u julu 2021. godine usvojila Deklaraciju Zapadnog Balkana o obezbjeđivanju održive integracije mladih na tržište rada i obavezala se da će preduzeti konkretne korake za postepeno uvođenje i implementaciju Garancije za mlade.
Slično kao i u Srbiji, i građani i građanke Crne Gore čekaju završtetak važnih zakonodavnih procesa koji bi normativno uredili prava mladih u zemlji. Na redu je usvajanje izmene i dopune Zakona o mladima, nove Strategije za mlade s obzirom na to da se prethodna odnosila na period do 2020. godine, ali i usvajanje Akcionog plana za njenu implementaciju. Kako se navodi u izveštaju, ova Strategija bi operacionalizovala i omladinske centre u zemlji, a od značaja je još jednom podvući njihovu važnost kao jednog od mehanizama omladinske politike.
Kada se radi o Sjevernoj Makedoniji, mladi su takođe prepoznati kao osjetljiva ciljna grupa koja se suočava sa poteškoćama na tržištu rada. Sjeverna Makedonija je prva ekonomija Zapadnog Balkana koja je uvela jedan oblik garancija za mlade 2018. godine. U periodu od 2018. do 2022. godine učešće nezaposlenosti mladih je smanjeno za gotovo 13 odsto, i pored toga što Zavod za zapošljavanje funkcioniše sa nedovoljno ljudskih resursa. Iako Sjeverna Makedonija predstavlja primer dobre prakse za zemlje iz komšiluka, Evropska komisija podvlači da je neaktivnost na tržištu rada i dalje posebno velika za žene, u odnosu na muškarce. Preporuka jeste da se intenzivno nastavi implementacija ovog plana, sa fokusom na ugrožene grupe u društvu. U državi postoje Nacionalna strategija zapošljavanja 2021-2027, kao i Akcioni plan zapošljavanja 2021-2023, a novi plan za implementaciju Garancija za mlade 2023-2026 usvojen je u martu 2023. godine. Zakon o participaciji mladih i omladinskoj politici donet je 2020. godine i uređuje brojna pitanja iz domena omladinske politike, a posebno omladinsko organizovanje, participaciju mladih u donošenju odluka, dokumenta omladinske praktične politike, aktivnosti i mjere na nacionalnom i lokalnom nivou. U izvještajnom periodu izrađena je Nacionalna strategija za mlade za 2023-2027, koja čeka da bude usvojena. Ostaje otvoreno pitanje koliko su u skladu donijeti normativni akti sa realnim kapacitetima zemlje za njihovu implementaciju.
Evropska komisija u izvještaju koji se odnosi na Kosovo* dotakla se okruženja za volontiranje koje bi trebalo poboljšati, uključujući uspostavljanje odgovarajućeg zakonodavnog okvira usklađenog sa međunarodnim standardima i izdvajanjem finansijskih i ljudskih resursa za omladinske programe volontiranja. Usvojen je višegodišnji plan implementacije Garancija za mlade, a u toku su reforme javnih službi za zapošljavanje, a Kosovska agencija za zapošljavanje imenovana je kao koordinaciono telo. Učinjen je ključni napor u toku prve faze implementacije ove šeme, a Ministarstvo za kulturu, omladinu, sport i inovacije osnovalo je radnu grupu koja će djelovati kao fokalna tačka za implementaciju Garancija za mlade. Faktori koji direktno otežavaju situaciju unapređenja zapošljivosti na Kosovu* svakako jesu intenzivno prisustvo sive ekonomije, kao i manjkavosti obrazovnog sistema. U toku godine, radilo se na obezbeđivanju uslova za pilotiranje Garancija za mlade u dvije opštine, na izmjenama relevantnog zakonodavstva, kao i na restrukturiranju javne službe za zapošljavanje.
Preporuke su tu, gdje je odgovornost?
Izvještaji Evropske komisije u dijelovima pojedinih poglavlja dotiču se položaja i problema mladih, dajući kratki osvrt na prethodna postignuća, kao i dalje preporuke. Razumljivo, zbog obima samih izvještaja, tematskih oblasti i preporuka, ne postoji nešto konkretniji fokus ka mladima kao specifičnoj ciljnoj grupi. Sa druge strane, mladi kao takvi u praksi jesu dio i drugih definisanih poglavlja, što bi značilo da smo horizontalna grupa koja bi trebalo da bude uključena i u pitanja socijalnih politika, zapošljavanja, slobode, bezbednosti, obrazovanja, zaštite životne sredine i klimatskih promena i ostalih oblasti.
Zaključak ove uporedne analize jeste da se nijedna zemlja Zapadnog Balkana posebno ne izdvaja, kada se radi o oblasti omladinske politike. U fokusima paketa predstavljenih od strane Evropske komisije jesu zapošljivost mladih, inovativni pristupi zapošljivosti i obrazovanju, smanjenje stope NEET mladih, kao i rodnih nejednakosti. Razlike uglavnom postoje u normativnim procesima, odnosno, pravovremenosti donošenja zakonodavnih akata. Dok neke od zemalja još uvijek čekaju na nacrte zakona i usvajanje istih, druge države mogu poslužiti kao primjeri dobre ili loše prakse od čijih procesa možemo učiti. Upravo ovo predstavlja međusobnu snagu i izvor informisanja, kako u odnosu između donosilaca odluka, tako i među samim mladima u regionu koji razmenjuju sopstvena iskustva. Ključno je istaći da uspješna omladinska politika koja uključuje mlade u donošenje odluka leži u postojanju kako regionalne, tako i međusektorske saradnje koja uključuje sve aktere u društvu, od javnog, privatnog, civilnog sektora, medija, stručne zajednice, ali i samih mladih.
Ono za šta Evropska komisija poseduje legitimitet i na čemu bi trebalo insistirati jeste uključivanje mladih u sve faze procesa donošenja odluka, kao i formiranje i monitoring nad mehanizmima kroz koje se mladi uključuju u procese. Preporuke Evropske komisije imaju svoju političku i pravnu težinu, implementacija mjera i odgovornost jesu na donosiocima odluka i drugim državnim akterima, ali politike usmjerene na mlade trebalo bi da budu kreirane i od strane nas mladih. Ukrštanje evropske i nacionalne ekspertize sa realnim stanjem potreba mladih trebalo bi da bude podrazumjevajući standard. Uključivanje mladih u donošenje odluka može uticati na postojeći nivo povjerenja u institucije, zainteresovanost i aktivizam u politici oko nas, kao i na stavove mladih prema Evropskoj uniji. Na primjer, pozitivna reakcija mladih na Evropsku uniju u Srbiji je na rekordno niskom nivou, a 41 odsto mladih ne podržava ulazak Srbije u Evropsku uniju. Stoga, stiče se utisak da je Evropska komisija što zbog geopolitičke situacije u regionu, što zbog opšteg opadanja podrške procesu pristupanja, iskoristila momentum izvještaja za čvršće simpatije i jačanje uticaja na zemlje Zapadnog Balkana. Zaključak istraživanja Indeksa napretka mladih (Youth Progress Index 2023) koji realizuje Evropski omladinski forum, najveća platforma omladinskih organizacija u Evropi, jeste da i pored napretka u pojedinim oblastima, postoje i stagnacije u vezi sa pravima i slobodama mladih, jednakim pristupom obrazovanju, pravdom, političkim slobodama, slobodom veroispovijesti, kvalitetom vazduha i stambenom politikom.
Važno nam je da se o mladima kao posebnoj ciljnoj grupi diskutuje i da kao takva bude uključena u donošenje kako nacionalnih, tako i lokalnih odluka. U tom sistemu, mi imamo naša prava i obaveze, kao i odgovornost. Ali, odgovornost mladih i donosilaca odluka u ovim procesima ne može biti na istom nivou.
Jelena Dadić, konsultantkinja u oblasti omladinske politike i komunikacija
* Izrada ove publikacije finansirana je od strane Evropske unije. Njen sadržaj je isključiva odgovornost Fondacije Centar za demokratiju i ne odražava nužno stavove Evropske unije.
* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
[1] Ova oznaka ne prejudicira status Kosova i u skladu je sa Rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti UN 1244/1999, kao i sa mišljenjem Međunarodnog suda pravde o kosovskoj deklaraciji nezavisnosti.
[2] Alternativni izveštaj o položaju i potrebama mladih, Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije, 2023.
[3] Alternativni izveštaj o položaju i potrebama mladih, Krovna organizacija mladih Srbije, 2023.
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